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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION
What is the self?

Each of us knows the meaning of this

term until we are asked to define it.

It is only then that

we realize that to give an accurate account of the self is
"the most difficult of philosophic tasks." 1

James

struggled with the problem of the self in a number of works
that spanned his entire philosophical career.

His radical

experiential approach to the problem of the self is still
being studied and interpreted by scholars today.

No teaching

of James, however, has been more subject to misunderstanding.
The philosophical literature surrounding James' theory
of the self continues to grow both in size and diversity.
Each interpreter of James tends to see his own James.
Interpretations of James' doctrine of the self have run the
gamut from those which insist he denies the existence of the
self to those which maintain he believes in a substantial
self.

There are those who feel that James identified the

self with the physical body and still others who are
convinced that he has reduced it to the present fleeting
pulse of consciousness.

Amongst Jamesian scholars, there

exist little agreement concerning the essense of his theory
of the self.

John Dewey once argued that James was moving

1
william James, The Principles of Psychology, 3 Vols.
ed. F. Burkhardt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981),
I, p. 220.
(Hereafter - Principles)
1

2

towards a behavioristic account of the self. 2

Milic C~pek

insists, however, that James rejected the behavioristic
interpretation of the self. 3

James Edie has recently tried

to demonstrate that James was really developing a
phenomenlogical approach to the problem of the self. 4

In

response to the growing phenomenological interpretation of
James, Andrew Reck has argued that James was steering a
middle course between Phenomenology and Behaviorism in his
treatment of the self. 5

As if the confusion created by

these conflicting interpretations wasn't enough, John Shea
has contributed to the controversy by arguing that James
offered numerous theories of the self that he never bothered
to reconcile. 6

As a whole, the literature on the Jamesian

self reflects the enormous amount of ambiguity and complexity
which is present in James' writings concerning the self.

It

is James' own confusing richness that has spawned such
diverse disciples.
2

John Dewey, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology
of James," Journal of Philosophy, 37 (1940), pp. 589-599.
3

Milic Capek, "The Reappearance of the Self in the Last
Philosophy of William James," Philosophical Review, 62 (1953),
p. 526.

4 James Edie, "The Genesis of a Phenomenological Theory
of the Experience of Personal Identity: William James on
Consciousness and the Self," Man and World, 6 (Summer, 1973)
pp. 293-312.
5

John Shea, "The Self in William James," Philosophy
Today, 17 (Winter, 1973), pp. 319-327.

3

Although the recent revival of interest in the
philosophy of William James has been mainly due to the
efforts of those thinkers who emphasize the phenomenological
and existential character of his thought, James has been the
subject of interest for a variety of philosophical camps.
James' Principles of Psychology has always managed to draw
the admiration of thinkers of different philosophical
persuasions.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Edmund Husser!, for

example, were both influenced by this work.

In the case of

the Principles of Psychology, one of the reasons for James'
ability to draw the attention of diverse philosophical
schools is his employment of two distinct methods of
psychological research:

(1) the method of introspection and

(2) the experimental method.

Because of this double strain,

James attracted the attention of behaviorists like Dewey and
Mead who warmly greeted his experimental method as well as
the admiration of phenomenologists like Husser! and MerleauPonty who were greatly impressed by the rich and penetrating
phenomenological descriptions gained by his introspective
method.
11

Dewey viewed James' dual methodology as constituting

two incompatible strains in the Jamesian psychology, 11 and he

noted that

11

the con£ lict between them is most mar ked in the

case of the sel£." 7

This mixing of methodologies is

surely no small factor in the growing number of disparate
interpretations of the Jamesian self.
7Dewey, £E· cit., p. 598.

4

To this mass of interpretations I now add my own view
of the Jamesian self.

My interpretation has been assisted by

the insights of James Edie, 8 Hans Linschoten, 9 John
WildlO and Bruce Wilshire. 11 These scholars have each
contributed important insights regarding the existential and
phenomenological orientation of James' thought especially
with regards to consciousness and embodiment.

These

commentators however, unlike myself, view the Jamesian self
as totally objective.

None argues as I do that the Jamesian

self is a unique and irreducible temporal process that flows
beyond the subjective-objective dichotomy.

Furthermore, none

of their treatments of the Jamesian self takes fully into
account the whole of James' thought on the self.

They have

mainly focused upon James' treatment of the self in chapter ten
of the Principles of Psychology.

Although this is the main

source for James' thought on the self, it should not serve as
the sole source for understanding James' long and continuous
struggle to grasp the meaning of personal existence.
8

James Edie, £E· cit.

9Hans Linshoten, On the Way Toward a Phenomenological
Psychology: The Psychology of William James (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1968).
10 John Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James,
(New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1969).
11 Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology: A
Study of "The Prineiples of Psychology," (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1968).

5

This study has two main objectives.

First, it will be

shown that there is present in James' writings a conception
of the self which has not yet been fully explored by any
Jamesian scholar.

Second, it will be argued that this

Jamesian account is one of the most thorough and honest
accounts of that mysterious part of reality we call the self.
The Jamesian account of the self that will be presented
and defended in this essay is not one that James fully
developed or one that he unambiguously adhered to throughout
his philosophical career.

It is nonetheless the only

consistent account of personal existence that can be
constructed from all his valuable but loosely organized
insights concerning consciousness and selfhood.

It is also

the one account of selfhood that is in agreement with the
entire philosophical thrust of James' writings.

In

elucidating what James must have held given his explicit
principles and insights, but did not always fully or clearly
express, it will be necessary at times to amend and or
further develop some features of James' account.

Although

some aspects of James' account are in need of
supplementation, this supplementation is mainly a matter of
extending and refining James' own principles and drawing out
their interconnections and their necessary implications_.
Finally, this interpretation of the Jamesian self is the only
one that leads to a wider, richer and more accurate portrayal
of personal existence than is found in the traditional

6

alternative views.
It will be argued that there can be found in James'
writings a development of a single unified theory of the self
according to which the self is best described as SelfConstituting-Historical-Existence, and as such the self's
existence entails the togetherness of a subjective and an
objective dimension and their continuous interdependence.

I

say "can be found" because there is so much ambiguity and
complexity in James' writings on the self that this theory is
never clearly laid out nor totally developed by James.

It

will be shown that according to this theory, the self should
be regarded as a subjective-objective temporal being, whose
existence can be symbolized as follows:

I

,ME.

Here the

"I" stands for the present subjective pulse of thought and
the "ME" stands for that aggregate known as the objective
self.

The arrows represent the continuous mutual influence

between these dimensions.

It will be demonstrated that the

Jamesian self is this process as a whole and that it is only
within this process that there is found and "I" and a "ME".
Evidence will be given to show that James' writings as a
whole support this interpretation more than any other.
Finally, an appraisal of the Jamesian theory will be offered
in which it will be compared to four major alternative
theories.
We will explore James' conception of the self in the
following manner:

First, James' reasons for rejecting the

7

traditional alternative theories will be analyzed to see what
they suggest regarding James' positive doctrine of the self.
second, the main features of the Jamesian self will be
outlined in the form of an initial rough sketch.

Third, the

objective dimension of the Jamesian self will be examined in
detail.

Fourth, the subjective dimension of the Jamesian

self will be thoroughly investigated.

Fifth, the full-self

and the relationship of its two dimensions and the problem of
self-identify will be discussed and sixth, the Jamesian
theory of the self will be appraised by comparing it to four
traditional alternative conceptions of the self with regard
to its treatment of four fundamental experiential features of
personal existence.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN PARTS OF THIS STUDY
In part two, James' critique of traditional theories of
the self will be examined.

This critique should provide us

with important clues regarding the main outlines of the
Jamesian self.

I am proceeding in this manner because James

is clearest about what he rejects.

The often overlooked

novelty of James' approach to the self is more readily
apparent when one examines his treatment of the
Spiritualists, Associationists, Transcendentalists and
Behaviorists.

His treatment of these four views points out

the inadequacy of any interpretation of the Jamesian self
which views James as a member of any of these four
philosophical groups or interprets him in terms of categories
borrowed from these systems of thought.

Because of the

complexity of James' theory of the self, and its special
affinities with all of the above views, it is important to
understand right from the start that James is breaking new
ground here, and this is what we intend to establish in this
section.

The critique represents our first set of clues on

the way to understanding the Jamesian self, and it must be
held fast to if we are to avoid misinterpreting his more
complex and ambiguous positive doctrine of the self.

An

understanding of James' reasons for rejecting these
conceptions of the self should be helpful in clarifying the
meaning of the Jamesian self.

It should be kept in mind that

this section is not concerned with demonstrating the real
8

9

inadequacy of these alternative theories of the self.

The

primary concern of this section is rather to explore exactly
what James rejects and why he rejects it, so that we can use
this information to clarify the meaning of the self he
accepts.
In the third part of this study, we will present a
rough sketch of the main features of the Jamesian self.
purpose of this section is to

p~ovide

The

the reader with an

initial understanding of the Jamesian view of personal
existence that subsequent sections will analyze in greater
detail.

Here we will explain what is meant in claiming that

the self has two dimensions and enjoys a unique way of being
that I call, self-constituting-historical-existence.
In part four we will focus on James' treatment of the
objective dimension of the self.

Here our discussion shall

concern the "ME" aspect of the self as opposed to the "I"
aspect.

To avoid misunderstanding here, it should be noted

that our present separate treatment of the two dimensions of
the self should not be taken as an indication that James
believed that they existed separately.

He did not.

This

section and the following section actually prepare the way
for part six in which the self is shown to be an irreducible
phenomenon involving the togetherness of its dimensions.
main concern of part four, however, will be the objective
dimension of the self.

Here we will investigate the three

principal constituents of the empirical self (material,

The

10

social, and spiritual).

We will discuss the unity of that

aggregate which we all recognize as the empirical "ME".

In

this regard, James' views concerning the functions of the
body and the role of care in the formation of a unified self
will be carefully explored.

In this section we will show

that the objective self is neither a mere manifestation of a
true hidden self nor is it exhaustive of that reality known
as the self.
In part five the subjective dimension of the self will
be explored.

Here, we will focus on James' theory of

consciousness with special attention devoted to its unity,
temporality and activity.

We will argue in this section that

there actually exists for James an "I" dimension of the self,
and that the subject of experience is far from vanishing (as
Dewey claimed).

It will also be argued that this subjective

dimension of the self is primarily a process of caring.
The concrete full self will be the focus of attention
in part six.

Here the interdependence of the dimensions of

the self will be discussed.

This will involve exploring the

historical character of the full self with emphasis upon both
the spontaneity and the sedimentation of personal existence.
Here "spontaneity" refers to the subject's active
constitution of the "ME" in the present.

Here

"sedimentation" refers to the influence exerted by one's past
objective selfhood on one's present subjectivity.

Our aim in

this section is to show that the Jamesian self is this

11

subjective-objective temporal process itself taken as an
irreducible whole.

The identity that this self enjoys will

then be explored.

Part seven will be devoted to a discussion

of the merits of the Jamesian theory of the self.

Here we

will be comparing the Jamesian account of the self to four
alternative views with regards to their treatment of four
fundamental experiential features of personal existence.
These features are:

care, temporality, agency and sociality.

we will also discuss certain objections that have or can be
raised regarding the Jamesian self.

The aim of this section

is to show the superiority of the Jamesian theory in
accounting for more of the experiential features of selfhood
with a minimum of metaphysical assumptions.
At the end of this study, there will be a brief summary
of our major findings as well as a discussion of the
significance of our results for both the philosophical
community and the world at large.

PART TWO
JAMES' CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF THE SELF
In this part of the study we shall examine James'
critique of traditional theories of the self.

Our hope is

that this will provide us with important clues regarding the
main outlines of the Jamesian self.

Here we shall be

discussing James' treatment of the Spiritualists,
Associationists, Transcendentalists and Behaviorists.
Knowledge of the reasons why James rejects a self that is an
automaton, or a bundle of perceptions, or an inactive soul or
a transcendental ego is knowledge that should prove useful in
clarifying the meaning of the Jamesian self.

our main goal

in this section is not to argue for the real inadequacy of
these alternative theories of the self.

our main concern

here is rather to explore exactly what James rejects and why
he rejects it, so that we can use this information to clarify
the meaning of the self he accepts.

we are taking this

approach because James is more clear about what he rejects
than what he embraces.

This part of the essay will point out

the inadequacy of any treatment of the Jamesian self which
equates it with any of the above four philosophical
approaches to personal existence.

12

A.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE SPIRITUALISTS

James says at one point that the soul theory seems to
offer the line of least logical resistance in our efforts to
account for the experience of selfhood.

The Spiritualist's

explanation is ultimately rejected by James, when he finds it
to be an unnecessary hypothesis to account for the
experienced continuity of the stream of consciousness.

James

sees no need to suppose any other agent than a succession of
perishing thoughts which have the power of appropriation with
regard to the past thoughts.

The soul is not only

unexperiencable; it is superfluous.

James regarded the soul

as a scientifically worthless concept because it does nothing
to explain psychological phenomena.

The term "soul" was for

James nothing but a "theoretic stop-gap."

The term simply

creates a place and reserves it for "a future explanation to
occupy.n 12

This "future explanation" is what this study is

all about.
James had little faith in the use of unexperienced
entities to account for our personal existence.

He clearly

saw the major weakness of the Scholastic theory of the soul
which dates back to Plato and Aristotle.

To state that my

stream of experience inheres in an unexperienced substance is
according to James telling me nothing new about this stream.
12 wiliiam James, A Pluralistic Universe ed. F. Burkhardt
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 95.
13

14

From this notion of inherence, what can we deduce?

James

feels that the spiritualists' account provides us with
nothing but the same stream repeating itself with a
mysterious transcendental support.
The principal reason for James' dissatisfaction with
the substantial soul hypothesis is that it guaranteed for the
subject a greater degree of unity than the facts of personal
existence support.

James was familiar with numerous cases of

mental breakdown and multiple personalities which suggested
to him that there was a passing principle of unity working
itself out, with perhaps various degrees of success and
failure throughout one's life.

our "experienced identity" in

life does not testify to the absolute unity that has been
talked of since the time of Plato.

James felt that such

conceptions of human identity go beyond the available
evidence.
James is aware of the major arguments for the existence
of the soul but he finds them all weak and inconclusive.

One

of the main arguments for the existence of the soul has been
that the material brain cannot be the agent of thought which
is immaterial and which is capable of taking cognizance of
immaterial objects.

James agrees that the great difficulty

is in understanding how a thing can cognize anything.

He

adds, however, "This difficulty is not in the least removed
by giving to the thing that cognizes the name of sou1." 13
13 P r~nc~p
. . 1 es, I , p. 328 .

15

James does not believe one must adopt a materialistic
conception of mind if one rejects the soul.

In James' theory

the subject of experience is neither the soul nor the
it is the present perishing pulse of thought.

brain~

"Even if the

brain could not cognize universals, immaterials or it 'self'"
says James "still the "Thought" which we have relied upon in
our account is not the brain, closely as it seems connected
Wl'th 1' t • "

14

The "I" of experience is a remembering and

appropriating Thought incessantly renewed.
One of the sources for the popularity of the soul
theory is the wish for immortality.

The Christian concept of

judgment and punishment after death lends support to the soul
theory.

James finds little merit in these practical reasons

for believing in the soul's existence.

For James the only

immortality that would be worthy of the name is one that
would involve a consciousness continuous with what we have
experienced in this life.

An imperishable simple soul

substance does not guarantee this.

Here James supports

Locke's view that the mere survival of one's soul substance
is not equivalent to the survival of one's self which is what
we normally mean by immortality.

By itself the concept of

the soul does not provide the type of immortality that we
cherish.
Although James rejects the notion of a substantial soul,
he does not hesitate to use the term soul in some of his
14 Ibid., I, p. 328.

16

works.

In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he speaks

of the soul frequently.
inconsistent here.

James is not really being

It must be

adm~tted,

however, that James

employs the term soul in a loosely descriptive manner that
tends to solicit charges that he is betraying his position
adopted in the Principles of Psychology.

Phrases like

"attitudes in the soul" and "the sick soul" seem to suggest a
belief in a substantial soul.

The truth is, however, that

James purposely leaves vague the meaning of the term "soul"
in The Varieties of Religious Experience and insists upon no
specific understanding of the term.
the reader of this fact.

He even formally warns

"When I say 'Soul'," writes James,

"you need not take me in the ontological sense unless you
prefer to." 15

James is actually adopting here the same

attitude towards the soul that he took earlier in the
Principles of Psychology which is that the soul can be a
viable option only to a believer through an act of faith
alone.

There James wrote, "If I ever use it [the term soul]

it will be in the vaguest and most popular way.

The reader

who finds any comfort in the idea of the soul, is however,
perfectly free to continue to believe in it •••• n 16

Had

these warnings of James been heeded, he would not have been
viewed by some critics as vacillating with regards to the
soul.
15

william James, The Varieties of Religious Experience

(1902, New York, Modern Library, 1936), p. 192.
l6p r1nc1p
.
. l es,

I, p. 332.

A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE
what clues can be gathered from this critique regarding
James positive doctrine of the self?

James critique of the

Spiritualist's position suggest the following points:
(1)

The self is something which is totally experienceable.

( 2)

The self is something which is dynamic and mutable.

(3) The self is not a spiritual substance.
not that physical mass called the brain.
perhaps perishable.

17

(4)
(5)

The self is
The self is

B.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE ASSOCIATIONISTS

James felt that it was their atomistic assumptions
regarding experience that made it impossible for the
Associationists to develop a viable theory of the self.
James accuses Hume and his followers of not being genuine
empiricists.

A genuine empiricists, James feels, describes

the phenomena just as they appear.

If the Associationists

had done this, they would have realized that our experience
is not of atomistic pure sensations, but always of things
that are fringed by all sorts of relationships.

Having

chopped up experience into a chain of distinct existences,
Hume tried in vain to account for our experience of personal
identity.

Fully aware of his own failure here, Hume

confessed in the appendix of his Treatise of Human
Nature " ••• this difficulty is too hard for my
understanding.

I pretend not, however, to pronounce it

insuperable.

Others, perhaps ••• may discover some hypothesis
that will reconcile these contradictions." 17
Hume's failure to provide an adequate account of self
identity stems from the fact that he was unable to reconcile
or renounce the following theories:

(1)

All our distinct

perceptions are distinct existences and (2) the mind never
perceives any real connection among distinct existences.

The

17 navid Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Selby Rigge
Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), pp. 635-636.
18

19
Associationist's view fails because it refuses to accept
either the unification of ideas in the conscious field or the
immanence of the recent past in the present.

James, however,

accepts both and continues from there.
Although James applauded Hume's rejection of the soul
substance, he did not look favorably upon Hume's view of
consciousness as a succession of unitary ideas with no real
relationship to each other.

James feels that Hume failed to

see that there is something other than the two extreme
alternatives of pure unity and pure separateness.

He points

out that Hume was as equally extreme as the spiritualists
that he rejected.

James writes,

As they say the Self is nothing but Unity,
unity abstract and absolute, so Hume says it is
nothing but Diversity, diversity abstract and
absolutei whereas in truth it is that mixture of
unity and diversity which we ~urselves have already
found so easy to pick apart. 1

For James the unity of the parts of the stream is just
as "real" a connection as their diversity is a real
separationi both connection and separation are ways in which
the past thoughts appear to the present thought.

In looking

for more than this, in seeking an impression that remains
always present and invariably the same, Hume revealed that he
too had not freed himself from that "Absolutism which is the
great disease of philosophic Thought." 19
18 Ibid., I, p. 333.
19 Ibid., I, p. 334.

The real tie that

20

aume sought in the train of perceptions, but couldn't find,
James found realized in the present appropriating pulse of
thought.
James points out that followers of Hume such as John
Mill tend to avoid confronting the problem of how
consciousness comes to be aware of itself if it is only a
train of independent thoughts.

"As a rule," says James,

"Associationists writers keep talking about 'the mind' and
about what 'we' do; and so, smuggling in surreptitiously what
they ought avowedly to have postulated in the form of a
present judging Thought, they either trade upon their
reader's lack of discernment or are undiscerning
themselves." 20
20 Ib1'd., I , p. 336 .

A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE
what does James' critique of the Associationists
suggest regarding his own positive doctrine of the self?

It

shows first of all that James himself is not in the same camp
with Hume with regards to the self.

This is an important

point for a number of interpreters of James have failed to
notice the difference between Hume's chain of unrelated ideas
and James' stream of appropriating Thoughts.

James' pulses

of Thought are active forces while Hume's ideas are simply
inert contents.

James' pulses of subjectivity unite through

continuous appropriation to form a single stream while Hume's
ideas are incapable of uniting.

It is indeed true that James

too speaks of a chain of Thoughts, but this is in no way
equivalent to Hume's chain of ideas.

With Hume there is

nothing that makes these ideas a real chain, while with James
the present active pulse of consciousness with its act of
appropriation makes possible the continuous existence of the
chain which is more aptly described as a stream.

"My present

Thought," writes James, "stands thus in the plenitude of
ownership not only de

faato~

but de

jure~

the most real owner

there can be, an all without the supposition of any
'inexplicable tie' but in a perfectly verifiable and
phenomenal way."21
In addition to the above, the critique of the
21 P .
. 1 es, I, p. 341 .
r1nc1p
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Associationists indicates:

(1) the Jamesian self is not a

fiction or a mere logical construction or simply the pronoun
• 1 ., (2) the Jamesian self is mutable, and (3) the Jamesian
self is an active force in the world.

C.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE TRANSCENDENTALISTS

The Transcendentalist's view of the self was strongly
attacked by James.

He regarded Kant's account of the
transcendental ego as "ineffectual and windy." 22 James
rejected the Kantian account for he saw no value in empty

constructs that are not tied to any concrete, empirical
manifestations.

Furthermore, Kant's ego was simply not

active enough for James.

James notes that unlike the soul,

the transcendental ego does not intend, select or judge for
its function is a purely logical one of maintaining that
there is an "I" which is regarded as a transcendental
condition for the possibility of experience.

James views the

Kantian ego as a barren form of consciousness with no
properties so that we cannot tell "whether it be substantial,
nor whether it be immaterial, nor whether it be simple, nor
whether it be permanent." 23

It has no properties; nothing
flows from it and so James calls it "simply nothing." 24
James points out that even if Kant's belief in the

original chaotic manifold were correct, the process of
synthesis is not the least bit explained by claiming it is
the work of the transcendental ego.
22 Ibid., I,
p. 345.
23 Ibid., I, p. 343.
24 Ibid., I, p. 345.
23

James writes,

24

Phrase it as one may, the difficulty is always the
same: the Man* known by the One. Or does one
seriously thin he understands better how the knower
"connects" its objects when one calls the former a
transcendental Ego and the latter a 'Manifold of
Intuition' than when 2gne calls them Thought and
Things respectively?

James adds that the best vehicle of knowing and the
best grammatical subject for the verb "know" would be one, if
possible, from whose other properties the knowing could be
deduced, and if such a subject couldn't be found "the best
one would be that with the fewest ambiguities and the least
•
preten t 1ous
name. n26

Given such guidelines, Kant's

transcendental ego is a rather weak candidate for the title
of "the vehicle of knowing."
James points out that if one views the transcendental
ego as an agent and not simply as an a priori form of
consciousness, transcendentalism "is only Substantialism
grown shame-faced, and the Ego only a 'cheap and nasty'
edition of the soul." 27

In this case, all the arguments

James gave for rejecting the Spiritualist's position would
apply with equal force to the Transcendentalists' account of
the self.

The connection of things in our knowledge is not

explained by making it the deed of an agent whose essence is
25
26
27

Ibid., I, p. 344.
Ibid., I, p. 344.
Ibid., I, p. 345.
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self-identity and who transcends time.

James feels that the

agency of phenomenal thought coming and going in time is just
as easy to understand.

He regards the present pulse of

thought which is an event in time as the only thinker which
the facts require.

There is simply no need for Kant's

extraempirical and preexisting subject and its categorical
equipment.

A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE

what can we gather regarding James' conception of the
self from his criticism of Kant?

There are, I believe, three

clues present here regarding James' positive doctrine of the
self.

(1) The self is primarily an agent in the world and

not simply the source of the unity of consciousness.
self exists totally in time.

(2) The

(3) The self is an empirical

reality.

26

D.

THE CRITIQUE OF THE BEHAVIORISTS

Behavioristic interpretations of the self are quite
popular today.
new phenomenon.

This approach to the self is not, however, a
In 1879 James published an article entitled

"Are we Automata?"

In it James launched a strong attack

against certain behaviorist of his day who believed man was a
automaton.

According to the "automaton theory,"

consciousness is a simple epiphenomenal accompaniment of the
neural processes whose course is strictly determined by the
laws of the physical world.

This was not the last attack

launched by James against the behaviorists of his day.

He

continued to criticize materialistic conceptions of personal
existence throughout his philosophical career.

Despite this

fact, there are some behaviorists who insist on reading
behavioristic implications into his own thought and claiming
him as one of their own.

It will be shown here why this is a

misinterpretation of James.

James' criticism of the

behavioristic approach to the self should also prove useful
in clarifying the meaning of James' positive doctrine of the
self.
One of the objections that James had against a
materialistic conception of the self was that it seemed to
conflict with Darwin's theory of evolution, a theory which
the behaviorists themselves claimed to support.

James argues

that the proponents of the automaton theory can not account
27

28

for consciousness' superfluous and logically unjustifiable
presence if it simply accompanies the real work of the brain
and the nervous system.

James also notes with regards to

evolution that the Automaton Theory can not explain why the
efficiency of the reaction of the organism increases with
decreasing automatization.

If the Behaviorist's account is

the correct one, the opposite of this should be the case in
the evolution of life forms.

James argues here that

increasing instability of the reaction of the organism would
be the natural consequence of the growing complexity of the

nervous system where no set response is associated with any
external stimulus.

In the highly complex human world for

example the stimulus is never exactly repeated.

Since

automatized association is the sole explanation accepted by
the behaviorists, they are in no position to account for the
fact that in evolutionary terms the efficiency of the
reaction of the organism increases in spite of its decreasing
automatization of fixed responses to the environment.
Another reason James offers for rejecting the
behaviorist account of the self has to do with the phenomena
of pain and pleasure.

There exist enormous correlations,

statistically speaking, between pleasure and action
beneficial to the human self and also between pain and action
harmful to the human self.

These correlations cannot be

accounted for by behaviorists who deny psycho-physical
interaction.

James writes,

29

But if pleasure and pains have no efficacity one
does not see (without such a priori rational harmony
as would be scouted by the "scientific" champions of
the Automaton Theory) why the most noxious acts,
such as burning, might not give a thrill of delight,
and the most Hecessary ones, such as breathing,
cause agony. 2

A third reason given by James for not adopting a
behavioristic view of the self is one's own experience of
activity and feeling of effort.

In an article titled "The

Feeling of Effort" James states,
There is a feeling of mental spontaneity, opposed in
nature to all afferent feelings; but it does not,
like the pretended feeling of muscular innervation,
sit among them as among its peers. It is something
which domina29s them all, by simply choosing from
their midst.

According to the supporters of the Automaton Theory,
the feeling of activity and hesitation are like any other
feelings lacking efficacy and thus involve no biological
advantage which could be preserved by natural selection.
Yet, as in the case of pain and pleasure the particular
distribution of feelings of activity remains an utterly
unaccountable coincidence for these behaviorists.

They are

not able to explain why it is that consciousness of activity
decreases in direct proportion as automatization of the
28

Ibid., I, p. 146.

29 James, "The Feeling of Effort," in Collected Essays
and Reviews (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), p. 204.
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response increases and vice versa.

Anyone who has had to

make an important decision knows how agonizingly intense
consciousness becomes as indecision grows.
correlation if man is an automaton?

Why is there this

According to James these

correlations like those spoken of earlier all point to the
same conclusion and that is that we are not automata.
In addition to the three reasons discussed above, James
also rejected a behavioristic conception of the self on
pragmatic grounds.

In a 1908 article for "The Philosophical

Review" James showed the unsatisfactory character of the
behaviorist view of the self by employing the ficticious idea
of an "automatic sweetheart."

Here James argues convincingly

that a robot sweetheart completely identical to a real maiden
except lacking in consciousness would not be a satisfactory
sweetheart for any person.

James points out that even if the

robot behaved in all ways like the perfect mistress, she
would not do as a sweetheart.

"It" would not do, for in the

case of the "sweetheart" outward treatment is valued
primarily as an expression of the accompanying consciousness
believed in.

"Pragmatically, then, belief in the automatic

sweetheart would not work," says James, "and in point of
fact no one treats it as a serious hypothesis." 30

Here

James is emphasizing the fact that the belief or denial of an
efficacious consciousness really leads to different practical
and emotional attitudes.

It does make a difference

30
James, The Meaning of Truth, ed. Fredson Bowers and
Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1975), p. 103n.
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whether I am viewed as a spontaneous and conscious being or
as a machine.

Some followers of Descartes enjoyed torturing

animals in order to prove that they took the denial of
consciousness in animals seriously.

James realizes that the

denial of an efficacious consciousness in man could lead to
even more dreadful consequences.

Although the pragmatic

argument offered here does not directly deal with the
validity of the automaton theory, it does illustrate the
absurd and perhaps dangerous consequences that would follow
if it was regarded by the world as a serious hypothesis.
Nonetheless, James was also aware of the difficulties of
the interactionist view.

In the Principles of Psychology he

admits that we can form no positive image of the way in which
a thought may affect the material brain.

He regarded this

issue as " ••• the ultimate of ultimate problems •••• " 31

He

noted, however, that since the time of Hume the concept of
causation itself has been subject to critique, so that it is
inconsistent to dogmatically deny mental causation while
holding for physical causality.

He writes, "As in the night

all cats are gray so in the darkness of metaphysical
criticism all causes are obscure." 32

Although he

recognized the obscurity surrounding the notion of mental
causation, he still believed that the evidence against the
automaton theory was very strong.

In the Principles of

Psychology he finally comes to state,
31 James, Principles, I, p. 177.
32
Ibid., I, p. 178.

32

The conclusion that it (i.e. consciousness) is
useful is, after all this, quite justifiable. But,
if it is useful, it must be so through its causal
efficaciousness. I, at any rate (pending
metaphysical reconstruction not yet successfully
achieved), shall have no hesitation in using t~3
language of common-sense throughout this book.

In his last works, a Pluralistic Universe and Some
problems of Philosophy, James was even less hesitant about
embracing the interactionist view.

Here our efforts and

activities are taken at their face value and accepted as
genuine ingredients of the real world, a world that involves
the continuous emergence of novelty which the automaton
theory so completely ignored.
Despite all the arguments that James put forth against
the mechanistic view of the self there are still some
interpreters of James who feel he really affirmed only a
"behavioral self."

John Dewey, for example, has argued that

the "behavioral self" is the only self which James intended
to maintain. 34

Dewey's position was motivated in part by

James' loose and unguarded expressions in an article titled
"Does Consciousness Exist?"

This article does not really

deny consciousness as some behaviorists believe but rather
maintains the inseparability of consciousness from its
content.

In other words, it simply declares that there is no

transcendental entity lurking behind concrete mental states.
33

Ib1'd., I , p. 147 .

34

Dewey, £E· cit.
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This is quite different from the behavioristic denial of the
concrete mental states themselves.

What should not be

forgotten is that not long after this rather ambiguous
article James declared in A Pluralistic Universe the reality
of the full self grounded in the dynamic solidarity of
concrete mental states.
It was probably James' emphasis upon the body in his
theory of the self that motivated some to view him as a
behaviorist.
achieved.

No one realized the break-through that he had

The body that James emphasized was not the

materialistic body of physiology but the body which
Phenomenology later called the lived-body.
It should also be noted that James' famous theory of
the emotions which contained behavioristic aspects probably
motivated some to interpret his theory of the self as
behavioristic.

If one examines James' theory of the emotions

carefully, however, he will discover that it does not entail
a behavioristic conception of the self for it doesn't deny
consciousness or its activity, rather it simply insists that
emotions involve a bodily component.

In other words, the

physical expression of certain emotions is a necessary part
of our experience of those emotions, i.e., but for the body
these emotions would not be.
In this matter Robert Ehman and I are in agreement.

In

his article on James' theory of the self Ehman states,
.,
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.
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There is perhaps nothing in James that has been more
radically misinterpreted than his account at this
point, and he has often been taken as a mere
materialist. However, there is in, fact no
materialism here, no denial of thought or emotion,
but simply the observation that we are unable to
grasp these as purely psychical, as nonbodily. For
James, the acts of thought and feeling are felt as
bodily acts: and the body is felt as a vehicle of
consciousness. When James asserts that the 'acts of
attending, assenting, negating are felt as movements
in the hea~ • the term "as" ought to be taken
literally. 5

The main thrust of James' entire philosophical thought
points in the opposite direction of behaviorism, and if he
were writing today, its direction would remain unchanged.

In

today's society people who experience themselves as
automatons are regarded as in need of psychiatric care.

Why

don't we also regard theories that seek to describe persons
as automatons as pathological?

According to James, the

experience of oneself as a person is primary and prior to any
scientific difficulties regarding how such an experience is
possible or how it is to be explained.

In this regard, James

would agree with R. D. Laing that the theory of man as a
person "loses its way if it falls into an account of man as a
machine or man as an organismic system of it-processes.n 36
35 Robert R. Ehman, "William James and the Structure of
the Self," New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. J. Edie (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 262.
36 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self,
Books, 1959), p. 23.

(Baltimore:
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A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CRITIQUE
What does James' critique of the Behaviorists suggest
regarding his positive doctrine of the self?

It indicates

at least four points regarding the Jamesian self:

(1)

oespite James' rejection of the soul substance, the self is
not to be equated with the physical body.

(2)

involves a consciousness which is efficacious.
is a source of novelty.

(4)

The self
(3)

The self

A theory of the self should not

ignore how this notion functions in one's everyday life and
the

conc~ete

value it carries there.
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A SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALL FOUR CRITIQUES
Let us now summarize what James' criticism of
alternative theories indicates concerning the type of self he
would accept.

As a whole, all four critiques point to a

Jamesian self that is:

(1) active and efficacious, (2)

within time, hence historical, (3) not exclusively material
but involving concrete mental states or pulses of thought,
(4) changing, never absolutely identical with what it was
and, (5) experiencable but perhaps not all at once for it may
be like Husserl's physical object revealing itself only

perspectively.
In our pursuit of the meaning of the Jamesian self, we
will keep in mind these five clues.

They should prove

helpful in removing some of the ambiguity surrounding his
positive statements concerning the self.

On those occasions

where James' loose statements invite varying interpretations
of his positive doctrine of the self, I believe we should
keep in mind what he has already clearly rejected and why he
has rejected it.

we will be referring to points made in this

section as our argument unfolds for a particular
interpretation of the Jamesian self.
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PART THREE
THE JAMESIAN SELF:

AN INITIAL SKETCH

There is present in the writings of William James a
unique conception of the self.

According to this theory the

self enjoys a special way of being that is quite different
from that of a "thing" and is perhaps best described as selfconstituting-historical-existence.

In this part of our study

our aim is to offer the reader a rough outline of the
Jamesian self which we will be analyzing and arguing for in
greater detail in the subsequent sections of this essay.
What makes the being of the self so special, so
different from that of a thing?

This whole study is

devoted to answering this question.

But one should note

immediately that unlike any "thing" the self has both an
objective and a subjective dimension.

It is this fact that

the Jamesian theory of the self fully respects.
In the Principles of Psychology, James summarizes his
findings on the self in the following way:
we may sum up by saying that personality implies the
incessant presence of two elements, an objective
person, known by a passing subjective Thought and
recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter, let
us use the words ME and 3 for the empirical person
7
and the judging Thought.
37 P '
. 1 es, I , p. 350 .
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The exact meaning of this statement and others like it
lies at the very heart of this essay.

When James says that

personality implies the incessant presence of two elements,
there ought to be no doubt that he is claiming that both
elements are essential constituents of the self.

A self is

never merely an empirical person (ME), and it is also never
merely a judging thought (I).

A self is neither of these

elements for it is both at once.

This is what James means

when he says that personality implies "the incessant
presence" of not one but "two elements."

The self is being

described here by James as an ambiguous being, one that is
simultaneously both subjective and objective.

This is the

feature of the Jamesian self that his commentators have for
the most part ignored or misinterpreted.
James Edie, for example, takes the position that James
developed a non-egological theory of consciousness according
to which a distinction is made between consciousness (viewed
as the non-personal condition of all objectification) and the
self (viewed as merely a priviledged object of
consciousness). 38

Bruce Wilshire shares Edie's view here.

38 James Edie, "The Genesis of a Phenomenological
Theory of the Experience of Personal Identity: William James
of Consciousness and the Self," Man and World, 6, pp. 322-338,
(Summer, 1973).
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Wilshire writes, "Rather he [James] has begun a
reinterpretation of consciousness:

we are not to speak of

consciousness, but instead of 'sciousness', because all that
is given is Object, or things just as they are known, and not
thought itself.• 39

Although Jamesian statements can

certainly be gathered in support of this interpretation, it
must be regarded as a basic misinterpretation of James'
position on the self.

Far from not talking about

consciousness, James talks of a personal, efficacious
consciousness repeatedly in the Principles and throughout
nearly all his philosophical works.

If one listens carefully

to what he does "speak of," it is clear that he regards
consciousness as being personal and a felt dimension of the
self which is simultaneously and irreducibly both objective
and subjective, both an individual and an agent, both known
and knower.

The textual evidence for this interpretation

will be given in the subsequent pages of this study.

It

should be noted now, however, that James offers us a nonegological theory of consciousness only in the sense that
there is no permanent ego behind or above the concrete stream
of consciousness which supports it and serves to unify it.
This view does not mean that James believes that
consciousness is an anonymous function or that the self does
39 w·1 h'
1 s 1re,

£E· cit., p. 136.
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not include consciousness.

It means rather that the Jamesian

self is a subjective-objective process constituted in and
with the flux of the stream of experience.
Patrick Dooley is in agreement with me concerning James'
position on the artificial separation of self and
subjectivity.

Dooley seems to recognize the fact that

chapter nine of the Principles which deals with the stream of
thought is just as important to an understanding of the
Jamesian self as the chapter which follows it that is devoted
exclusively to the self.

Dooley writes,

For James, it makes no sense to talk of thoughts or
experiences apart from the self; experiences and
thoughts are only personal. Since the states of
consciousness we study are parts of personal selves,
our discussion of the first characteristic of the
stream of consciousness beiarnes a discussion of
James' theory of the self.
The quotation cited on page 37 is not the only place
where James depicts the self as a subjective-objective
process.
writings.

Such descriptions are found throughout his
He also begins his account in Psychology, Briefer

Course, by stating:
Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the
same time more or less aware of myself, of my
personal existence. At the same time it is I who am
aware; so that the total self of me, being as it
were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly
object and partly subject, must have two aspects
40 Patrick K. Dooley, Pragmatism as Humanism: The
Philosophy of William James (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1974), p. 28.
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discriminated in it, of which for sh~ltness we may
call one the Me and the other the I.
what James here refers to as aspects of the self, I call
dimensions of the self.

The self has both a subjective

dimension and a objective dimension and these dimensions are
interdependent.

The self is strictly speaking neither of its

dimensions but always both at once.

In other words the self

is this total process as an irreducible whole.

This is why

James refers to the "Me" and the "I" as "aspects" of the
self.

The self is a unique form of being in that it has both

a subjective aspect and a objective aspect.

This is

reflected in the fact that the self unlike anything else in
experience is both the "knower" and the "known."
The claim that the self is both subjective and objective
may appear unusual and puzzling and yet is not the self
exactly that, unusual and puzzling?

Is not the self really

quite unique among all of the objects that occupy our
thought?

It may be that a faithful description of the

essential uniqueness of the self leads to a recognition of
its ambiguous nature, that it

~

in fact a subjective-

objective being, that it truly is subjectivity incarnate.
There is a natural tendency among both philosophers and
psychologists to reduce the self to the status of a mere
object.

Since our experience deals almost exclusively with

objects, it is only natural to approach our own existence as
if

l't

too was purely objective.

Even those who recognize the

41 william James, Psychology, The Briefer Course, 1892.
2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1895), p. 176.
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reality of consciousness tend to continue to treat the self
as if it was no different from any other object in
experience.

The following example is given in order to

clarify the mistake that occurs when the self is viewed as a
purely objective being.

Imagine two traffic light poles

standing at opposite corners of a busy intersection.

A basic

description of one of these traffic light poles may be said
to apply equally to the other.

Now imagine that one of these

is miraculously given the gift of consciousness so that it is
aware of itself and its surroundings.

Now can we still claim

that a basic description of one of these traffic light poles
applies equally to the other?

Can we take the position that

there now exists only a minor difference between the two
poles and that this difference can be described in the
following manner:

One traffic light pole is now aware of

itself as a traffic light pole while the other is not?

Such

a view is, of course, a monumental understatement of the
transformation that has occurred at this intersection.

It is

a misunderstanding stemming from the belief that selfawareness is an extrinsic feature that does not affect the
essential nature of what the awareness is of.
tends to be ignored in theories of the self.

This fact
James realizes,

however, that awareness including self-awareness must be
regarded as an essential part of the being that is aware.
The self is a great deal more than its objective
manifestations in experience; just as, our one traffic light
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pole is now a great deal more than its neighboring traffic
light pole.

The point we are emphasizing here is this:

subjectivity itself is also a dimension of the self and is
not simply the means by which the self is grasped.

The

Jamesian theory of self takes this fact fully into account.
But even if awareness, including self-awareness, could
be regarded as a nonessential trait, we must remember that
for James consciousness is a great deal more than simple
awareness.
force.

For James, consciousness is primarily a selective

It is because of this teleological character of

consciousness that James places consciousness at the core of
the self rather than treats it as the means by which we
become aware of a separate entity called the self.
Concerning this point Ellwood Johnson comments, "The
expression 'stream of impulsive thought' is the closest James
carne to a solid definition of the human self.

There is,

inherent in this expression, the principle that 'will is
identity.'

Whatever it is in consciousness that focuses,

selects, attends is the individuality of the person." 42
What does it mean to claim that the self is not totally
and purely objective?

It means, among other things, that no

particular object is in and of itself necessarily a self or a
part of a particular self.

A body viewed as a physiological

42 Ellwood Johnson, "William James and the Art of
Fiction," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 30
(Spring 1972), p. 286.
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mass is not even intrinsically a part of a self.

If a body

is regarded as a part of a particular self, it is because
there is present a consciousness that cares for it.

we do

not care for our bodies because we identify ourselves with
them, rather we identify ourselves with them because we care
for them.

Thus, even the core of one's objective self is

constituted as such by a caring attitude of the present pulse
of subjective thought.

It is care which personalizes all the

elements that constitute the self.
To deny that one's body is in and of itself personalized
does seem strange.

One is tempted to reply, "If I am

anything, I am my body."

One is also tempted to view James'

position here as being Platonic.

This last temptation should

be avoided, however, for James is not denying that the body

comes to form a part of the self or that a self is always an
embodied self.

James is simply claiming that a living body

per se does not constitute a self, that more is required for
a self than the existence of a body.

In the case of severe

brain damage, for example, a body may be kept alive by our
modern, marvelous medical machines for days after its
personhood had vanished forever.

The body does have a

central and vital role to play in the Jamesian theory of the
self, but this physiological mass is nonetheless not
intrinsically personal.

It is care which personalizes the

body, and it is this subjectivized-body which comes to form
the core of the self.
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That no particular object is intrinsically personalized
stems from the fact that the self is not purely objective nor
purelY subjective.

The "I" and the "Me" are only dimensions

of the self and exist as an "I" and a "Me" only within that
whole subjective-objective temporal process which is the
self.

The present pulse of thought is an "I," i.e. is

personalized, only because it cares for and takes a peculiar
interest in certain of its ejects which thereby becomes its
"Me."

If this did not occur, it would simply be a present

pulse of anonymous experiencing or what James refers to as
pure experience.

Pure experience is something we can't

really conceive for being selves we are only familiar with
ordinary experience which always tends to be personal.

The

objects which come to form one's "Me" are also nonpersonalized until they are cared for by the present pulse of
subjectivity.

In short, an "I" and a "Me" can only exist in

union, that is, only within the subjective-objective temporal
process which is the self.

The "I" and the "Me" are

dimensions of the self and can have no existence apart from
that irreducible whole which is the self.

The "I" and the

"Me" can be regarded as abstractions in the sense that they
are insofar as they are in union.
The relationship that exists between the dimensions of
the self is not unlike that relationship that exists between
space and time in Einstein's Relativity Theory.

According to

Einstein, neither space nor time can exist without the other.
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our experience is always of space-time.

It is impossible,

saYS Einstein, to conceive of space except against the
background of time and in terms of it and vice versa.

There

reallY exists neither space nor time, but only space-time.
one might also say that there exists neither an "I" nor a
"Me," but only "I"< ,"ME" according to James.
"I"~"ME"

is a kind of shorthand that is meant to

indicate the process which is the self.

Personal existence

is more complex than even this formula suggests but for the
time being it can serve as a rough representation of the
dynamic nature of that irreducible totality known as the
self.

The being which this formula is meant to symbolize we

shall call self-constituting-historical-existence.

This name

has been chosen because it emphasizes certain essential
features of selfhood.

The self helps to determine its own

mode of existence and is thus to a certain extent selfconstituting.

The word helps here is meant to indicate

that the self is also formed under the influences of the
situation within which it acts.

The self is historical in

the sense that it has an accumulative existence for it always
brings a past to bear on a present.

Of course this past is

always an interpreted past, i.e., a past seen from the
perspective of the present pulse of subjectivity.

The term

existence refers to the fact that the self does not have
the being of a thing.

A thing simply is or as Heidegger

would say, it is merely "present-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand."
This is not so in the case of the self, for it stretches
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itself out through time by projecting its future in the
present in light of its past, and this is what we mean here
by the term existence.

To emphasize all these essential

traits of its being, I have labeled the Jamesian self, selfconstituting-historical-existence.
In an article titled "A Jamesian Theory of Self," James
Bayley made the following observation concerning the
constitution of the self:

"More than half a century before

sartre claimed that human existence precedes human essence,
James argued that the self is a human creation whose nature
can be uncovered only by examination of human action.

The

self is what it is known as, or found to be, in
practice." 43

Unfortunately after this excellent start

Bayley then proceeds to give a behavioristic reinterpretation
of the Jamesian self along similar lines begun by Dewey in
his, "The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James ... 44
It is puzzling to see this kind of comparison to Sartre
followed by the comment, "'Selfing' is something an organism
does, just as are breathing and digesting.
James, is a doing, not a being."

The self, for

It will become clear in the

subsequent pages of this study that the self is truly selfconstituting and not merely a "human creation" in the sense
that it is an organism's adaptation to its environment.
43 James E. Bayley, "A Jamesian Theory of Self"
Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society, Vol. 12 (Spring
1976), p. 149.
44
Dewey, £E· cit.
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we will now take a brief look at each of the dimensions
of the self.

We will cover both dimensions in greater detail

in subsequent chapters.

Our present aim is to provide the

reader with an initial rough sketch of the Jamesian self
before commencing our detailed analysis and argumentation in
the following sections.
The objective dimension of the self is the sum total of
objects for which a particular consciousness has a special
caring interest.
care.

These objects become personalized through

Theoretically, any object can become part of one's

objective self by creating excitement of an unusual kind in
the stream of consciousness.

There is, however, great

agreement among people regarding the kinds of objects that do
in fact enter the field of the personal.
The objective dimension of the self can be divided into
three main areas:
spiritual me.

the material me, the social me, and the

The material me is composed of all those

physical objects towards which consciousness takes a special
caring attitude.

The physical body tends to form the nucleus

of the material me.

The social me includes all of those

images that we believe others carry of us.

Much more than

•sticks and stones," names can hurt because of this social
character of the self.

There is finally the spiritual me

which actually is not spiritual at all, but is rather one's
own concrete acts of consciousness taken reflexively as
objects.

These three "me"s together form the objective
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dimension of the self.

The body, according to James, is not

onlY the central factor in the material me, it lies at the
core of the whole objective self and serves as its dominant
source of unity.

James discovers in fact, that every object

that makes up the objective dimension of the self is related
in some way to that priviledged object called the body.
Although the objective dimension may be analyzed into three
•me"s, a self is never purely material or purely social or
purely spriritual.

A self is always material, social, and

spiritual all at once.

We shall examine the objective

dimension more fully later on, but let us now take an equally
brief glance at the subjective dimension of the self.
The present passing pulse of thought is the subjective
dimension of the self.
part of the self.

It is the present caring and acting

It is also the self as knower as opposed

to the self as known.

According to James, the title of "I"

is passed along by each perishing pulse of thought to its
successor.

This appropriation by each pulse of thought of

its predecessor makes possible the continuity of the
subjective dimension and the self as a whole.
absolute identity in the subject.

There is no

There is, however, an

ideal or functional identity established in the subjective
dimension, in that each present pulse of thought carries the
title of "I" and functions as an enduring ego.

James

describes this view by borrowing an illustration from Kant.
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Each thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned,
transmitting whatever it realized as its Self to its
own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if
elastic balls were to have not only motion but
knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit
both its motion and its consciousness to a second,
which took both up into its consciousness and passed
them to a third, until the last ball held all that
the ~Sher balls had held, and realized it as its
own.

The nature of this mysterious act of appropriation will
be examined more fully later on.

The point we want to make

clear here is that for James, the subjective dimension of the
self is not a body, or a soul, or a transcendental ego, but
is rather the perishing present pulse of thought itself.

It

should be noted early that one should not let the temporary
character of acts of consciousness blind one to the crucial
functions they perform.

A comparison with our present view

of matter might help here.

In the area of nuclear physics,

it is held that there are subatomic particles that exist for
only a small fraction of a second and these temporary
entities are viewed as vital to the very existence of
matter.

Why may not the same situation prevail in the mental

world?

The exaggerated importance of permanence has been the

Plague of Western Philosophical Thought.

This is perhaps no

more evident than in its treatment of the self.

We have a

direct acquaintance with our temporary pulses of thought.
Perhaps we ought to make sure that these fleeting realities
4SP r1nc1p
. . l es, I, p. 322.
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can't do the job before we start attributing the work to
unexperienced entities.

James feels they can do the job.

Later, we will explore more fully how the present pulse of
thought functions as the subjective dimension of the self.
Let us now return to our discussion of the whole self.
The concrete full self involves both of the dimensions
described above.

The self exists as the whole irreducible

subjective-objective temporal process.

Like most of us,

James uses the term self in various ways, sometimes to
designate parts of the self and sometimes the whole of the
self.

Despite this, James makes it clear often enough that

the only real self is the whole self, i.e., this subjectiveobjective existence taken as an irreducible whole.
The dimensions of the self are interdependent, i.e.,
they have a relationship which is reciprocal.

The present

pulse of subjectivity in caring for certain objects
constitutes the "Me."

we will let

phase of the process.

This constitution of the "Me" does not

occur in a vacuum.

"I"~"ME"

symbolize this

There are many forces influencing the

creation and conservation of one's objective self.

One of

the major influences here is one's past constituted "Me"s.
The past constituted "Me"s having been appropriated by the
present "I," exert an influence on the "I"'s present
constitution of the "Me."

This influence is mainly on a

subliminal level and "I"f--"Me" symbolizes this phase of the
Process.

Thus, we have a single continuous process that can
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be roughlY represented by the formula

"I~"Me."

-

I say

roughlj[ represented because the process is in actuality

even more complicated than this formula suggest.

Until we

discuss the whole process in detail, however, this formula
•I·~"ME"

can serve as a kind of shorthand for the dynamic

relationship which exist between the dimensions of the self.
The ingredients of each of the dimensions are changing, but
the relationship between the dimensions remains constant.
The objects that compose the "ME" are fluctuating, and the
stream of thought itself is a constant flux.

Amidst this

change, the self continues to exist and remain relatively
stable as a rainbow persists with a certain stability through
the flux of sunshine and rain.
is not an illusion.

But unlike a rainbow the self

On the contrary it is the reality that

we are closest to and the one reality in terms of which all

other things are judged to be real or unreal.

We call this

dynamic process, which each of is, self-constitutinghistorical-existence for this title does not simplify or
overlook the vague and ambiguous nature of our existence.
Such a view of the self does not provide the absolute
identity that we tend to associate with the self.

James

believes, however, that if we reflect on the history of our
individual existence, we do not find anything like the
absolute identity of the pure ego that many of us had assumed
existed.

We find instead, that change and growth are real

features of the self.

I am, for example, no longer the
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infant I was, and I am not yet the senile invalid I may
become.

According to James, the self is that mixture of

identity and diversity that we all recognize as forming a
part of our existence.
James believed that John Locke had taken a step in the
right direction when he treated personal identity as the
identity of which we are conscious, the experience that
"makes a man be himself to himself." 46

To James, "the

importance of Locke's doctrine lay in this, that he
eliminated 'substantial' identity as transcendental and
unimportant, and made of 'personal' identity (the only
practically important sort) a directly verifiable empirical
phenomenon.

Where not actually experienced, it is not." 47

Unfortunately Locke didn't appreciate the full significance
of his own analysis and retreated back to the substantial
soul.

James, however, realizing fully the breakthrough that

Locke had made, saw no need to bring in any unexperienced
entity to account for one's experienced self-identity.

As

Ralph Barton Perry has pointed out, the significance of this
step lies in the fact that the self takes its place within
46

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Book II, chap. XXVII, 10.
47 william James, "Person and Personality," Johnson's
Universal Cyclopaedia, (1895), VI, p. 539, cited by Ralph
Barton Perry in In the Spirit of William James, p. 86.
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the field o f 1. t s own k now1ng.

The Jamesian conception of the self that I have sketched
bere in this section in a rough fashion may appear at first
glance to portray the self as too mysterious and too
complicated.

James was, however, simply dedicated to

describing the self as it presents itself in experience.
James never had a fondness for overly complicated
explanations and in this regard he was highly critical of
Kant.

He did, however, have a fondness for being totally

faithful to what is revealed in experience.

It was this

later fondness that resulted in his complex conception of the
self.

He could not ignore the fact that the self presents

itself as not having the transparent being of a thing.

We

have a natural tendency to treat the self as a thing because
experience mainly deals with things.
problem with time.

We have a similar

This tendency to treat the self as a

"thing" has led to various reductionistic approaches to the
self which have tried to reduce it to the body, or the soul,
or a combination of these two.

On the other hand, James

tried to be faithful to all the experiential features of
selfhood which together suggest that the self exists in a
manner quite different from that of a "thing."

It is the

uniqueness of personal existence itself which led to James'
complex conception of the self.
48 Ralph Barton Perry, In The Spirit of William James
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press 1958), p. 86.
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It is important to note here that this interpretation of
Jaroes' theory of the self happens also to be the kind of self
that was suggested by his four critiques.

All that James

found lacking in the alternative views of the self can be
found here in the Jamesian self we have been describing.
This self is:

(1) active and efficacious,

(2) historical,

(3} possessing both objective and subjective aspects, (4)
mutable and (5) experiencable.
Although this Jamesian view of the self may appear
initially as rather strange, it is actually in agreement with
and is supported by our everyday commonsense views on
selfhood.

we usually do not view the self as being simply

the physical body, but we also do not view the self as being
non-bodily.

we usually do not view the self as being just

the present acting pulse of thought, but we also do not view
this as being outside of the self.

We usually do not view

the self as being simply all of those images that we think
others have of us, yet we recognize that these images have a
huge role to play in our experience of selfhood.

We usually

think of the self as something which has more than a
momentary existence and yet something which is capable of
change and growth.

All of these common opinions regarding

the self suggest the Jamesian self that we have described
above as self-constituting-historical-existence.

I am not

here suggesting that we ought to embrace this Jamesian
conception of the self because it is in agreement with common
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sense. I am now rather making the more humble claim as
sishoP Berkeley once did in behalf of his own theory, that
thiS theory is not as strange and as anti-commonsense as it
might initially seem.

This point will become even more

apparent in the following sections where this Jamesian
account of the self will be analyzed and evaluated in greater
detail.

PART FOUR
THE OBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF THE SELF
Most everything that one is tempted to call "his" tends
to form a part of the objective dimension of the self.
describes the objective self in a very broad manner.

James
One's

objective self consists of all the objects that one cares
for.

What is called the "ME" is simply a field of care, and

it can include one's body, past mental activity, clothes,
house, family, reputation, work, etc.
One's "me" is never a stable, isolable, self-identical
thing.

It manifests itself differently in different

contexts.

Much more than a body, the objective self is a

fluctuating material.

The objective dimension of the self is

found by James to be a single network or field composed of an
interrelated plurality of selves.
developed.

It does not come fully

The objective self is constructed in time through

a process in which care is attached to phenomena which
generate an intense interest.

The body tends to be the first

object of care but slowly the field of care expands to
include other objects which have the power to produce in a
stream of consciousness excitement of a certain peculiar
sort.

Together these objects form the complex field known as

the objective self.
three distinct areas:

This self-field can be analyzed into
(1) the material me, (2) the social

me, and (3) the spiritual me.
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The material me refers first
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to the body which is its central part and then to clothes,
immediate family, home and other physical objects of care.
The social me refers to the images that we think others have
of us, and there are as many social selves as there are
individuals or groups of people who know us and whom we think
carrY an image of us in their minds.

The spiritual me

indicates one's inner or subjective being which James calls
the "home of interests." 49
49

.
. 1 es, I, p. 285 .
Pr1nc1p

A.

THE MATERIAL ME

The body lies at the core of the material me.

"My own

£od_y" says James "and what ministers to its needs are
thus the primitive objects, instinctively determined, of my
egoistic interest." 50

Each of us seem to have a natural

fondness for our body, clothing, family, friends and the
objects that we make and own.

These items tend to constitute

in varying degrees one's material me.

we have a propensity to

identify ourselves with these objects to such a degree that if
one of them is destroyed, we experience a "shrinkage of our
personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to
nothingness." 51
James is making the amazing claim here that his material
me transcends his physical body.

At first glance it appears

to be a rather strange claim and yet it seems after careful
analysis to be supported by our common experience of
selfhood.

This expansive view of the material me is, for

example, able to account for a number of facts of human
behavior where the welfare of one's own body is subordinated
to other concerns.

Why is the artist willing to endure an

impoverished existence for the sake of his art?

Or why is

the miser ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of his
50 Ibid., I, p. 308.
51 Ibid., I, p. 281.
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gold?

The facts of personal existence suggest that the

material me does not simply lie under the skin.

My total

material me extends well beyond the boundaries of the
biological sciences.

One's material me is actually a "field"

of objects centered in the body, stretched out around it in
space and time.

I actually am this whole field united

through care.
In a Pluralistic Universe, James descri·bes his expansive
view of the self in the following manner:
My present field of consciousness is a centre
surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a
subconscious more •••• What we conceptually identify
ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any
time is the centre; but our full self is the whole
field, with all those indefinitely radiating
subconscious possibilities of increase that we can
only feel w!2hout conceiving, and can hardly begin
to analyze.

The items that compose my material me are all objects of
natural preference or are associated with such objects.

They

are things that tend to be related to the most vital
interests of the organism.

There exists a natural propensity

to protect one's body, to care for one's parents, wife and
children, to find a home and improve it and to make and
collect things of value.
these cherished things.
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We come to identify ourselves with
We do it to such an extent that an

william James, A Pluralistic Universe, ed. F. Burkhardt
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 130.
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attack upon any of them is taken to be as an attack upon
one's person.
me.

You laugh at my attire and you are laughing at

MY child's misdeeds are my shame.

You don't appreciate

my artistic creations and you are ignoring me.

Moreover,

when any of these cherished objects of one's material me
disappears, one feels a shrinkage of self.

James writes,

•our father and mother, our wife and babes, are bone of our
bone and flesh of our flesh.
very selves is gone." 53

When they die, a part of our

All the ingredients that go into

forming one's material me create in one the same feeling of
care with variations only in intensity.
Normally, the objects of care that come to compose one's
material me belong to a special narrow range of things,
nevertheless in principle any object is a possible candidate
through care.

One might argue that the admission that

anything could become a part of the self constitutes a
reductio ad absurdum of the Jamesian view of self.
Would James admit a baseball team as a possible constituent
of a self?

He would have to, but even though he did, he

would not be admitting to a reductio.

A self that included a

baseball team would be regarded as strange, but it would
still be a self for it is an object's power to generate care
rather than its other characteristics that mark it as part of
a self.

One may at this point argue that though James

PDsition is not a reductio ad absurdum it is nevertheless
counter-intuitive.

But is it really counter-intuitive?

53 James, Principles, I, p. 280.

Is
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it any more counter-intuitive than the alternatives argued
against it?

Is it really any less implausible to claim that

the self is a spiritual substance?, or a transcendental ego?,
or a physical mass? or a packet of memories?

From one

perspective a theory of the self that allows for the
possibility of a sports team becoming part of a self appears
ridiculous and yet from another perspective, for example, the
first person perspective of the sports fan, such a view seems
not at all at odds with one's lived experience of the field
of the personal.

Does not the enthusiastic sports fan come

to identify with his team?

Isn't his team's victory his

victory, and his team's defeat his defeat?

On a cold

December Sunday in 1963 the Chicago Bears won the National
Football League Championship, and this event had no bearing
whatsoever on my material well being, and yet I was ecstatic
over it.

Why was I so affected by this team's good fortune?

The answer is quite simple.

I had become so intensely

involved with the Bears that year that they came to form a
part of my selfhood.

I felt ecstatic that Sunday long ago

because their victory was my victory.

If one reflects deeply

upon one's own personal existence, James' field conception of
the self does not appear at all counter-intuitive.

My

material me truly transcends the boundaries of my physical
body.

It is this form of transcendence and not the Kantian

kind that distinguishes the field of the personal from that
of both the merely physical and the merely organic.

B.

THE SOCIAL ME

The social ME refers to the recognition we get from
others.

Since you exist in your social relations, you have

as many different social selves as there are distinct groups
of persons about whose opinion you care.

You are the various

roles you adopt in your family, your profession and in the
different organizations of which you are a member.

As one

moves from one social setting to another, there seems to
occur changes in one's behavior and character.

We present,

for example, a different self to our employees than we do to
our children.

"Properly speaking," says James, "a man has

as many social selves as there are individuals who
recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind." 54
James should have added here after the word "who, n

n

that he

thinks" for all social selves are really what we feel others
think of us and not necessarily what they do in fact think of
us.

James does, however, makes this point clear in other

passages.
We identify ourselves with the mental portraits that we
suspect others are carrying of us to such an extent that we
feel hurt when these images are tarnished in any way.

We do

it to such a degree that one is tempted to claim that we live
Primarily in the hearts and minds of others.

For some, this

very notion actually removes some of the sting of death.
54

Ibid., I, pp. 281-282.
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There have been many an artist who has labored without
recognition with the hope that some future generation would
come to appreciate his genius.

All this points to the fact

that the self is not a monad or as Sartre would say not just
a being-for-itself but also a being-for-others.
we often don't appreciate the real importance of these
images that we think others have of us until we are rejected
by a friend or especially by a lover.

It is mainly on such

occasions that we realize just how much our very self is
w.rapped up in these images.

A rejected lover contemplates

suicide because he feels that a good part of himself is
already dead and gone.

James describes this special social

self in the following manner:
The most peculiar social self which one is apt to
have is in the mind of the person one is in love
with. The good or bad fortunes of this self cause
the most intense elation and dejection -unreasonable enough as measured by every other
standard than that of the organic feeling of the
individual. To his own consciousness he is not, so
long as this particular social self fails~o get
recognition, and when it is regggnized his
contentment passes all bounds.

One's honor is another kind of social self.

It refers

to one's image in the eyes of his fellow colleagues.

It

measures how well one lives up to a particular standard of
conduct associated with one's station in life.

It is this

social self that tends to discourage soldiers from crying,
55

Ibid., I, p. 282.
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professors from writing trashy novels, and priests from going
to the race track.
"club-opinion."

This social self is often referred to as

James notes that it carries a great deal of

force in everyday life.

"The thief must not steal from other

thieves; the gambler must pay his gambling debts though he
pay no other debts in the world." 56
The significance of this particular social self called
honor was recognized recently in our political history.

In

pardoning President Nixon, President Ford argued that the
loss of his honor would be more punishing to former President
Nixon than any prison sentence.

The argument found

acceptance only among those who recognized the importance of
this particular social self in one's being as a person.

The

true significance of it is perhaps only fully recognized by
those who have experienced at one time a fall from grace.
John Locke was also familiar with the significance of
this particular social self called honor.

He states in his

Essay,
Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled
to; but nobody that has the least thought or sense
of a man about him can live in society under the
constant dislike and ill opinion of his families and
those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy
for human sufferance: and he must be made up of
irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure
in company and yet be insensibs7 of contempt and
disgrace from his companions."
56 IbJ.'d., I
' p. 283 .
57

John Locke, Essay, book II Ch XXVIII, sec. 12.
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The importance of the social ME in the experience of
selfhood should not be underestimated.

Many a man has

sacrificed his bodily existence for the sake of preserving
hiS image in the minds of his comrades.

The much talked

about "peer pressure" indicates the enormous influence of a
particular social ME on one's behavior.

In a recent popular

poll of the greatest fears of man, it was found that "fear of
death" lagged far behind "fear of public speaking."

This

suggests that most of us are often more concerned about our
social ME than our material ME.

We tend to preserve at all

cost the positive images that we think others have of us for
they form a huge part of our experience of selfhood.

This is

why so many of us are ready to risk bodily harm in defense of
our good name when someone attacks us merely with words.
The social character of the Jamesian self has been
ignored for the most part or treated very briefly by Jamesian
scholars. 58

Even John Dewey who held that selves have no

existence save for environing conditions failed to note in
his interpretation of the Jamesian self that for James the
"environing conditions" are primarily social in character.
While Dewey stressed the organic specification of the "Self
of selves," he did not attend to the social specification
58

The two most notable exceptions to this are John
Wild, The Radical Empiricism of William James, op. cit. and
Henry S. Levinson, Science, Metaphysics and the Chance of
~lvation:
An Intrepretation of the Thought of William
~ames (Dissertation series - American Academy of Religion;
no · 24 ) 19 7 8 .
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that occurred in the very same paragraph of the Principles

£f

psychology:

" ••• the innermost of the empirical selves

of a man is a Self of the social sort ...... 59

As we shall

make clear in part seven of this study, the social feature of
the Jamesian self is no less fundamental than its agency or
its temporality.

No self, in James' view, is devoid of

social significance.
In James' writings, the social me is recognized as a
vital part of the objective self.

All of us have a need to

be noticed and noticed with admiration and approval.

This is

why total isolation is often considered the worst form of
punishment.

The images that we believe others have of us do

indeed constitute a considerable part of our feeling of
selfhood.
in society.

We are to a great extent the roles that we assume
Nevertheless, for James the objective self is

not merely social in nature for there is beside the social
ME, a material ME and a spiritual ME.
ME that we must now turn.
59 P .
. 1 es, I , p. 301 .
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It is to the spiritual

C.

THE SPIRITUAL ME

The third area of the objective dimension of the self is
what James calls the spiritual self.

The term is quite

misleading for the spiritual ME is not a spiritual substance
at all but is rather what we experience when we try to catch
our mental activity in process.

The spiritual ME for James

is one's psychic powers or dispositions taken concretely.
be

To

more precise, it is one's past subjectivity viewed as an

object.

It is not the principle of personal unity, the pure

I, and it is not the soul.
James describes the spiritual ME as "the self of all the
other selves," "the sanctuary within the citadel" and "the
innermost center within the circle."
an active element of experience.

It presents itself as

James writes,

It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over
the perceptions of sensations, and by giving or
withholding its assent it influences the movements
they tend to arouse. It is the home of
interest ••• It is the source of effort and attention,
and the plac5 0from which appear to emanate the fiats
of the will.

A certain ambiguity surrounds James' description of the
Spiritual ME.

On certain occasions, he seems to be

identifying the spiritual ME with the "I" or subject of
experience.
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For James, however, the spiritual ME is not the

rb;d.,
I ' p.
....
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subject of experience, and such a view is really a
misinterpretation of the Jamesian self motivated in part by
James uncautious description of the spiritual ME.

We must

keep in mind that James began his discussion of the spiritual
ME by stating unambiguously, "By the Spiritual Self, so far

as it belongs to the Empirical Me, I mean a man's inner or
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions,
taken concretely; not the bare principle of personal Unity or
•pure' Ego, which remains to be discussed." 61
we should also not forget that he began his chapter on
the self by stating,
The constituents of the Self may be divided into two
classes, those which make up respectively - (a) the
material Self; (b) the social Self; <g~ the
spiritual Self; and (d) the pure Ego.
These words of James make it clear that the spiritual
self is not the same as the subject of experience.

The two

classes which James refers to here are (1) the empirical self
made up of (a) the material ME (b) the social ME and (c) the
spiritual ME and (2) the pure Ego which is subjectivity
itself.

These two classes are what we refer to as the

objective and subjective dimensions of the self.
The spiritual ME is part of the empirical self and as
such 1' t 1s
· ent1re
· 1 y o b]ect1ve.
·
·

It is an object for the

present pulse of consciousness and is not itself the present
61

Ibid., I, p. 283.

62 rbid., I, p. 280.
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pulse of consciousness.

Past pulses of consciousness can be

grasped as objects by a reflective act of the present pulse
of consciousness.

These past acts of consciousness are all

part of the spiritual ME and the objective dimension of the
self.

The present pulse which is doing the reflecting is on

the other hand not an object and not part of the spiritual
self as yet, but is presently functioning as the subjective
dimension of the self.

One might say that the spiritual ME

is a collection of the past "I's" for the present "I."

A

transformation occurs, however, to the "I" as it recedes into
the past and becomes a mere object for a new "I."
process it ceases to function as an "I."

In this

Thus, when we grasp

it in reflection, we are not really grasping the "I" at all
for the present subject of experience remains by its very
nature beyond our grasp.

Our predicament is like that of

grasping a snowflake to examine its intricate structure.
With the grasp it ceases to be a snowflake and becomes
something else, a drop of water.
subjectivity.

The same is true of

In objectifying it, we transform it.

The

spiritual ME is objectified subjectivity as the drop of water
is a melted snowflake.
As the function of all objectification, consciousness is
itself necessarily pre-objective.

As the indispensable

subjective condition for all objectification, it is itself
beyond objectification and remains always the pre-reflective
awareness "that," which is the experiential condition of all
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·refleXive awareness of "what."

James writes,

The present moment of consciousness is thus, as Mr.
Hodgson says, the darkest in the whole series. It
may feel its own immediate existence -- we have all
along admitted the possibility of this, hard as it
is by direct introspection to ascertain the fact -but nothig~ can be known about it till it be dead
and gone.

The above facts become very important when James goes on
to discover that the spiritual ME is mainly a feeling of
embodiment.

Some interpreters of James believing that the

spiritual self is the subject of experience feel that James
has reduced the subject to the physical body and that he is
really presenting a behavioristic view of the self.

What

James is saying here, however, is that subjectivity manifest
itself objectively in reflection as an embodied

11

I 11 -ness.

In

other words, in reflection the body is felt as the vehicle of
consciousness.

Consciousness is not denied and James is no

materialist.
Failure to note and appreciate James' distinction
between the spiritual me which is specified primarily in
terms of bodily movement and the

11

I 11 which is specified

exclusively in terms of the present pulse of consciousness
has fostered behavioristic interpretations of the Jamesian
self and charges that James was a materialist.

John Dewey

and James Bayley, for example, have each emphasized what they
regard as the behavioristic character of James' account of
63
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the self.

64

Even George Santayana failed to recognize the

breakthrough that James had made.

Santayana wrote in his

review of the Principles "Professor James ••• has here outdone
the materialists themselves." 65
Now that we have made clear that the spiritual ME is not
the present subject of experience, let us examine more
closely James' positive description of it.

We pointed out

above that it is our psychic power or dispositions taken
concretely in reflection.

It is what we feel when we try to

catch our own subjectivity in introspection.

In

introspection, James finds that it is difficult for him to
discover any purely spiritual element.

In his efforts to

catch the source of effort and attention, he finds himself
grasping some corporeal event occuring mostly in his head.
James writes,
Whenever my introspection glance succeeds in turning
round quickly enough to catch one of these
manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can
ever feel distinctly is some bodily pro~gss, for the
most part taking place within the head.

Let me repeat, what is involved here is no denial of
thought or emotions, but rather the more modest claim that we
are unable to grasp these in reflection as being nonbodily or
64
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completely psychical.

The body is always felt as the vehicle

of consciousness.
Andrew Reck shares this view.

Although he recognizes

that James' analysis of the spiritual self returns to the
bOdY for its primary meaning, he points out that this does
not mean that James is embracing a reductive behaviorism.
Reck notes that there remains in James' account two foci.
The present passing thought is the first focus.

The

experienced-body which always accompanies thought is the
second focus.

"The passing Thought is the self as thinker.

The Body is the self as the object of all physical and mental
processes." 67

In other words, selfhood entails two

inseparable dimensions for the self is an irreducible
subjective-objective temporal process.
In his own introspective glance James discovers vague
feelings of something more than the experience of
embodiment.

Is this vague feeling the feeling of

subjectivity itself?
question.

At this point James leaves it an open

He writes,
••• there is an obscurer feeling of something more~
but whether it be of fainter physiological
processes, or of nothing objective at all, but
rather of subjectivity as such, of thought become
'its own object,' must at present remain an open
question ••• Farther than this we cannot as yet go
clearly in out 8 analysis of the Self's
constituents.

67
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In the above quote we find a hint of his later claim
that although we can't have "knowledge about" we can have a
feeling of or "knowledge by acquaintance" of our own
subjectivity.

He leaves the issue an open question here

because his discussion now is of the empirical self only
i.e. the self that we can have "knowledge about" and not mere
"knowledge by acquaintance."

In saying "Farther than this we

cannot as yet go" he is suggesting there will be a deeper
penetration of this issue when he comes to discuss the
subjective dimension of the self.
But here in his discussion of the objective dimension of
the self James is exploring the structure of the lived-body
in a way that anticipates the work of Merleau-Ponty
in The Phenomenology of Perception.

It was not the body of

physiology, the mere mass of matter extended in space, that
James saw as forming the spiritual me.

It was rather the

moving, living conscious body which James regarded as the
spiritual ME.

The body of physiology creates less of that

peculiar interest we described earlier, and so forms a part
only of the material ME and does not belong to what James
calls "the sanctuary within the citadel" i.e. the spiritual
ME.

We must now take a closer look at this spiritualized-

body to see how it functions as the heart of the entire
objective dimension of the self.

D.

THE ME AS A FIELD OF CARE CENTERED IN THE LIVED-BODY
The material ME, the social ME and the spiritual ME

together form a single unified field which we call the
objective dimension of the self.
field is the lived-body.

At the center of this self-

James found that though the various

"ME"s which form the objective dimension of the self are not
all reducible to my physical body, each does carry as part of
its meaning a reference to my lived-body.

He writes,

••• each human mind's appearance on this earth is
conditioned upon the integrity of the body with
which it belongs, upon the treatment which that body
gets from others, and upon the spiritual
dispositions which use it as their too1, ~nd lead it
either towards longevity or destruction. 6

James believes that one's body can never be perceived as
just another object of consciousness.

We know it first of

all by "direct sensible acquaintance." 70
as an isolated thing.

It is never felt

"Never is the body felt all alone, but

always together with other things." 71

The body lying at

the center of the self's objective dimension is never
experienced apart from the experienced-world.
body is inseparably linked to the lived-world.

This livedIn all this,

James anticipates the work of the French phenomenologist
Merleau-Ponty.
69
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James insists that the body is concomrnitantly
experienced with every object of experience, and it is that
object in terms of which other objects are themselves located
and objectified with respect to one another and with respect
to the subject of experience.

For James, the body is the

core of experience and the origin of reality.

He writes,

The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field
of consciousness') comes at all times with our body
as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action,
centre of interest ••• The body is the storm centre,
the origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of
stress in all that experience-train. Everything
circles round it, and is felt from its point of
view. The word 'I' then is primarily ' noun of
position, just like 'this' and 'here'. 2

James notes that words like 'here' 'now' and 'this'
imply a systematization of things with references to a focus
of action and interest of the subjectivized-body.

"Where the

body is 'here'; when the body acts is 'now'; what the body
touches is 'this'; all other things are 'there' 'then' and
'that' ." 73
For James, a thing is viewed as real when it is known in
a fringe of relationships, the main one being a practical
relationship to one's body.

If an object is so fringed, it

is regarded as part of the same world inhabited by one's
body.

We believe in the reality of an object when we feel

that the object belongs to the past, present or future of the
72
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same spatial-temporal field as our body.

This view put forth

in the Principles of Psychology later became a central
feature of James' pragmatic theory of meaning and truth.
James maintains that some awareness of the body
accompanies all awareness.
awareness of one's body.

There is always some nonfocal
Since the body is in the fringe of

all experiences, there is always a marginal prereflective
continuous sense of personal existence.
There are at least six reasons why James regards the
body as the objective center of the Self-Field:

(1) the self

of selves, i.e., the spiritual self is discovered to be
primarily the experience of embodiment: (2) all the selves
whether material, social or spiritual carry as part of their
meaning a reference to the body: (3) the body is that
persistent object in the field of experience which makes the
judgment of self-identity possible: (4) the body is required
for the appropriation of past acts of consciousness: (5) the
body is the first and also the most intimate and the most
interesting object in the whole field of care known as the
ME: (6) the wider self is built up around and knitted to the
body and other objects tend to become interesting
derivatively through it.
Some of these reasons we have already touched upon and
the others we will discuss in detail when we deal with the
concrete full self and the constitution of the ME.

For now

we merely want to make it clear that for James the body
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serves as the center of the objective dimension of the self.
Although we can't over emphasize the importance of the
bOdy, we must nevertheless keep in mind that it occupies only
the center of the self-field which is irreducible to it or to
anything else.

This self-field is a field of objects that

are related by being cared for.

The objective dimension of

the self is simply the totality of the cared-for.

We must

also remember that the cared-for exist as cared-for only by
virtue of

th~

caring.

pulse of subjectivity.

Caring is a function of the present
A self is the irreducible unity of

these subjective and objective dimensions.

We must not,

therefore, stop our analysis of the Self (as many have) with
our description of the field of care and the function of the
body. 74 We must also examine the caring for the caring
itself is not something outside the self but is perhaps the
most personalized part of the self.

A Self is the dynamic

unity of the caring present and the cared-for.
totality that we represent symbolically as I<
~

It is that
~ME

call Self-constituting-Historical-Existence.

and which
It is to the

caring-present that we must now turn.
74
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PART FIVE
THE SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF THE SELF
our focus now shifts to that aspect of the self that is
often referred to as the subject of experience.

In our

investigation of the subjective dimension of personal
existence we will be exploring James' theory of consciousness
with special attention devoted to its unity, temporality,
activity and its caring character.

79

A.

THE FIVE TRAITS OF THOUGHT

James believes that the first fact that all psychologists
111

ust accept is "that thinking of some sort goes on." 75

James uses the word thinking here to cover all forms of
consciousness.

In his exploration of how thought goes on,

James discovers that it has five fundamental characteristics.
It is personal, changing, sensibly continuous, cognitive and
selective.

He writes,

(1)
Every thought tends to be part of a personal
consciousness.
(2)
Within each personal
consciousness thought is always changing.
(3)
Within each personal consciousness thought is
sensibly continuous.
(4)
It always appears to deal
with objects independent of itself.
(5)
It is
interested in some parts of these objects to the
exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects choose, from among them, in a word - all the
while. 6

James' chapter on the stream of thought in the
Principles of Psychology is perhaps just as important for a
correct understanding of the Jamesian self as his subsequent
chapter that deals exclusively with the self.

Interpreters

of James' conception of the self tend, however, not to give
sufficient emphasis to this chapter that deals with the
nature of consciousness.
75 P
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to ignore our best clues regarding the subjective dimension
of the Jamesian self.
THE FIRST TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
what does James mean when he states, "Every thought tends
to be part of a personal consciousness?"

This first trait of

thought means primarily that no thought has an isolated
existence and each thought belongs with only certain other
thoughts.

The thoughts I have belong with other thoughts

that I have and the thoughts that you have belong with other
thoughts that you have.

Between individuals there is no

sharing of pulses of subjectivity.

James insists that the

existence of personal selves can not be doubted by any
psychology for the universal fact is not "thoughts exist" but
"I think".

Each single thought always forms a part of an

individual personal consciousness.
thoughts apart from the self.

It is absurd to talk of

Even so called subconscious

thought is not really a case of nonpersonal thought for such
modes of consciousness are either on the fringe of the main
self or they belong to secondary selves.
owned.

Every thought is

The basic fact of subjectivity is not thought or this

thought or that thought but "my thought." 77

The law of

consciousness is "absolute insulation and irreducible
Pluralism. n 78
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78
Ibid.

82

James believes that the ultimate source of the notion of
personality lies with the stream of thought.

To refuse to

personifY the stream of thought would be foolish for it is
already personified.

James feels that the biggest error a

psychology can commit is to interpret the stream of thought
in a reductionist manner so as to steal from this stream its
personal quality.

My thinking is not merely one of the many

activities that I perform.

I am my thinking.

I exist

through it and when it ceases irretrievably so do I.
think therefore

I

"I

am," is true because this thinking is to a

great extent what I am, and yet I am even more than this.

am more because

I

I

am a being that has both a subjective and

an objective dimension.
The subject of experience is not something behind the
stream of thought like a soul or transcendental ego.

James

insists that the present segment of the stream of thought
functions as the subject.

Here is the "I" of experience, and

besides this present pulse of thought, there is no other "I"
nor is there a need for one.
The precise meaning of the first trait of thought will
not be made totally clear until we have completed our
explanation of the Jamesian self.

When James discusses this

first fundamental characteristic of the stream of
COnsciousness, he also warns the reader that what he means

When he says consciousness always tends to be personal will
not become clear until he has finished his analysis of the
Self.

THE SECOND TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

constant change is the second fundamental characteristic
of consciousness.

This second trait of thought does not mean

that there is no duration to mental states.

To say that

thought is constantly changing means for James that no mental
state once gone can return and be identical with what it was
before.

The same pulse of consciousness never returns

although the same object may come back repeatedly.

James

rejects Locke's notion of mental atoms for there is no proof
at all that we ever encounter the same thought twice.

James

subscribes to a temporalist conception of consciousness
according to which it is a constant flux.

He sees no

evidence for the static atoms of thought and feeling of the
associationists.

The intentional activity of feeling,

thinking, desiring, etc. is never exactly the same on two
different occasions even if it is dealing with the same
object on these occasions.
The principal reason James rejects the notion of a
recurring mental state is that he feels experience is
transforming us constantly and thus our mental reaction to
any thing is a function of our entire experiential history up
to that point in time.

The significance of this fact will

become prominent when we come to discuss the historical
character of the self.

continuous change in consciousness is

thus related to the ever present influence of accumulative
83

84

sedimentation of experience within consciousness.

A thing

once experienced, such as a statue, is never experienced
exactly the same when it is encountered again, for one's
initial encounter will influence how one experiences it when
it comes again.

An object is always experienced within a

context and any previous experiences of it forms a part of
this context.

James writes,

Every thought we have of a given fact is, strictly
speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of
kind with other thoughts of the same fact. When the
identical fact recurs, we must think of it in a
fresh manner, see it under a somewhat different
angle, apprehend it in different relations from
those in which it last appeared. And the thought by
which we cognize it is the thought of it in those
relations, a thought suf7~sed with the consciousness
of all that dim context.

The same object is being thought of at different times by
pulses of consciousness that are not the same.

James regards

the notion of a permanently existing idea which keeps
returning to consciousness as being as mythical as the Jack
of Spades.

This second trait of thought will become

important later on in our discussion of the role of the sense
of sameness in the experience of selfhood.

The sameness that

we encounter is always the sameness of the object and not the
sameness of the acts of consciousness.

James declares,

" ••• it would certainly be true to say, like Heraclitus, that
we never descend twice into the same stream." 80
79
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THE THIRD TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
consciousness does not reveal itself as chopped up in
bits.

It doesn't appear in reflection as a chain of thoughts

but rather as a stream of thought.

In the following words

James expresses the third trait of consciousness:

"Within

each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly
continuous." 81
things.

This character of thought means two

It means. first of all, even in the case of time-

gaps, the consciousness before the gap is felt as belonging
with the consciousness after the gap and both are viewed as
parts of the same self.

Secondly, it means that there are no

absolutely abrupt changes in the quality of consciousness
from one moment to the next.
Like time itself consciousness is continuous.

James

believes this fact is often missed because one tends to treat
the thoughts themselves as if they were the same as the
things of which the thoughts are aware.

The acts of thought

which are subjective facts are very different from the
objects that they manifest.

James states,

The things are discrete and discontinuous: they do
pass before us in a train or chain, making often
explosive appearances and rending each other in
twain. But their comings and goings and contrasts
no more break the flow of the thought that thinks
them than 2hey break the time and the space in which
they lie. 8
Blibid., I, p. 231.
82
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Between the thought of one thing and another thing there
iS no fissure in consciousness.

Consciousness involves

besides substantive states, transitive states which are the
transitional states for consciousness as it goes from
focusing upon one thing to focusing upon another.

James

points out that the transition is as much a part of
consciousness as a joint in a bamboo is a part of the bamboo
and not a break in the wood.
James believes that there is no break in consciousness
because there is always an awareness of the recent past in
the present pulse of consciousness.

For example, one never

experiences thunder pure, for there is always the awareness
of the previous silence and thus what one really experiences
is "thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-withit."83

Because of this continuous retention of the recent

past in the present pulse of consciousness, there is never
any absolutely abrupt changes in the quality of consciousness
from one moment to the next.
This third trait of consciousness means that one has not
only an awareness of things but also feelings of relations,
most of which are unnamed.

James believes there exist

feelings of "and," "if," "but" and "by" but we tend to
overlook these transitive states of consciousness in favor of
the objects that these relations connect.

Our language with

its bias towards the substantive parts makes it easy to
ignore our anonymous transitional states.
83 rbid., I, p. 234.

James reminds us,

87

however, that namelessness is compatible with existence.
surrounding every image, there is always a vague
consciousness of the sphere to which it is intended to
belong.

These transitive states are what gives meaning and

direction to the stream of consciousness as it moves from
attending to one thing to another.
Feelings of relations of transition and feelings of
relations of tendency are often ignored because our knowledge
of them is a knowledge by direct acquaintance rather than a
knowledge about and because we have no precise names to cover
each of their kind.

James wants to reinstate the vague to

its proper place in our mental life.

He writes,

This is all I have to say about the sensible
continuity and unity of our thought as contrasted
with the apparent discreteness of the words, images,
and other means by which it seems to be carried on.
Between all their substantive elements there is
'transitive' consciousness, and the words and images
are 'fringed,' ~id not as discreet as to a careless
view they seem.

The unity of consciousness that results from a process of
continuous appropriation is a real unity.

James insists that

all the pulses of consciousness melt into each other like
dissolving views.

"Properly they are but one protracted

consciousness, one unbroken stream." 85
84
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THE FOURTH TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
"Human thought appears to deal with objects independent

-

of itself; that is, it is cognitive, or possesses the
~nction of knowing." 86 This is how James describes the
fourth character of thought.

entails two things:

This trait of consciousness

(1) the thought and its object are not

one and the same and (2) the thought itself is the thinker.
James does not regard thought and feeling as total
opposites.

"From a cognitive point of view, all mental facts

are intellectious.
are feelings." 87

From the subjective point of view, all
Both feeling and thought are cognitive

for both reveal the world.

"Acquaintance-knowledge" is given

through feelings and "knowledge-about" is given through
thoughts.

James believes that knowledge by acquaintance is

our main access to the real world.

He writes,

All elementary natures of the world, its highest
genera, the simple qualities of matter and mind,
together with the relations which subsist between
them, must either not be known at all, or known in
this d~Wb way of acquaintance without knowledgeabout.

James sees knowledge by acquaintance as constituting our
main reality for two reasons:

first, it signifies access to

86 Ib;d.,
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our most primitive contact with the world, and secondly, all
knowledge-about must ultimately refer back to this original
relation to the world which is disclosed in knowledge-byacquaintance.
This conception of knowledge-by-acquaintance plays an
important role in the Jamesian theory of the self.

The

present pulse of subjectivity which functions as the "I" only
feels its existence, it has no knowledge-about with regard to
itself.

With his two types of knowledge, James can thus

confidently assert the reality of the present "I" while still
maintaining that it is the "darkest in the whole series" for
we lack knowledge-about it.

In his treatment of this cognitive trait of
consciousness, James points out that it is wrong to believe
that the reflective consciousness of self is required by the
cognitive operation of thought.

Here James' conception of

consciousness is in agreement with the view of Sartre
presented in The Transcendence of the Ego.

Consciousness

according to Sartre is only non-positionally aware of itself
in the present moment, although past moments of consciousness
may be made into an object of knowledge through reflection.
Both James and Sartre reject the notion of a permanent ego
that dwells in consciousness as its source.

There is no

permanent subject of experience that lies behind
consciousness.

There is only the present pulse of

consciousness which continuously functions as the "I".

90

Although James finds no evidence for a belief in a
permanent ego that lies behind consciousness and makes
consciousness of objects possible, he does believe that one's
bOdY is continuously felt on the fringe of one's conscious
field and there is also a vague feeling of the pulse of
subjectivity itself.

So we must be careful here in our

understanding of James.
times lacking a self.

He is not declaring that one is at
On the contrary, James insists that

one has a continuous awareness of one's own existence but
this is knowledge by direct acquaintance which is quite
different from knowledge-about the self which is gained
through reflection.
Two more important points that James makes in his
discussion of the cognitive character of consciousness are as
follows:

(1) the object of each thought is all that the

thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, and (2) no
matter how complex the object, the thought of it is one
undivided pulse of consciousness.8 9
When one states "Columbus discovered America in 1492,"
James believes that the object of consciousness is not
"Columbus" or "America" but is rather the entire sentence
"Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492."
constitution of the thought.

This is the actual

To treat one of its substantive

elements as the object of consciousness is to falsify the
thought.

"Columbus" might be the topic of this thought, but
89 rbid., I, p. 266.
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it should not be regatqed as the object.

James recognizes

the fact that there are time-parts when having this thought
but he insists there are in the thought no parts
corresponding to the object's parts.

"Whatever things are

!bought in relation" says James, "are thought from the outset
!n a unity, in a single pulse of subjectivity, a single
E?ychosis, feeling, or state of mind." 90
The above statement is significant for our understanding
of the relationship between the dimensions of the self which

we shall soon be exploring in depth.

James' position here

indicates that no matter how complex the objective dimension
of the self, the subjective dimension remains always a single
pulse of subjectivity.

For all the numerous elements of the

material me, spiritual me, and social me there is one single
active and irreducible "I" to which they belong.
THE FIFTH TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The fifth character of thought refers to the freedom and
activity of the subjective dimension of the self.

It is also

this trait of consciousness which plays a major role in the
constitution of the objective dimension of the self.
James, consciousness is primarily a selecting agency.

For
James

describes the fifth trait of consciousness in the following
manner:

"It is always interested more in one part of its

~ject than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses,
!!l the while it thinks." 91
90
91
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James believes that consciousness is constantly selecting
according to its own interest at the time.

This selection

occurs not only in cases of deliberations of the will, but in
every experience that we have.

In every act of perception,

there is always accentuation and emphasis, and this is the
work of the selectivity of consciousness.

The formation of a

conceptual order has its basis in the acts of selective
attention.

"Focalization, concentration of consciousness,"

says James, "are of its essence." 92

He writes,

Out of what is .in itself an undistinguishable,
swarming continuum, devoid of distinction or
emphasis, our senses makes for us, by attending to
this motion and ignoring that, a world full of
contrasts, of sharp accents, ~f abrupt changes, of
picturesque light and shade. 9

For James things themselves are simply a collection of
sensible qualities which are of interest to consciousness for
practical or aesthetic reasons and to which we give
substantive names.

The essence of a thing is also grounded

in the selective attention of consciousness.

Essences are

not Plato's eternal Forms, rather they are simply
"teleological weapons" that we employ to get a handle on the
given of experience.

Guided by its own ends, consciousness

determines which sensations shall be regarded as real and
Valid.

James writes,
92
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The mind, in short, works on the data it receives
very much as a sculptor works on his block of
stone. In a sense the statue stood there from
eternity. But there were a thousand different ones
beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for
having extricated this one from the rest. Just so
the world of each of us, however different our
several views of it may be, all lay embedded in the
primordial chaos of sensations, which gave the me9~
matter to the thought of all of us indifferently.

James believes that the selective action of consciousness
is most obvious in the area of ethics.

In discussing the

choice that consciousness makes in the field of ethics, James
rejects Schopenhauer's notion that with a given fixed
character only one reaction is possible under given
circumstances.

James says that Schopenhauer forgets that in

the case of moral decision, what is being decided _is the very
structure of one's character itself.

In significant ethical

situations, the question is not merely what action shall I
now take but also and more importantly, what being shall I
now choose to become.

This view of self transformation plays

a vital role in James' discussion of sudden religious
conversions in The Varieties of Religious

Ex~rience.

James believes that to a great extent we choose our "ME."
The specific character of the objective dimension of the self
is determined by the selectivity of consciousness.

James

notes that there is great similarity in a general way
94
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concerning the selections that each human consciousness
makeS.

There is a strong concensus concerning what in

experience functions as things and what are their essences.
aut James then describes one mode of conscious selection in
whic h a "concensus never occurs."

James is here referring to

the selectivity of consciousness that is involved in forming
one's objective self.

He writes,

There is, however, one entirely extraordinary case
in which no two men ever are known to choose alike.
One great splitting of the whole universe into two
halves is made by each of us; and for each of us
almost all of the interest attaches to one of the
halves; but we all draw the line of division between
them in a different place. When I say that we all
call the two halves by the same names, and that
those names are 'me' and 'not me'
respe95ively, it will at once be seen what I
mean.

James could not have stated it any clearer that one's
•ME" is formed through the selective activity of
consciousness.

The nature of this self constituting process

will be discussed more fully in the next section.

We must

now examine the temporal structure of the subjective
dimension of the self.

All five characters of the subjective

dimension of the self owe their existence to the retentionalProtentional structure of consciousness or what James calls
the "specious present."

It is what makes consciousness a

stream.
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Ib1.'d., I , pp. 277 - 278 .

B.

APPROPRIATION AND TEMPORALITY

James believes that self-identity, like the identity of

anY ObJ'ect of consciousness, rests on the power of
consciousness to cognize the same object.

For James, the

sense of sameness forms the basis of the experience of
(identical) things including those things which come to
canpose one 1 s "ME • n

This sense of sameness is in turn

grounded on the retentional-protentional character of
consciousness, i.e., in the temporality of consciousness.

It

is this temporal structure of consciousness that allows for
the lived appropriation of each pulse of consciousness by its
successor.
As we noted above, two of the traits of consciousness are
that it is constantly changing and sensibly continuous.

In

James' chapter on time, these two characteristics of thought
are further explained.

There is a persistent stream of

consciousness despite the transitions due to the fact that
the present pulse of subjectivity appropriates its
predecessor and projects its successor.

Without this

Operation we would be unable to speak of a stream of
consciousness.

"The knowledge of some other part of the

!!ream, past and future, near or remote," says James, "is
!!ways mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing." 96
96
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James realizes that the experience of sameness would be
impossible if our perception of time was simply an awareness
of a succession of now points.

He believes that the present

moment is not a point of timei it has thickness.

He writes,

In short, the practically cognized present is no
knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth
of its own on which we sit perched, and from which
we look in two directions into time. The unit of
composition of our perception of time is a
duration, with a bow and a stern, a9 it were, a
rearward and a forward-looking end. 7

This doctrine of the temporal fringe of consciousness was
not confined to James' Principles of Psychology.

On the

contrary, it makes its appearance in a number of his works.
In A Pluralistic Universe he writes, "If we do not feel both
past and present in one field of feeling, we feel them not at
all." 98

In Essays in Radical Empiricism he declares that

the identity of each personal consciousness is based on the
fact that each new experience has past time for part of its
'content•.9 9

James regards the temporal fringe as the

everlasting peculiarity of the life of consciousness.
James' "specious present" makes possible both reflection
and the sense of sameness, both of which are required for
self-consciousness.

It is the retention of the recent past

in the lived-present which provides our immediate link with
the past and gives to us the possibility of reflection upon
97
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the past stream of experience.

The sense of sameness which

requires the experience of duration also has the livedpresent as its foundation.

James noted that a succession of

experiences is in itself not yet an experience of the
succession.

According to James, the past, to be experienced

as "past," must be experienced together with the present and
during the present moment.

Thus, the sense of sameness

requires the temporal fringe.

James states,

These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of
new are the germs of memory and expectation, the
retrospective and the prospective sense of time.
They give that continuity to conscious~ s without
which it could not be called a stream. 00

A discussion of James' theory of the temporality of
consciousness naturally leads to a discussion of his theory
of the appropriation of consciousness.

It is due to the

temporal fringe of consciousness that appropriation of the
recent past is possible.

James admits that common sense

seems to demand for the "Subject" a more real unity than the
appropriating thought provides.
~orne

The present thought seems to

already owning the past thoughts and this suggests

something like an Arch-Ego which transcends and yet controls
the entire stream of consciousness.

James calls this the

•never-lapsing ownership" feature of consciousness and he
believes it can be accounted for without an "Arch-Ego" and
lOOP r1nc1p
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without the thought that is the present owner being
substantially indentical with the thought that was the past
owner.

According to James, there is a continuous

transmission of ownership such that the title of a collective
self is passed from one thought to another.

The present

thought is not substantially identical with the preceding
thought but he does inherit his title of "I" in such a way
that the past self is always owned by a title that never
lapses and is constantly being transmitted.

James writes,

Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought
dies away and is replaced by another. The other,
among the things it knows, knows its own
predecessor, and finding it 'warm', in the way we
have described, greets it, saying: "Thou art mine,
and part of the same self with me." Each later
thought, knowing and including thus the thoughts
which went before, is the final owner - of all that
they contain and own. Each thought is, thus born an
owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it
reali~ed as bis Self to its own later
propr1etor. 1

The body plays a vital role in this process of
appropriation.

Since the present pulse of subjectivity has

no knowledge about itself in the present moment, its
appropriations are projected onto the lived-body which always
forms a non-focal part of its present object. 102

The past

stream of consciousness is thus appropriated to the body by
the present pulse of consciousness with its temporal fringe.
The body is the kernel to which the past and future
101
102
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dimensions of the self are appropriated by consciousness.
of all of James' interpreters, A. J. Ayer gives the most
elaborate analysis of James' theory of appropriation.

Ayer

is correct in emphasizing the crucial role this process plays
in personal identity.

Nevertheless, Ayer is wrong in

reproaching James for ignoring the role the body plays in the
experience of personal identity.

According to Ayer, James

onlY employs the experience of embodiment to account for
one's present feeling of selfhood.

He claims that James does

not rely on the body in his account of how experiences which
occur at different times are assigned to the same self.

Ayer

thus concludes, "It is, therefore, to this process of
appropriation and not the construction [of the body] that he
looks for the source of personal identity." 103
point Ayer is mistaken.

On this

For James self-identity involves

both the functional identity of consciousness and the
constituted identity of the objective self of which the body
is the core.

Moreover the body according to James is

involved in the process of appropriation itself which is
responsible for the functional identity of consciousness.
James' analysis of the subjective dimension of the self,
then, returns to a discussion of the body, the core of the
objective dimension of the self.

This does not mean that

James is developing a reductive behavioristic theory of the
self.

It means rather the inseparability of the subjective

103 A. J. Ayer Th e 0 r~g~ns
. .
.
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and the objective dimensions of the self.

Neither dimension

iS reduced to the other for there remains for James two
foci.

First, there is the pulse of thought which perishes

immediately.

Second, there is the experience of embodiment

which is a constant accompaniment of thought.

The body

provides the continuity required for the continuous
appropriation of one's past mental life and so it serves as
the objective core of the self.

C.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE "I" AND ITS ACTIVITY

Do we have an "I" that really exists and is it a real
agent?

After having discussed the five traits of

consciousness, its temporality, and its acts of self
appropriation, it should be clear that the answer to both
questions is yes.

There is no substantial soul and there is

no pure ego, but there is nonetheless an "I" which exist and
acts.

In discussing the selective character of consciousness

we have already touched upon the activity of the "I".

Now we

must decide if this selectivity means the "I" is truly
efficacious and the self exists as a real agent in the world.
Many interpreters of James have regarded the Jamesian
self as something totally objective.

John Dewey was one of

the first to view James in this light in his article "The
Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James."

Dewey argues

that certain passages in the Principles of Psychology suggest
a reduction of the "subject" to a vanishing point save as
"subject" is identified with the organism.

He concludes his

article, however, with these words which seem to support our
~sition

on the Jamesian self:
Nevertheless the dualism reappears, for he still
assumes that a "passing thought" must be there as the
knowing subject. Hence after recurring to his
doctrine that "'perishing' pulses of thought" are
what know, he makes what on the face of it looks like
an extraordinary compromise between the "pulse ~ 04
thought" as ! and the "empirical person" as ME.
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This "extraordinary compromise" is what this essay is all
about.

This is precisely what the self is, an extraordinary

compromise.

It is that alleged impossibility which Sartre

called pour-et-en-soi.

For Sartre it is man's impossible

goal, while for James, it is what each of us already is.
Each of us is an extraordinary compromise of spontaneity and
sedimentation.
James' denial of a permanent substantial subject should
not be regarded as denying the existence of the "I".

The "I"

exists in the only way an "I" can exist, that is, as the
present pulse of subjectivity.

Each perishing pulse of

thought functions as an "I" and so the "I" is a reality and
not just a word or something ideal.
James admits that the "I" viewed as the thinker, as that
to which all the concrete features of the objective self
belong and are known, seems to suggest "a permanent abiding
principle of spiritual activity identical with itself
wherever found.• 105

If it wasn't for the reality of

perishing pulses of consciousness, James points out that we
would be required to posit an abiding principle, absolutely
one with itself.

Once the reality of passing states of

consciousness is recognized, however, there is no need to
believe that the thinker posesses such substantiality and
permanence.

James argues that a functional identity is the

only sort of identity in the thinker which the facts
105 James, Psychology, Briefer Course (Riverside
New Jersey: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1962), p. 202.
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indicate.

He writes,
Yesterday's and today's states of consciousness have
no substantial identity, for when one is here the
other 1s 1rrevocably dead and gone. But they have a
functional identity, for both know the same objects,
and so far as the by-gone me is one of those
objects, they react upon it in an identical way,
greeting it and calling it mine, and opposing it to
all the other things they know ••• Successive
thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the
same past in the same way, form an adequate vehicle
for all the experience of personal unity and
sameness which we actually have. And just such a
train of s~ gessive thinkers is the stream of mental
states •••• 0

What all this means is that the "I" exists, but its
existence is temporary.

Through continuous acts of

appropriation it has, however, a functional identity with all
the "I"s that preceded it and all the "I"s that will come
after it.

Each pulse of consciousness in its turn will

function as the subject of experience before passing this
title to its successor.

An "I" which is transitory may seem

strange to one who believes in the absolute permanent
identity of the self, but a non-transitory I seems just as
odd to one who believes in the spontaneity of the self and
its ability to change and grow.

James, needless to say, was

a firm believer in the latter.
Following Dewey's lead some Jamesian scholars treat
James• perishing pulses of thought as merely tools for the
106
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real subject of experience- the body. 107

These

interpreters of James assume that if he denies the soul and
the transcendental ego, he must affirm the body as the
subject of experience.

But in truth the Jamesian subject of

experience is the present passing thought, and this is why he
refers to it as the "I".

Since the subject of experience has

been generally regarded by philosophers as something more or
less permanent, it is easy to understand their hesitancy to
view the perishing pulse of consciousness as the subject.
For James, however, the temporary nature of the pulse of
consciousness does not make it any less real or any less
active or any less worthy of the term "I".

It only appears

as an unworthy candidate for the term "I" to those who still
imagine a more permanent "I" like a soul or a transcendental
ego.

James believes his less permanent "I" is better able to

account for self-becoming and growth and moreover this "I" is
experiencable.
In the Psychology, Briefer course James points out that
the "I" is a much more difficult subject of inquiry than the
ME.

By

the "I" James means "that which at any given moment

is conscious ... lOS

The "I" is the Thinker.

James then

ponders the question, what is the thinker?

He writes,

Is it the passing state of
is it something deeper and
passing state we have seen
of change. Yet each of us

consciousness itself, or
less mutable? The
to be the very embodiment
spontaneously considers

107 see Hans Linschoten, ~· cit., Bruce Wilshire~·
c't
~- and James Bayley ~· cit.
108 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 195.
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that by 'I', he means something always the same.
This has led most philosophers to postulate behind
the passing state of consciousness a permanent
Substance or Agent whose modification or act it is.
This Agent is the thinker~ the 'state' is only its
instrument or means.
'Soul', 'transcendental Ego',
'Spirit', are so 1~§ny names for this more permanent
sort of Thinker.

After examining the grounds for admitting a more
permanent agent then the present pulse of consciousness James
concludes " ••• we had better cling to our passing 'states' as
the exclusive agents of knowledge~ •••• " 110
for taking this position are simple:

( 1)

James' reasons

We have no

experience of any of these alleged "more permanent agents"
and

(2)

A "more permanent agent" is not needed to account for

the facts of our mental life or our sense of personal
identity.
For James then the present pulse of consciousness is the
Thinker and even though this "I" lacks knowledge-about
itself, it does feel its own immediate existence. 111

This

present pulse of conscious life is a genuine reality.

It may

be the "darkest in the whole series" but this doesn't mean

that it cannot feel prereflectively its own existence in the
very act.

Unless the present pulse of subjectivity was so

aware of itself, it would be unable to appropriate past
segments of consciousness and view them as warm and intimate.
109 Ibid.
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consciousness has a non-positional and pre-reflective
awareness of itself, and so it contains an intrinsic self
relatedness.

The positional awareness of the ME is made

possible by the non-positional self awareness of the "I".
It is true that James was critical of the Kantian notion
that self-consciousness is essential to consciousness. 112
This does not mean, however, that James is denying that
consciousness has a non-positional or pre-reflective
awareness of itself.

James simply means that consciousness

need not objectify itself in knowing its objects.

In other

words, we live through out subjectivity and so directly feel
it, and even though we may lack "knowledge-about-it" we
always have knowledge of it by direct acquaintance.
Some of James• phenomenological disciples tend to ignore
James' position here.

They prefer to read into James the

transcendental subjectivity of Husser!.

John Wild is one of

James• phenomenological interpreters, however, who recognizes
the fact that for James consciousness is pre-reflectively
aware of itself.

Wild writes,

For him James , the passing, present thought knows
itself directly by acquaintance in the very act of
knowing and choosing. For the transcendentalist,
there is no such self-knowledge by direct
acquaintance. My knowing and choosing can be known
only as objects, or appearances, by a transcendental
self that is never united with them. Hence as James
says: 'the only pathway that I can discover for
bringing in a more transcendental thinker would be
to deny that we hiY3 any direct knowledge of the
thought as such.'
112
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A pulse of consciousness is not an object.
pointed out it is not a thing.

As Sartre

It is like nothing else.

baS its own unique mode of being.

It

It is not simply nothing

but is rather that reality which we feel most directly.
since all our knowledge-about deals with objects, it is
difficult to even discuss that which is the condition of all
objectification but is itself never an object.

One can only

saY be feels it directly or knows it by direct acquaintance.
If there is someone who doesn't feel thought going on, we
can't convince him otherwise.

James, like Descartes, takes

the position that he directly feels his thinking activity and
if others are like him, they too will feel it.

James regards

this as "the most fundamental of all the postulates of
psychology. " 114

Even in his famous essay "Does

Consciousness Exist?" James does not really reverse his
position on this point as Dewey and others have claimed.
There James simply denies that consciousness is some kind of
•thing" or "entity."

James writes, "That entity is

fictitious, while thoughts in the concrete are fully
real." 115
In this matter Patrick Dooley and I are in agreement.

In

response to Dewey's claim that James' doctrine of the self
amounts to an incipent biological behaviorism, Dooley writes,
114 P . . 1
r1nc1p es I , p. 185. '•
115
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Undeniably these strains exist in the Principles,
especially in the sections treating the cephalic
movements as biological adjustments. However, James
himself does not deny the existence of the I, the
thinker. James' concern is to avoid the separation
of the act of consciousness (I) from its content,
which is experienced in terms of biological
adjustment. The thinker is not a timeless,
transcendental ego but thought in a given time and
place. James repudiates both the transcendental ego
and the soul for neither is experienced nor required
to explain knowing and personal identity.
Nonetheless he does not go so far as to equate
thought with 11 series of behavioral
adjustments. 6

other Jamesian scholars, while not denying James' belief
in consciousness, have nevertheless placed his pulses of
thought outside the self preferring to view it as a neutral
stream of experience.

Bruce Wilshire treats James' notion of

consciousness in this manner. 117

Such an interpretation of

James conflicts with his explicit position regarding the
first trait of thought, i.e. that it is personal.

In

refutation of the view that James separates the self from
consciousness, I offer the following words of James:
The universal conscious fact is not 'feelings and
thoughts exist,' but 'I think' and 'I feel' •••• A
French writer, speaking of our ideas, says somewhere
in a fit of anti-spiritualistic excitement that,
misled by certain peculiarities which they display,
116
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we 'end by personifying' the processing which they
make, -- such personification being regarded by him
as a great philosophic blunder on our part. It
could only be a blunder if the notion of personality
meant something essentially different from anything
to be found in the mental processing. But if that
processing be itself the very 'original' of the
notion of personality, to personify it cannot
possibly be wrong. It is already personified.
There are no marks of personality to be
gathered aliunde, 1 fRd then found lacking in the
train of thought.

The above quotation suggest to me that though Wilshire
maY consider it a blunder to regard consciousness as personal
and a real dimension of the self, James does not.

This "fit

of anti-spiritualistic excitement" is in any case not
attributable to James.

James believes that the quest for a

nonempirical principle of selfhood only becomes necessary if

we make the blunder of reducing the stream of consciousness
to a neutral stream devoid of intrinsic self-relatedness.
This mis-reading of James may stem from the fact that the
self has been traditionally treated as if it were a thing
(material or spiritual or both).

To place the present pulse

of consciousness outside the self is, however, to make the
self totally passive and all thought anonymous.

James is,

however, adament about viewing the self as active and viewing
consciousness as personal.

James' present pulse of

consciousness is thus not simply that by which the self is
apprehended and thus something external to it but rather it
is the subjective dimension of the self.

To isolate

consciousness from the self is to abolish what James regards
118
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as the most distinguishing characteristic of the self,
purposeful action.

The self is for James primarily an

individual agent, and it is this because one of its
dimensions is subjectivity or consciousness.
The self that James describes is one that is active in
space and time.

It is a "fighter for ends" and the source of

effort, attention and will.

A spontaneous, initiating self,

a self that acts on its own, means a self which is no mere
object of thought.

It suggests a dynamic self which has both

an objective and subjective dimension.
Far from "vanishing" the Jamesian subject is not only
real~

it is also quite active.

James believed that personal

activity is a genuine and irreducible fact.

He rejected the

static pure ego of Kant in order to affirm an active and
temporal subject.

This position of James was not fully

adopted until after the Principles of Psychology.

In his

later works, James was unambiguous in his affirmation of the
creative character of self agency.

In Essays in Radical

Empiricism, James concluded that personal activity is
"just what we feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction
which our own activity series reveal." 119
James regards the very essence of consciousness as being
discrimination.
perception.

Selective attention is present in all

Consciousness is forever emphasizing and

choosing certain features of its object to focus upon.

It is

119 James, "The Experience of Activity," Essays.in
~dical Empiricism, pp. 93-94.
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always partial, interested, discriminitive and evaluative in
character.

The self is always active because there is always

·a single pulse of spontaneous selective attention functioning
as the "I".
consciousness is not only partial and selective, it is
for James efficacious.

The discriminating selection of

consciousness does not operate merely on a theoretical level
but actually affects the course of events in the world.
James regards the materialists' conception of a superfluous
consciousness as irrational.
spectator.

Consciousness is no mere

Consciousness is always active and embodied.

we have already discussed James' criticism of the
automaton theory of the self which treated consciousness as a
mere epiphenomena.

The critique shows that he was familiar

with all the problems associated with the belief in the
causal efficacy of consciousness.

In his earlier writings,

James maintained that the issue of determinism couldn't be
settled on a purely theoretical level.

During this period,

he made a personal choice of indeterminism mainly because of
ethical considerations.

In his later works the activity of

consciousness is, for James, just as real as the objects
which it knows.
As we pointed out earlier, James argues for the efficacy

Of consciousness on the following grounds:
directly experienced {ala Descartes).

(1) That it is

(2) It is the only

way to account for the enormous correlations between pleasure
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beneficial activity and between pain and detrimental
and
activity.
(3) It is the only way to account for the enormous
correlations between the feeling of effort and non-automatic
responses.
James did not pretend to be able to explain how
interaction between consciousness and matter occurs.

He

didn't believe like Descartes that it could be explained in
terms of the laws of classical mechanics.
~rase

He knew that his

"the finger of consciousness" was only a metaphor

containing no explanatory insight regarding interaction
~tween

the mental and the physical.

He did believe,

nonetheless, that the existing evidence did favor
interactionism.

As for explaining it, James stated:

That, when the idea is realized, the corresponding
nerve-tracts should be modified, and so de proche
en proche, the muscles contract, is one of those
harmonies between inner and outer worlds, bef~2o
which our reason can only avow its impotence.

James admitted we can form no positive image of just how
a volition affects the cells of the brain.

He feels,

however, that this is no reason to deny causality between the
mental and the physical.

He points out that even though we

don't have a clear understanding of causality between
Physical objects we don't reject this type of causality.
Despite our lack of understanding it, James goes on in the
120
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principles of Psychology to point out that the

c ircumstantial evidence points toward the efficaciousness of

consciousness.

He concludes that the belief in it is

justified by the facts and asserts that the automaton theory
must give way to the theory of common sense. 121
In his chapter on the Will in the Principles of
James continued to argue for the efficacy of

~ychology,

consciousness.

Here he illustrated the issue by portraying

the conflict between a natural inclination and an ideal
motive as being a battle between a powerful sensual factor
and a weak ideal force.

By itself the ideal motive had no

chance of overcoming the powerful influence of the sensual
opponent unless it was supported by personal effort, which
was an independent factor derived from conscious energizing.
Symbolizing effort as E, propensity as P, and ideal motive as
I James wrote:

"But the E does not seem to form an integral

part of the I.

It appears adventitious and indeterminate in

advance." 122

James goes on to contrast our experience of

making such an effort with our strength, intelligence, and
other character traits and he concludes:

"But the effort

seems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it
were the substantive thing which we are, and those but
externals which we carry." 123
121
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Later in his article "The feeling of Effort" James stated
hiS position more forcefully.

Here he declared the feeling

of mental spontaneity to be "psychic effort pure and simple,"
and be regards it as "the inward gift of our selfhood." 124
In his final works, A Pluralistic Universe and Some
problems of Philosophy, James unhesitantly affirmed the
-efficacy
of consciousness. Here he spoke of "the everlasting
coming of novelty into being" 125 that interactionism
implies.

In these works, he treated our activities and

efforts as genuine ingredients of reality and part of the
continuous emergence of novelty in the universe.

In his

president's Address before the American Psychological
Association in December of 1904, James stated,
I conclude then that real effectual causation as an
ultimate nature, as a category, if you like, of
reality, is just what we feel it to be, just that
kind of z~njunction which our own activity-series
reveal. 1
124 James, "The Feeling of Effort," Collected Essays
and Reviews, p. 2:04.
125 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 149.
126 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 93.

D.

CARE AS AN ESSENTIAL TRAIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

care is of the essence of consciousness and lies at the
oore of selfhood.

Without care there is no self at all.

selfhood centers around the feeling of care.
so does the self.

When this goes,

Where there is total indifference, there

is no self.
According to James, our acts of caring are not our own
because we care for them.

This caring itself has no need of

a principle to make it our own.

It is in relation to these

pulses of feeling and interest that all else becomes our
own.

Since we exist and live through these subjective acts,

they are our very self in a way nothing else is for they are
warm and intimate in a manner in which nothing else is.

For

James, caring is the basic mode of self-appropriation, and
the present pulse of subjectivity functions as the "I"
because it is

primari~y

a present pulse of care.

As Patrick

Dooley points out James' acceptance of the present pulse of
consciousness as the thinker is "grounded in the empirically
given selective character of consciousness." 127
The immediate interest or care is for James the real
meaning of the word "my."

"Whatever has it," says James, "is

!2 ipso a part of me." 128

James is here challenging the

127 Patrick Dooley, ~· cit., p. 42.
128 Jarnes, Principles, I, p. 308.
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vieW that we must first conceptionally recognize something as
our own before we can take an interest in it or care for it.
self-love and self-feeling have no need of a prior conceptual
awareness of a pure ego.

The objects which forms one's ME

are judged to be our own because we care for them, we don't
care for them because we judge them to be our own.

Things

don't become a part of one's ME because of some deliberate
inference; they have a direct and prereflective relation to
the subjective dimension of the self which cares for them.
All the things which have the power to produce in the stream
of consciousness excitement of a peculiar sort form a part of

.

one's me and these objects tend to be the kind that affect
one's welfare and image in the minds of others.
The mark of the presence of mind according to James is
purposeful action.

The positing of ends and fighting for

them indicates the presence of consciousness.
physical world there are no final causes.

In the purely

Final causes are

the fruit of consciousness.

The given implies no state of

affairs other than itself.

It is only through an evaluation

of the given in light of some non-existent future state of
affairs that the given state of affairs can become an
intuition that motivates one to act.

This envisioning of a

non-existing future state as desirable is possible because
consciousness is essentially that which cares.
in the physical universe has this property.

Nothing else

Consciousness is

an intentional activity and its intending is based upon its

caring.
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James regards this selectivity of consciousness as

•one thing which it does, sua sponte, and which seems an
original peculiarity of its own; •••• "l29
one way in which consciousness influences behavior is by
selecting what is present to the individual.

The efficacious-

ness of consciousness is rooted in attention, and it is
interests {practical, aesthetical, ethical and religious)
that directs consciousness' selective attention.

This

selectivity based on interests is present in all conscious
states.

It operates in sensation, perception, conception,

reasoning, belief, emotion as well as in voluntary action.
This continuous selectivity of consciousness based on its
interests is possible because consciousness is primarily a
caring process.

Choosing occurs always in terms of what is

regarded as valuable, i.e. what is cared for.

This means

that if an essential trait of thought is its selectivity,
another primordial trait must be that it cares.
the present pulse of subjectivity always is.
consciousness is caring.

Care is what

For James

Here lies the basis for Andrew

Reck's correct observation that for James will is the generic
form of all the specific modes of consciousness - attention,
conception, etc. 130
What does consciousness care for?

The answer to this

question is that it cares for certain of its objects and
through this care these objects become its objective self.
129 James, "Are We Automata?" Mind, 4 (1879), p. 9.
130
Andrew Reck, £E· cit., p. 307.
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consciousness cares for its "ME."

To be more precise, the

•I" cares for its "ME" for the present pulse of consciousness
in caring is already functioning as the "I."

It is this

caring feature of the present pulse of consciousness which
•akes of it an "I," that is without care there would be only
an anonymous stream of experience.
There are many things which interest consciousness and
which it selects to focus its attention on, but these are not
all things which consciousness cares for and for which it has
an intense and enduring interest.

In other words, not every

object that consciousness entertains becomes an element of
its "ME."

Nevertheless, all that is interesting to

consciousness is so through its relation to what
consciousness cares for.

In other words, the basis of all

selectivity by consciousness is care.

In point of fact

consciousness cares for the body and those things that are
intimately related to the body, and together these objects
form the entire objective self.

If consciousness didn't care

in this way, the body, and with it consciousness, would soon
cease to exist.

James writes,

Unless our consciousness was something more than
cognitive, unless it experienced a partiality for
certain of the objects, which, in succession, occupy
it~ ken, it c~~ld not long maintain itself in
ex1stence ••••
131 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 193.
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Although the present pulse of consciousness feels its own
immediate existence, it has no knowledge-about itself and
thus what it cares for at the moment is not itself but rather
certain of its objects.

In caring for these objects, it

creates a "ME" and sustains itself in existence as an "I."
Although past segments of consciousness can be made into an
object of care, the present pulse of consciousness does not
have to be made into an object of care for it to be our own
for the self exist and lives through this process of caring.
James believes that each object that forms a part of the
self does so through the medium of care.

He holds that this

is true even of that special object called the body.
care, one's body is part of one's very self.
personalizes the body.

Through

Caring is what

According to James one doesn't care

for one's body because he identifies with it, but rather he
identifies with it "because he loves it." 132

Our bodies

lie in our objective field -- "they are simply the most
interesting percepts there." 133

He notes that what happens

to our bodies causes in us emotions and tendencies to action
that are more habitual and energetic than any which are
excited by any other objects.

Although the body always tends

to be an object of care, James insist that what is the target
of the caring act is not determined a priori but is solely a
question of fact.

He writes,

132 James, Principles, I, p. 304.
133 Ibid.
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The phenomenon of passion is in or1g1n and essence
the same, whatever be the target upon which it is
discharged; and what the target actually happens to
be is solely a question of fact. I might
conceivably be as much fascinated, and as
primitively so, by the 1 l~re of my neighbor's body as
by the care of my own.

In treating the self as a dialectic of caring and cared-

tor, James is in a sense anticipating Heidegger•s notion of
~orge.

In Being and Time, Heidegger argued that the

being of the individual was care.

For Heidegger this care

referred mainly to the unique temporality of the self.

For

Heidegger the self exists by projecting a future in the
present in light of its past.
Jamesian self.

The same is true of the

The same temporal structure can be seen in

James• notion of the "specious present" in which all three
dimensions of time find a place.
Consciousness in caring changes the given into a motive
or situation by its ability to evaluate the given in terms of
some end that does yet exist and which is cared for.

Action

has its basis always in the caring of consciousness.

Thus,

human action from birth to death has its source in the
process of care which consciousness primarily is.
There is an ancient Latin fable which Heidegger quotes to
show that there has always existed a primitive understanding
Of human existence as a process of care.

I think the fable

is even more relevant to the Jamesian theory of self that we
are exploring.
134

For this reason, I will quote it at length.

Ib1.'d., I , p. 309 .
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Once when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some
clay~ she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to
shape it. While she was meditating on what she had
made, Jupiter came by.
•care' asked him to give it
spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she
wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade
this, and demanded that it be given his name
instead. While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing,
Earth arose and desired that her own name be
conferred on the creature, since she had furnished
it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be
their arbiter, and he made the following decision,
which seemed a just one: 'Since you, Jupiter, have
given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at
its death~ and since you Earth have given its body,
you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first
shaped this creature, she shall posess it as long as
it lives. And because there is now a dispute among
you as to its name, let it be 1 3~lled 'homo,' for it
is made out of humus (earth).

The most significant line in the fable is:

"But since

•care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as
long as it lives."

Note that even in the fable's traditional

way of taking man as a compound of body and soul the priority
of care is recognized.

Caring is what forms the self and it

is what personalizes both body and mind.

To exist as a self

is to care about one's objective mode of being.

For James,

as for Heidegger, the self is that being whose very being is
an issue.

A bare logical thinker inside an extended mass of

flesh would be selfless and not entitled to the name person.
The fable can be interpreted as suggesting that there are
three levels involved in the being of a person:
material, the organic, and the personal.

the

With each level

135Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (SCM Press, London, 1962), p. 242.
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something entirely new comes into existence.
no t

The personal is

reducible to the material or the organic.

In the fable

if we let spirit signify the life principle, it represents
~e

organic level, and earth represents the material level.

These levels by themselves can't be regarded as forming a
self, for care is needed for this.

Care is what forms and

constantly sustains or changes the self.
~rsonhood.

Care is the mark of

Only with care is there a transcendence of the

mere organic level.
People generally treat care as the mark of personhood
even though they might not be reflectively aware of doing
so.

When the computer in the movie 2001 began acting as if

it really cared for its own continued existence, the audience
~gan

viewing this computer as a person, as an end unto

itself and no mere machine.

Although this is a fictitious

example, it does illustrate the importance of the presence of
care in deciding if something is a person.

With the advance

of computer technology and the growing possibility of contact
with alien beings, it may become necessary to develop some
criteria for determining personhood that is not tied to the
human anatomy.

The presence of the process of caring, I

submit, ought to play an essential role in deciding the issue
of personhood in the event of such puzzle cases.
James pointed out in his famous automatic sweetheart
argument that robots could never be sweethearts no matter how
much their behavior was like real sweethearts.

In the case

of sweethearts, it is not the behavior itself that is valued,
bUt rather the care that one assumes lies behind the
behavior.
selves.

What is true of sweethearts is true of all
The presence of care is required for both.

A robot

not onlY won't do as a sweetheart, it won't do as a person,

tor a self requires a stream of consciousness that is
essentially a process of care.

PART SIX
THE CONCRETE FULL SELF
The concrete full self is a subjective-objective
temporal process.

It exists as a dialectic of subjectivity

and objectivity and we shall call it, Self-ConstitutingHistorical-Existence.

It is the only real self there is.

Personal existence entails a continuous mutual influence
between the self's subjective and objective dimensions.

We

will first examine the influence of the subjective dimension
upon the objective dimension, and then we will show how the
objective dimension in turn affects the subjective dimension.
We will then explore reasons why the self's mode of existence
must be that of an irreducible temporal process involving the
mutual relationship of these dimensions.

Finally, we will

discuss the type of identity that this self is capable of
having.
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A.

THE SPONTANEITY OF CARE AND THE CONTINUOUS CONSTITUTION
OF THE ME ,

I~

ME

we have already touched upon the constitution of the

"ME."

We must now explore this process in greater detail.

BY caring for certain of its objects, the present "I"

constitutes a "ME."

One's total self is what one cares

about, and it is the present pulse of consciousness that does
the caring.

Through care it selects which objects are to

form the "ME."
As noted above, no object is in and of itself
personalized.

All that belongs to the field of the "ME" does

so through the medi urn of care.

The "ME" is not some one

specific item which is the same for all individuals but is
instead whatever is an object of special interest to
consciousness, i.e. the subjective dimension of the self.
Through care the subjective dimension of the self creates and
sustains the ME, i.e. objective dimension of the self.
"This sort of interest is really the meaning of the word
'my'," writes James, "Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of
me." 13 6

He points out that this field of care may grow and

alter its boundaries in countless ways. 137

At the heart of

this field of care invariably lies the body and what
13 6 w1· 11 1arn
·
J ames, P r1nc1p
·
· 1 es, I , p. 308.

137 Ibid.
125
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ministers to its needs.

Other objects tend to get knitted on

to this core of selfhood through care.

All the objects of

the material, spiritual and social areas of one• s "ME" are
cared for by consciousness.

This is the condition for the

personalization of these diverse objects.

The entire

objective dimension of the self is a field of care, and this
field is created and sustained through the acts of care of
the subjective dimension of the self.
Certain kinds of objects tend to become part of one's
objective self.

James believes, however, that any object can

be a candidate for personalization through care.

What is the

target of care is solely a question of fact. 138
This position with regards to one's objective self has
the merit of allowing for the possibility of change.
"ME" is mutable.

The

Growth and decay are possibilities of the

objective dimension of the self.
fluctuating material."

It is as James said "a

One's "ME" of ten years ago is

probably not identical with one's present "ME."

If there is

a difference between my present "ME" and my "ME" of a decade
ago, the difference stems from the fact that my consciousness
no longer cares for the same objects in the same way after a
passage of ten years.

Many of the items that we cherished as

children no longer stir the same emotion in us.

A prized

doll for example is likely to fade away from one's self-field
138 Ib;d.
I , p. 309 .
...
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with the approach of adulthood.

These alterations in one's

caring attitude means changes in the "ME," and these changes
maY be grave or slight.
its~,"

"Thus the identity found by the I. in

says James, "is only a loosely constructed thing,

an identity 'on the whole,' just like that which any outside
observer might find in the same assemblage of facts." 139
With the passage of time various objects are added and
dropped from one's self field.

Care is the means of entry

for these objects into the self-field.

Those objects that

continue to remain within the self-field do so because they
are sustained by care.

This present manuscript that I am now

working on forms a part of my objective self.

It is as James

would say, "saturated with my labor," and I care for it.
Years from now or perhaps even tomorrow, I may cease to be
fascinated with this project, and it may slip away from my
field of care and be no longer a part of the objective
dimension of my self.

I am always capable at any moment of

choosing a new mode of existence, i.e. of adopting a new self
through a transformation in care.

James felt that such

sudden conversions were rare, but he didn't doubt that
really occurred.

the~

In The Varieties of Religious Experiences

he discusses the phenomenon of sudden conversion at length.
Long term conversions are, however, more familiar to us.
One of the goals of higher education is in fact to bring
139 Ibid. I, p. 352.
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about such long term conversions.

If a new college graduate

feels that he is the exact same person that he was four years
ago, then the chances are that this institution did not serve
him well.

If, however, he feels that he is a different

person, he feels this way because he recognizes the fact that
he now has all sorts of new interests, i.e. his field of care
has been transformed.

New objects of care have been added

and others dropped from his self-field.

What we have here is

a fluctuating field of care in which the same object being
once treated as a part of me is now regarded, "as if I had
nothing to do with it at all. n 140
At class reunions one may find that it is difficult to
renew the same old friendships.

The difficulty here stems

from the fact that the selves involved have not remained
fixed and frozen during the intervening years.

Your old pal

may not have simply gone bald and put on weight; he may have
also undergone a transformation in his very self.

Your old

school friend may now have a whole new set of values and care
quite differently about things then he once did, and to the
extent that this is so and to just that extent, he is a
changed self.
One • s "ME" is something that is created and conserved by
care.

When an i tern belonging to the "ME" ceases to be

cherished by consciousness, this object ceases to form a part
140

Ibid. I, p. 279.
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of the "ME."
•M~"

A spouse, for example, may form a part of one's

but not so if the caring ceases.

If a divorce is

emotionallY traumatic for an individual, it is often because
one is experiencing a partial loss of one's very self.

In

such situations a reorganization of one's objective self
tends to occur.

As a result, during such times one's sense

of self is in a highly confused state.

In other words, in

such situations of sudden alteration in one's life one is not
certain about what to value or care for, and as a result the
self's own boundaries become vague.

James writes,

Sudden alterations in outward fortune often produce
such a change in the empirical me as almost to
amount to a pathological disturbance of selfconsciousness. When a poor man draws the big prize
in a lottery, or unexpectedly inherits an estate;
when a man high in fame is publicly disgraced, a
millionaire becomes a pauper, or a loving husband
and father sees his family perish at one fell swoop,
there is temporarily such a rupture between all past
habits, whether of an active or a passive kind, and
the exigencies and possibilities of the new
situation, that the individual may find no medium of
continuity or association to carry him over from the
one phase to the other of his life. Under these
conditi£ii mental derangement is no infrequent
result.

The specific form of one's "ME" is a function of the
caring selectivity of one's consciousness.

One's "ME" has a

certain form because consciousness cares for only certain of
the objects it entertains.
141

The body that one constantly

rbid. I, pp. 357-358 n.
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feels, i.e. one's lived-body, seems invariably to be the
first and main object of this care.

Around this privileged

object the entire objective self is built up with its
material, social, and spiritual areas.

All the objects in

the entire self-field are cared for by consciousness, and all
are in some way related to one's body.

"The nucleus of the

•me'," says James, "is always the bodily existence felt

-

w be present at the time.nl42
The material, social and spiritual areas of one's "ME"
are all formed in the same manner, i.e. through the process
of care.

A particular attitude, a beardless and flabby body,

a brown suit and a woman named Shirley are all presently a
part of my objective self but only because they are all cared
for by my present subjective dimemsion.

Same of these items

may always be a part of my self-field, but if they are, it is
because they are sustained in this field by care.

Some time

in the future I may forget that special attitude, grow a
beard, get in shape, throw away my brown suit, and forsake
the woman named Shirley.

If

~here

is stability in the self,

it is because changes like this usually don't all occur at
once but gradually over a long period of time.

"Any man

~comes, as we say, inconsistent with himself if he forgets

his engagements, pledges, knowledges, and habits:" says
James I

"and it is merely a question of degree at what point
142 b"d I
I 1 •

,

p. 378 .

-e
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Shall say that his personality is changed."
Let us now examine how care functions in the constitution

of each of the three areas of one's "ME":
spiritual, and social.

material,

In the case of the material "ME" the

physical body is dominant.

Other material objects that are

related to the body tend to become also a part of one's
material "ME" because they are cared for in the same way.
ThiS is the case with one's family, clothes, property and
creations.

One's body may seem like a natural part of the

•ME" and these others may seem like artificial extensions,
but James does not believe that this is the case.

Each is

part of the "ME" by virtue of the same fact, it is cared for
by consciousness.
s~ply

In and of itself the physiological body is

an extended physical mass and totally non-personal.

The importance of the role of care in selfhood is revealed by
OOM quickly we regard as foreign that which was once a very
~rt

of our physical body.

~see

When the barber cuts our hair and

it lying on the floor, we no longer view it as we once

did when it rested atop our head.

In Becoming, Gordon

Allport points out that we don't think twice about swallowing
our own saliva but if we were asked to spit into a cup and
~en swallow it, we would find it to be a different matter

altogether. 144

It is different despite the fact that the

143 Ibid. I, p. 358.
144 Gordon Allport, Becoming, (London:
Press 1955), p. 43.

Yale University
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same physical substance is present in both cases.

What was

once felt as warm and intimate is now regarded as foreign and
repulsive.

Allport's example illustrates the fact that it is

not merely the nature of an object that determines whether it
is a part of one's self.

What is more important for entry

into the self-field is how the object is grasped by
consciousness:

with or without care.

James believes that

this is why there have been men throughout history who "have
been ready to disown their very bodies and to regard them as
mere vestures, or even as prisons of clay from which they
should some day be glad to escape.nl45
James' observation here reminds me of the words of a
dear friend whose life was cut short by multiple sclerosis.
The words were her last words.

In her will she wrote that

she wanted that "awful thing set ablaze."

That "awful thing"

was her body which turned against her in the prime of her
life and from which she too wished to escape.

I suspect that

at the time of her death her own sense of self no longer
included those physiological parts over which she no longer
had control.
One's material goods also tend to form a part of one's
Objective self.

When one cares for his riches to a great

extent, they too become a part of one's very sense of self.
1 suspect that after the stockmarket crash of 1929 a number

145 Jarnes, Principles, I, p. 279.
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of people committed suicide not because of fear of starvation
bUt rather because of a loss of their wealth.

Care for one•s

material belongings can become so intense that one's very
identity becomes wrapped up in them.

A friend of mine once

came to me with a gloomy face and told me that he had been
•disfigured.n
sideswiped.

I then learned that his brand new car had been
The man•s remark was rooted in a true sense of

self-loss which he was experiencing.

In such situations one

tends to feel a shrinkage of one•s very self.

On occasion,

each of us in varying degrees experiences a sense of selfloss with regard to our material goods that we lose or see
destroyed.

I once believed that I had lost forever a part of

this very manuscript on a commuter train.

In the hours it

took to recover my paper, I experienced a real sense of self
diminishment.

Such experiences illustrate the fact that the

self is a field that greatly transcends the boundaries of
one•s body.

If this were not the case, we would not feel na

partial conversion of ourselves to nothingnessn when we lose
these goods that we cherish. 146

This is why James feels

that one•s property becomes, nwith different degrees of
intimacy, parts of our empirical selves.n 147
Care is also the common ingredient with regard to the
elements of one•s spiritual nME.n
146 rb;d. I
....
' p. 281 .
147
Ibid.

One•s past subjective acts
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(perceptions, volitions, emotions, etc.) form a part of one's
objective self through care.

When the care fades for these

past acts of subjectivity, they cease to be an intimate part
of one's objective self.

For example, the feelings one had

as a child often seem when they are recalled years later to
lack the warmth of recent feelings.

They appear to the

present subjective dimension as foreign.

Since they are no

longer cared for by consciousness, they are no longer
regarded as a part of the same "ME."

"My spiritual powers,

again, must interest me more than those of other people, and
for the same reason" says James.

"I should not be here at

all unless I had cultivated them and kept them from
decay." 148
It is also care that creates and sustains one's social

•ME."

Not all the images that we think others have of us

form a part of our social self.

It is only those images that

one cares for that manage to be assimilated into one's
objective self.

I might, for example, be aware of the fact

that certain individuals regard me as a poor golfer, but
unless I cherish this particular image and value the approval
of this golf group, their opinion has no bearing on my social
me.

As James pointed out, it's what image we care about,

what we stake ourselves to be, that matters most.
148 Ib'd
1

•

I, p. 308 .
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thiS point James reveals the following about his own social
self:
I, who for the time have staked my all on being a·
psychologist, am mortified if others know much more
psychology than I. But I am contented to wallow in
the grossest ignorance of Greek. My deficiencies
there give me no sense of personal humiliation at
all. Had I 'pretensions' t£ ~e a linguist, it would
have been just the reverse. 4

Against this view it might be argued that a man is the
social roles he plays whether he cares for them or not.

A

person might be in a profession he no longer likes, but he is
still defined by this role and how well he performs it.

In

response to this, it can be said that a person may lose
interest in his profession but still care about how others
regard his performance in this profession and so still care
about this particular social image.

If this kind of regard

is also lacking, it can be truly said that he is so isolated
from his labor that his work really forms no part of his
social nME.n

Such cases, I suspect, are quite rare, but

where they do exist they illustrate that it is not simply the
roles we play but rather the roles we perform and care about
that form our social nME.n

James maintains that one has only

as many different social selves as there are ndistinct groups
Of persons about whose opinion he cares.n 150

As in the

case of one's material and spiritual nMEn, it is care that
constitutes one's social nME.n
149 Ibid. I, p. 296.
lSOibid. I, p. 282.
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So we see that all three areas of one's "ME" are
constituted through care.

The material, spiritual and social

aspects of one's ME require a caring consciousness for their
creation and conservation in existence.

It is a caring

consciousness which divides the universe into "two halves"
which James notes we all call by the same names, "and those
names are 'me• and •not me• ." 151
The care which forms the objective dimension of the self
is a function of consciousness, i.e. the subjective dimension
of the self.

Consciousness is basically a process of care.

It is consciousness that establishes ends for the individual
and through its selective character, chooses means to those
ends.

The term interest implies consciousness, and all

interests that are commonly attributed to the organism
including survival are really the interests of a particular
consciousness.

Without consciousness, normative judgements

like "right reaction" are meaningless.

The purely physical

order of existence is completely lacking in goals or ends.
"Matter has no ideals," says James.
indifferent to the molecules

c,

"It must be entirely

H, N, and

o, whether they

combine in a live body or a dead one." 152
Caring is not a function of matter but of consciousness.
Ends and goals imply care, and care implies consciousness.
lSlibid. I, p. 278.
152 Jarnes, "Are We Automata," Mind 4(1879): 1 p. 6.
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•sverY actually existing consciousness seems to itself at any
rate to be a fighter for ends," says James, "but for its
153
presence, (there] would be no ends at all."
consciousness freely cares for certain of its objects.
fhiS is what we mean by the spontaneity of care.

We are not

suggesting, however, that consciousness acts arbitrarily in
its caring.

Consciousness is not coerced into caring for

anything, but it is influenced by the present situation it
finds itself in and by its previous acts of care.

Unless

this process of care was so motivated there would be very
little continuity to selfhood.

Thus besides the spontaneity

of care, we have also a sedimentation of care.

One's past

acts of care influence the direction taken by the present
pulse of care.

Because of the continuous acts of

appropriation, the present segment of consciousness has its
past objective self as part of its content.

This historical

content along with the present given situation affects how
the present active pulse of consciousness constitutes its

•ME."

This constitution always entails varying degrees of

Sedimentation and spontaneity.

The given environment and

one's past do not act deterministically for the present
active pulse of consciousness interprets and regulates the
influence of both.
This section has tried to establish that for James the
153 b"d
I 1 • pp. 6-7.
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objective dimension of the self is constructed through care,
i.e. the activity of the subjective dimension of the self.
we can symbolize this process in the following manner:
I~ME.

In the next section we will be exploring the

influence one's past objective self upon the present active
part of the self.

We can symbolize this process in the

following manner:

I~ME.

We will discover later on that

these are not two separate processes but rather two phases of
the same temporal process which the self is.

B.

THE SEDIMENTATION OF CARE AND THE CONTINUOUS

SUBLIMINAL INFLUENCE OF THE PAST "ME,"

!~ME

In the Jamesian theory of consciousness, one's past
exerts an on-going influence on one's present existence.
consciousness is accumulative, for in the act of
appropriation the present pulse appropriates the past pulse
and all that it had appropriated.
carried along into the present.

In this way one's past is
This view of consciousness

is not as counter-intuitive as it might first appear.

James

is not claiming here that we recall our entire past each and
every moment.

He is pointing out rather the often ignored

fact that our past is continuously influencing our present
consciousness without the need of any explicit act of
memory.

Our past experiences are available for explicit

recall because they already form the fringe of our present
consciousness.

From the fringe, my past objective self can

influence the direction of my present active consciousness
without ever becoming focal.

In this manner the "I" comes

under the influence of the "ME."
The following may serve as an illustration of James'
position here.

When one takes up bicycling as an adult, one

may explicitly recall having ridden a bicycle as a child and
compare the two experiences.

It is clear, however, that

Prior to any explicit recollection those past experiences
must be already operative informing my present activity.
139

If
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thiS were not the case, I would have to relearn how to ride a
bicycle, but I find this relearning isn't necessary.

When I

do recollect my childhood experiences with a bicycle, I
recognize their bearing on what I am now already doing, i.e.
mY adult bicycling.
Nearly all our intentional actions are made possible by
the fact that our past lies available for us in the present.
when we talk, we don't have to recall our learning of each of
our spoken words.

Our entire vocabulary is available to us

as the fringe of our present consciousness, and this
sedimentation of language helps guide its direction.

The

same is true of all our skills such as swimming, typing,
walking, etc.

As I write this manuscript, my entire past

studies of James are being brought to bear upon my current
action.

This is not all, however, for my entire past

philosophical studies are also operative here, as well as my
knowledge of the English language.

In fact, much more of my

past than I realize is presently influencing the work I am
now engaged in.
activity.

The same can be said of all purposeful

James writes,
In the pulse of inner life immediately present now
in each of us is a little awareness of our own body,
of each other's persons, of these sublimities we are
trying to talk about, of the earth's geography and
the direction of history, of truth and error, of
good and bad, and of who knows how much more?
Feeling, however dimly and subconsciously, all these
things, your pulse of inner life is c£~~inuous with
them, belongs to them and they to it.

154

James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 129.
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How one's past lives on as the fringe of one's present
consciousness is not easy to conceptualize.

Yet, it is clear

that the facts of everyday experience suggest that this is
the case.

Each experience that we have is felt as either

familiar or strange and this suggest that we are not isolated
from our past but rather bring it with us and evaluate the
present in terms of it.

This is not explicit memory.

Explicit memory is mainly a matter of bringing to the center
of consciousness what was previously only on its fringe.
past experience affects us without the need of conscious
recall.

Without being brought to center stage, while

remaining in the wings, one's past is able to exert its
influence upon the present active part of the self.

Each new

pulse of consciousness thus comes inheriting a specific past
whose influence it feels.
James illustrates the influence of this temporal fringe
by examining the phenomenon of trying to recall a particular
word.

He notes that in one's effort to recall a word one is

able to reject possible candidates for the word one is trying
to recall.

One would not be able to do this if the word or

at least an approximate feeling of the word were not already
a part of the fringe of one's present consciousness assisting
him in his effort at its explicit recall.

One's mental void

in trying to recall one word is not the same when trying to
recall a different word.

The difference lies in what forms

the fringe of the present consciousness.

This is an example
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of hOW one's past can affect one's present active self prior
to any explicit recall.

James writes,

And the gap of one word does not feel like the gap
of another, all empty of content as both might seem
necessarily to be when described as gaps. When I
vainly try to recall the name of Spalding, my
consciousness is far removed from what it ~s when I
vainly try to recall the name of Bowles. 5

continuous appropriation by each new pulse of
consciousness of the previous pulse of consciousness creates
in effect a single unbroken stream of consciousness.
consciousness is continuous and accumulative through
appropriation.

Each pulse of consciousness becomes a

temporal segment of a single stream of consciousness.

It is

this fact that makes possible the temporal fringe described
above, allowing a past to be brought to bear on a present.
James writes,
In principle, then, the real units of our immediatelyfelt life are unlike the units that intellectualists
logic holds to and makes its calculations with. They
are not separate from their own others, and you have
to take them at widely separated dates to find any
two o~ them that sei~ 6 unblent •••• All real units of
exper1ence overlap.

James did not believe in the existence of an entity
155 James, Principles, I, p. 243.
156 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 129-130.
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called the unconscious.

His notion of the fringe of

consciousness, however, functions in a similar manner in that
through it one's past is silently and ceaselessly exerting
itS influence on the present active self.

The active center

of consciousness is affected in a special way by what lies on
itS margin.

James writes,

My present field of consciousness is a centre
surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a
subconscious more •••• The centre works in one way
while the margins work in another, and presently
overpower the centre and are central themselves.
What we conceptually identify ourselves with and say
we are thinking of at any time is the centre~ but
our full self is the whole field, with all those
indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of
increase that we can only feel wi59out conceiving,
and can hardly begin to analyze.

In his article "The Hidden Self" James discusses the
influence of the marginal areas of one's consciousness that
are dramatically revealed in case of post hypnotic suggestion.
Here he refers to the past temporal fringe of consciousness
as "the submerged consciousness."

James writes,

Ordinary hypnotic suggestion is proving itself
immensely fertile in the therapeutic field~ and the
subtler knowledge of sub-conscious states which we
are now gaining will certainly increase our powers
in this direction many fold. Who knows how many
pathological states (not simply nervous and
functional ones, but organic ones too) may be due to
the existence of some perverse buried fragment of
consciousness obstinately nourishing its narrow
157

rbid., p. 130.
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memory or delusion, 1g~ thereby inhibiting the
normal flow of life.

Many of the phenomena associated with the notion of the
James examined in The Varieties of Religious

~conscious

Experience.

Here he comes to the conclusion that the term

-

•unconscious" is a misnomer and is better replaced by the
term "subliminal." 159

Our past doesn't lie locked away in

same entity called the unconscious but forms instead the
fringe or margin of our present consciousness.
The important fact which the 'field' formula
commemorates is the indetermination of the margin.
Inattentively realized as is the matter which the
margin contains, it is nevertheless there, and helps
both to guide our behavior and to determine the next
movement of our attention. It lies around us like a
'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of
energy turns like a compass-needle, as the present
phase of consciousness alters into its successor.
Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this
margin, ready at a touch to come in~ and the entire
mass of residual powers, impulses, and knowledges
that constitute our empi6bcal self stretches
continuously beyond it.
The "I"

continuou~ly

objective selfhood.

feels the influence of its past

It constitutes its present "ME" for the

158

James, "The Hidden Self," Scribners Magazine Vol. VII
PP. 361-373 included in A William James Reader, ed. by Gay
Wilson Allen, p. 106.
159

James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 170.

160

Ibid., p. 187.
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most part in conformity with this influence.

In practice the

constitution by the present "I" is almost always a matter of
sustaining one's past "ME" rather than selecting a whole new
•ME·"

In principle, however, nothing prevents the "I" from

embracing an entirely fresh objective self.

One tends,

however, to continue to care for the same body, clothes,
emotions and social images that one has cherished in the
past.

One tends to act in character because one's past

character traits maintain their influence while forming the
fringe of our present active consciousness.
The temporality of consciousness with its past and
future fringes means the self enjoys more than a momentary
existence.
~ing

All three dimensions of time are involved in the

of the self.

The self always experiences what it is

about to become as the future of its present existence.
One's future intentions form a part of one's being right here
and now.

I am always a being towards some future goal and

this is a feature of my present self.

James believes that I

am not only my past but also what I stake myself to be.
One's future possibilities reveal themselves as possibilities
of sustaining or changing one's own past.

One's past is

carried forward into each moment of one's existence.

If as

they say, one's character is one's fate, it is so because
there is no gap separating our present active self from our
Past.

Personal existence always involves a projection of a

future in the present in light of a past.

we are historical
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beings because the self is intrinsically historical.
which is selfless is not really historical.

That

A tree has its

rings but they no longer exert any active influence.

An

accumulative consciousness through continuous appropriation
makes possible the historical nature of the self.

Like one's

vocabulary on the horizon of one's present active
consciousness there lies also one's past objective selfhood.
This sedimentation of existence influences what the present
consciousness is going to care for, i.e. it helps in the
formation of the present "ME."

Because of this we do not

have to start from nothingness each moment in determining the
manner of our existence.

To a great degree and through a

certain amount of inertia on our part, we tend to sustain our
past objective self.

Nonetheless, our objective self always

tends to involve some degree of novelty and is at no time a
completely stable and static field.

This is due in part to

the fact that one's utilized past is always an intrepreted
past of a consciousness that is primarily concerned with the
future of one's present self.
Differences in one's past experiences and one's future
expectations causes the world of one person to differ from
that of another.

Each of us brings his unique past to bear

upon what he is now experiencing.

My lived-present includes

all that now makes my present experience what it is.

I am

constantly utilizing my past prior to any explicit recall of
it.

This is why it is impossible for two people to read
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exactly the same novel.

The experience that is had in

reading a novel is in no small part due to what the reader
himself brings to this experience.

As Sartre once pointed

out the images and expectations that each page conjures up in
the mind of a reader is determined in part by the reader's
past rather than solely by the novelist's words.

One's

present subjectivity is always functioning under the guidance
of one's past objective selfhood.
This section has tried to establish the fact that my
present subjectivity is influenced by my past objective
self.
I~ME.

We can symbolize this process in the following manner:
So represented this process appears as the

antithesis of the process that we began our discussion with
in this section:

I~ME.

In what follows we shall see that

we have not two opposite processes but rather a single
process that can be analyzed into two phases.

This single

dynamic process, which is the Jamesian self, can be
symbolized as follows:

r<

>ME.

c.

THE FULL SELF AS SELF-cONSTITUTING-HISTORICAL-EXISTENCE,
I~ME

According to James the concrete full self is partly
object and partly subject.

He calls it a "duplex," 161 but

be does not mean the self is composed of two separate things.
se means rather that the self in being partly known and
~rtlY

knower is something which involves more than one

dimension or aspect.

The self is that which has both an "I"

and a "ME" dimension to it.
no independent existence.
only in union.

These aspects of the self have
,They refer to each other and exist

James writes,

I call these 'discriminated aspects,• and not
separate things, because the 1dentity of the I with
me, even in the very act of discrimination, is
perhaps the mosi 6 ~neradicable dictum of
commonsense, •••

In previous sections we have explored the nature of the
objective and subjective dimensions of the self and in this
section we have already treated the interrelationship of
these dimensions.

We are now in a position to understand why

the self must be viewed as a subjective-objective temporal
Process taken as an irreducible whole.

This Jamesian self

can be represented symbolically as follows:

I~.

161 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, p. 176.
162

Ibid.
148
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Neither of the dimensions of the self can exist without
the other, for caring implies a cared-for and vice versa.
The present pulse of consciousness is personalized and
functions as the "I" because it is part of a continuous
process of care.

Consciousness cares for certain of its

objects and it is due to this care that these objects come to
compose its ME.

Each dimension of the self thus implies the

existence of the other.

The "I" and the "ME" are like

abstractions in that they exist only in union.

The self

exists as a temporal process involving these dimensions and
their interrelationship.

Wherever there exists a self, there

exists a dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity (I

,~>

for this is what personal existence necessarily entails.
Richard Stevens recognizes this "dialectic" feature of
the Jamesian self.
in Husserlian terms.

Unlike myself, however, he interprets it
He writes, "James's distinction between

the "I" and the empirical "ME" parallels Husserl's
distinction between the pure phenomenological ego and the
human ego.n 163 From James' hostile treatment of Kant's
transcendental ego, it is clear to me that James would not
look too favorably upon Stevens interpretation of the
subjective dimension of the Jamesian self.

Unlike Husserl's

transcendental ego James' "I" is always a dimension of a
concrete empirical self that is totally immersed in the world
163

Richard Stevens, James and Husserl:

The Foundations

~Meaning, Martinus Mijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1974,

p. 178.
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as an individual agent.
For James, "Self" is a term that implies not only a
concrete individual thing but also an agent.

P. F. Strawson

haS pointed out that our concept of person seems to be a
primitive and irreducible concept which nonetheless involves
the notions of agency and individuality. 164

This view is

related to James' position which holds that the self is
necessarily two dimensional.

There is the agent aspect of

the self, the "I" and there is the individuality aspect of
the self, the "ME."

James believes that a self necessarily

involves,
••• a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I'
can (1) remember those which went before, and know
the things they knew: and (2) emphasize and care
paramountly for certain ones among 1 6gem as 'me'
and appropriate to these the rest.

James' distinction within the self between the "I" and
the "ME" can be described in a number of ways:

the I is the

owner and the ME is the owned: or the I is the enduring
subject and the ME is that which changes: or the I is the
subject of responsibility and of praise and blame, and the ME
is that for which I is responsible and is praised or blamed.
The best way to describe the distinction, however, is that
the I is the active caring dimension of the self and the ME
164 P. F. Strawson, Individuals, London:
Ltd., 1959.
165 James, Principles, I, p. 378.

Methuen & Co.,
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iS the objects and events ordered or classified into a self
bY this caring.
Each of the above descriptions has the merit of taking
into account the real ambiguous nature of the self.

our

ambiguous existence must not be falsified in order so we can
easilY deal with it like any ordinary object of
consciousness.

To take for example either of the dimensions

of the self and claim that this is what the self is, is to
totally misrepresent the self.

To take the ME as exclusively

the real self is to remove agency from the notion of the self,
thus rendering all human action nonpersonal.

To take the I,

the perishing pulse of subjectivity, as exclusively the real
self is to empty it of objective historical content and so
individuality is lost.

At times it may be convenient and

perhaps necessary to treat the self as if it were a thing, but
~mustn't

existence.

forget that this is a distortion of personal
A self is not a thing but is rather an individual

agent and as such its existence is intrinsically two
dimensional and so ambiguous.

James writes,

We may sum up by saying personality implies the
incessant presence of two elements, an objective
person, known by a passing subjective thought and
recognized as continuing in time. Hereafter let us
use the words ME and 1 G
for the empirical person and
the judging thought. 6

To speak of agency and individuality with regards to the
166 rb1'd. I
' p. 350 .
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self is to speak of its spontaneity and sedimentation.

The

self is neither pure spontaneity nor pure sedimentation.
iS a mixture of both.

It

I am free but I am not absolutely free

for there is a sedimentation to my existence.

The mode of

existence of the self is that of a projecting of a future in
the present in light of its past.

The self is that mixture

of sedimentation and spontaneity that each of us discovers
when he reflects upon his own existence.

Most of us feel

that we are autonomous and yet we recognize that we are also
to a great extent creatures of habit.
Despite the momentary existence of the present pulse of
consciousness, the self does not have a momentary existence.
Each I perishes quickly and one's ME also changes.

The self

is, however, not just a particular I nor just a particular

ME.

The self is rather this entire on-going process which I

call "self-constituting-historical-existence."

A self is not

just the present caring subjectivity and it is not just the
present objective field of care.

It is quite clearly both.

The self is not simply a collection of static personality
traits nor is it a pure ego.

The self is rather a free

agent that already has a specific character.

It is a freedom

with a past to which it listens but to which it is not
absolutely bound.

In fact, this "listening" is one of the

ways it avoids being bound to the past.

The self always

finds itself already moving in a particular direction but it
has no fixed destiny.

,
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'

I am what I have been but I am also what I am intending
to be and what I am currently.

Personal existence always

involves all three dimensions of the time.

There is always

the present "I" projecting a future "ME" in light of its past

•ME·" The future "ME" and the past "ME" are all part of the
objective dimension of the self.

The subjective dimension

exists only in the present, and it determines the degree of
influence on one's past objective self on one's future
objective self.
The activity that I am presently engaged in can serve as
an example of what I mean when I say that the self always
involves all three dimensions of time.

The work that I am

now doing has a reference to both my past and my future.
With regard to my past, my present labor on this manuscript
leans on all those years of my philosophical studies.

With

regard to my future, my present labor is in no small way
aimed at securing for me a future career in philosophy.
Isolated from my past "ME" and my future projected "ME," my
present self and its activity is unthinkable.

The same is

true of each moment of my personal existence for the self is
always projecting a future in the present in light of its
past.
The temporality of the self is made possible by the fact
that each present pulse of consciousness involves a temporal
fringe that includes both an appropriated past and an
anticipated future.

It is due to this lived-present that the

154

•!" is able to project a "ME" which it views as the future of
itS past "ME."

This process which the self is can be signified the
following way:

I(

>ME.

The process is, however, more

complicated than this formula might suggest.

This formula

does serve, however, to indicate that the subjective
dimension affects the objective dimension and vice versa.

If, however, we were to symbolically represent the process of
selfhood in a way that more accurately reflects the flux of
consciousness it would be as follows:

Each new I constitutes a ME under the influence of a
past ME which in turn was constituted under the influence of
a previous ME.

This chain of influence stretches back in

time indefinitely through one's personal history.
The above description is still not a complete portrayal
of the subjective-objective temporal process which is the
self.

It isn't complete because it doesn't convey the fact

that each new I not only appropriates the former ME but also
the former I.

The former I is appropriated and becomes

available to reflection as if it was an objective element of
the spiritual ME.

This is the only manner in which past acts

Of subjectivity manifest themselves.

When we take this
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factor into account, a symbolic representation of the self
1ooks like the following:

The dotted line indicates that the previous pulse of
subjectivity is available to the present pulse of
subjectivity as if it were an object and a part of one's
spiritual ME.
I~ME,

is thus a way of representing in a simplified

way a rather complex process.

In chemistry complex chemical

processes are often represented in a formula in such a way
that only the basic steps of the process are clear.
are doing the same.

Here we

The formula displays the main facts of

selfhood but not all the facts.
The self can also be represented in terms of its
temporality in the following manner.

T1 , T 2 and T 3 refer to three different temporal
segments of the stream of consciousness. The dotted lines
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refer to the act of appropriation by which a present pulse of
thought appropriates its predecessor along with its objects.
fhe vertical lines with their arrows indicate how the
appropriated past ME affects how the present I projects a
future ME.

This diagram of the self has the merit of

displaying the fact that the self exists every moment as a
dialectic not only of subjectivity and objectivity but also
as a synthesis of past, present and future. 167 One's past
and future exist in the present as intentional objects of
consciousness.
As the above diagram indicates, the self is a subjectiveobjective temporal process.

It is an historical process that

is to a certain extent self determining for it involves both
sedimentation and spontaneity.
together in the self.

All three phases of time come

This Jamesian view of the self

accurately portrays the fundamental ambiguity involved in
human existence.

The self is no mere object of

consciousness, to treat it so is to ignore the fact that
consciousness itself is an aspect of the self.

To treat the

self as a thing means missing its spontaneity and
temporality.

As James makes clear, the self is neither

purely subjective nor purely objective.

Its existence is

intrinsically ambiguous for its unique mode of existence is
to be both subjective and objective at the same time.
167 This diagram has the merit of offering the detail
factors left out of James• own diagram depicting the self's
temporality. See Principles I, p. 324.
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A self has a developing essence.

Sartre once pointed

out that in the case of man a fixed essence only comes with
death.

In actuality a self never attains a fixed essence for

with death there is no longer a self to which to attribute an
essence.

If the self has an evolving essence, the evolving

must itself always form a part of its essence.

This means

that the self is forever two dimensional, always involving
both sedimentation and spontaneity.

When this fact is

neglected in any investigation of the self, one is no longer
dealing with a self.
one of its dimensions.

One does not grasp the self by grasping
One can not totally objectify the

self because it is that which is more than objective.
this point Kierkegard was correct.

On

Any attempt to reduce the

subjectivity of the self to anything else but itself, is to
lose the self altogether.

Not unlike the falling snowflake

that one grasps in vain to examine its intricate structure,
the self resists being fully grasped objectively.

This study

has from the start refused the futile exercise of trying to
reduce the subjectivity of the self to something else.

We

have avoided this move because it leads not to clarification
of the self but to its destruction.

It is time that it is

realized that the ambiguous language used in talking about
the self is based upon the genuine ambiguous existence that
the self enjoys.
This ambiguity of the self is bound up in its
temporality.

With the temporal fringe of consciousness there
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iS a synthesis of spontaneity and sedimentation.

This

synthesis means the self has both a subjective and objective
~pect

to it.

Personal existence involves not only a present

pulse of subjectivity but also an objective sedimentated past
and an objective intended future.

The self is a subjective-

objective process due to its unique temporality, i.e. the
fact that its mode of existence is that of a projecting a
future in the present in light of its past.

This temporality

in turn is based upon the fact that consciousness is
essentially a process of care.

Without care there is no

concern for the future and so no intending a specific future
under the influence of a sedimentated past.

It is care that

grounds the unique temporality of the self.

Thus, we see

that the self's ambiguity, temporality and caring quality are
all related.
caring self.

The Jamesian self is an ambiguous, temporal,

D.

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

with respect to the issue of identity, James saw selves
as being no different from other phenomena.
can change over a period of years.

One's character

One remains the same self

to the extent that one's behavior is continuous enough to be
reidentified as the same self -- again and again during the
period of change.

This is the case because, "there is

nothing more remarkable in making a judgment of sameness in
the first person than in the second or the third.• 168
James avoided the difficulties of Burne with regard to
personal identity because he recognized the fact that
personal identity does not involve nor require the kind of
absolute identity that Burne sought for it.

For Burne the same

cannot change, and persons change, then persons cannot remain
the same, so personal identity is a myth.

James regards

Burne's absolute identity as something that is found nowhere
in experience.

James believes that every object we

experience reveals itself as mutable and this also applies to
the objective self.

The very stream character of experience

itself precludes the absolute identity that Burne sought for
the self.
James believed that self-identity is a matter of
comparative identity.
168

Comparative identity allows for

Ibid. I, p. 315.
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sameness and change to coexist.

For an object to be

comparatively identical, it need only be subject to
reidentification despite its alterations.

Selves remain

comparatively identical according to James for generally they
are able to remain the same despite their various changes.
In the very concept of a thing there is an allowance made for
certain kinds of changes without the loss of identity.

To

know how to use a concept of a thing is to be aware of the
changes this thing can undergo and still remain the same
thing.

A cherry tree may grow taller each year, produce

cherries in June and lose its leaves in November and still be
the same cherry tree.

If, however, this tree were to produce

apples one June, we would regard this type of alteration as
involving a loss of identity for the concept of a cherry tree
does not make allowances for this kind of change.
As Terence Penelhum has pointed out, Hume's flawed
account of personal identity stems from the fact that he did
not recognize Locke's principle that the "same" is an
incomplete term that functions only in conjunction with
substantives and most substantive concepts (including that of
the self) are designed to allow for certain kinds of
changes. 169

For James also, sameness is to be found in our

meaning intentions, i.e. it is a matter of our conceptions.
169 Terence Penelhum, "Personal Identity," The
!ncyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 95-107. New York:
Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1967, p. 96.
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James position is consistent with the brilliant and
1 ucid account given by Terence Penelhum of the compatibility
of identity and change in a particular sense of identity.
unfortunately they do not use the same names to stand for the
tWO notions of identity that each compares and contrast.
what Penelhum calls comparative identity James calls
numerical identity and vice versa.

Despite differences in

terminology, they both agree that there is a type of identity
that allows for change and that this is the type of identity
we have in mind when we speak of personal identity.

Penelhum

notes that there is nothing paradoxical about ascribing both
change and identity to the same subject provided we are
ascribing numerical identity (or what James calls comparative
identity) rather than comparative identity (or what James
calls numerical identity). 170

In other words, provided it

is realized that we are not prescribing Hume 1 s absolute
identity in such cases.

Penelhum writes,

There is, of course, one sense of the words "same"
and "identical" in which sameness and change are
incompatible. This is the sense of "same" in which,
if applied to two distinct things, it means "alike"
and, if applied to one thing at different times, it
means "unaltered." This we might call the
comparative sense of the word. It is to be
distinguished from the numerical sense, in which two
things said to be the same are said not to be two,
but one. Clearly, one thing cannot be said to be
both changed and the same if the comparative sense
is intended, but this is not the sense we intend
when we wonder whether we are entitled to consider
someone the same throughout changes. Once this is
noted, we can easily see that there is no need to
assume that "to an accurate view" (Hume) an object
has to be the same in the comparative sense to
l?Oib'd
1 • p. 99 .
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remain the same in the numerical sense. If this is
t?fense of paradox will be only too easy to
susta1n.

misse~,

Like Penelhum, James approaches the problem of personal
identity quite differently than Hume.

First of all, James

did not make the Humean mistake of ignoring the role of the
body in personal identity.

The problem of self-identity

James realized, unlike Hume, is not the same problem as the
identity of mind.

Furthermore, James does not believe that

the concept of personal identity must precede and guide the
development of our concept of self.

He sees no good reason

why an account of the self ought to be shaped by an account
of personal identity rather than vice-versa.

It seems more

logical to James to have an account of personal identity
shaped by an account of self for the self is the thing whose
identity is at issue.

James' theory of personal identity is

thus a consequent of his account of the self.

In other

words, James recognizes the principle that the "same" is an
incomplete term that functions only in conjunction with
substantives or things intended to be thought about.
For James the question is not whether, but how we are
able to reidentify ourselves and others.
James believes, is a matter of fact.

That we do so,

According to James our

ability to recognize ourselves is like the ability a cattle
owner has when he "picks out and sorts together when the time
for the round-up comes in the spring, all the beasts on which
l?libid.
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inds his particular brand." 172
f
be

James writes,

As we think we see an identical bodily thing when,
in spite of changes in structure, it exists
continuously before our eyes, or when, however
interrupted its presence, its quality returns
unchanged, so here we think we experience an
identical self when it appears to us in an analogous
way. Continuity makes us unite what dissimilarity
might otherwise separate~ similarity ,jkes us unite
what discontinuity might hold apart. 1

The self possesses no absolute unity.
is comparative and generic.

What unity it has

The past and present selves

compared are the same only to the extent they really are the
same.

"Where the resemblance and the continuity are no

longer felt," says James, "the sense of personal identity
goes too. n 17 4
For James, self-identity is more of a relative identity,
•that of a slow shifting in which there is always some common
ingredient retained.n 175

He refers to Pope's story of a

man who had his black worsted stockings darned so often with
silk that they were finally transformed into a pair of silk
stockings.

To the owner of the stockings they kept their

identity throughout this period and in the end they felt as
172 Pr1nc1p
.
. 1 es, I , p. 317 .
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., I, p. 318.
175 Ibid., I, p. 352.
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warm and as intimate as they ever did.

With regards to

identity, the self is similar to this pair of stockings.

The

criteria of identity of persons has commonly been either
memory or bodily continuity or both.

James notes that since

the body and memories are both subject to change, "the
identity found by the I in its me is only a loosely
constructed thing, an identity •on the whole' just like that
which any outside observer might find in the same assemblage
of facts."

176

James points out that alterations in the ME recognized
by the I or by the Other may be slight or quite grave.

It is

common to hear the expression "He is so changed one would not
know him," and James notes that it is only less often that an
individual speaks of himself in this way.

For the most part,

however, we tend to think of selves as having the stability
and lasting identity that we find in our furniture.
Sometimes circumstances forces one to suddenly recognize that
this is truly not the case.

Imagine a man happily married

for years to a woman whom he deeply loves.

It is then his

misfortune to go to war and be captured by the enemy and
spend five years of his life as a prisoner of war.

After the

war he is released and comes home expecting to pick up his
civilian life where it was interrupted by the war.

Many

soldiers in this situation have been greeted upon their
return with the sad words, "Sorry dear, but I'm not the same
176

Ibid.
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person you left behind."

To the soldier his wife looks

basically unchanged, and he is baffled and shocked by her
statement.

He is told by his wife that the person he cared

tor and the person who cared for him no longer exists, but to
him there she stands right before him just like the same old
sofa.

Eventually the soldier comes to accept the fact that

selves can change in a way that sofas do not, for they can
actually vanish altogether.

For in the above case for all

practical reasons this soldier's bride has vanished.

It is

time we realize that the models that we currently tend to use
in our understanding of the self (for example:

furniture)

may be more than misleading; they may be harmful.
James' "judging thought" makes possible both personal
identity (unlike Hume) and the dissolution of personal
identity (unlike Kant).

Through appropriation by the present

pulse of consciousness, an individual may maintain a sense of
identity by repossessing enough information about himself.
There is always, however, a possibility that an individual
may not be able to do this.

Selves disappear.

People

forget, undergo amnesia, sink into insanity and manifest
multiple personalities and sometimes are transformed into
neural vegetables.

Such drastic alterations in selfhood are

described by James in The Principles of Psychology, The
~rieties

of Religious Experiences, and in an article

titled "The Hidden Self."

The Jamesian account of the self
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iS able to account for these mutations in selfhood in a more
adequate way than either Hume or Kant.
In the Jamesian account what identity the self possesses

iS an identity based upon (1) the functional identity of the
pulses of one's consciousness and (2) the constituted
identity of the ME.

These factors account for the

experienced identity of the self.

They do not give to the

self an absolute identity that some feel it has, but James
insists that we have no reason to believe that the self
possesses an absolute identity, nor that it even needs such
an identity.

It is this imagined need that gave birth to

fictions like the soul and the transcendental ego, as well as
aume's attitude of skepticism.

James is determined to avoid

all three of these fruitless alternatives.
~enomenological

His

account of the experienced identity of the

self does just that.
The functional identity of the pulses of one's
consciousness refers to the fact that each new pulse of
consciousness carries on the same function as subject of
experience.

Each new pulse of consciousness inherits the

title of "I" and functions as the "I" while appropriating the
entire past stream of consciousness to the body that it
Presently feels.

This act of appropriation is what makes

possible whatever sameness the self is experienced as having.
James' description of the identity of the self involves
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no permanent substratum of change.

Personal identity is not

a case of inherence in a lasting entity like a soul or
transcendental ego.

In his treatment of the self, James

holds the character of flux and flow to be primordial.
is no permanent ego above or behind the flux.

What identity

the self has is constituted in and with the flux.
be

There

It is to

found in the immediate felt continuity and resemblance of

the pulses that form a single unified stream of
consciousness.

The present pulse of subjectivity

appropriates its predecessor which exhibits the same warmth
and intimacy as it.

There exists within the stream of

consciousness a continuous and immanent self-relatedness.
constant accumulative appropriation of earlier by subsequent
pulses of thought is what makes possible self-identity.
James notes that yesterday's and today's pulses of
consciousness have no substantial identity for when one is
here the other has already perished.

These pulses of

consciousness have, however, a functional identity for they
are aware of the same past in the same way and know and react
to one's by-gone ME in the same caring manner.

"Successive

thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the same
past in the same way," says James, "form an adequate vehicle
for all the experience of personal unity and sameness which
we actually have.n 177
177 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 202-203.
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one's present pulse of caring consciousness is in no
need of anything to make it an "I."

It is always felt as the

verY core of one's existence for one exists through it.

Its

identity with the past stream of subjectivity is made
possible through the continuous acts of appropriation by
which one's past subjectivity is transformed into the
spiritual ME of the present pulse of consciousness.

In a

verY real sense the "I" dimension of the self exists only in
the present, for only the present pulse of consciousness is
able to function as the subject of experience.

The title of

•I" is truly given up and passed on to the next pulse of
consciousness with the practical result being that the
subject is always moving forward in time.

"Each Thought is

thus born an owner, and dies owned," states James,
•transmitting whatever is realized as its Self to its own
later proprietor." 178 To say that each new pulse of
consciousness inherits the title "I" means that it functions
in such a way that it is capable of serving as the referent
of the concept "I."

The present pulse of consciousness is

for James not only the knower but also the source of interest
and effort and so rightfully inherits the title "I."
As mentioned above, the identity of the self is based
Upon two principal conditions:

(1) the functional identity

Of the pulses of one's consciousness and (2) the constituted
identity of the "ME" by one's caring consciousness.
178

.
. 1 es, I , p. 322 .
Pr1nc1p
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just examined the first condition, let us now look at the
second.

179

The experience of sameness in the "ME" as in the case of
anY object of consciousness is the result of the mind's
intention to think the same as before.

This sense of

sameness is the source of all experienced sameness.

Whether

things in themselves are actually the same makes no
difference for without the mind's ability to intend an object
as the same as before no object would be so experienced.

A

thing may change considerably during the course of time but
if consciousness intends it as the same object, then it is
experienced as the very same object that was encountered
before despite the changes.

Of course, consciousness is only

going to intend the object as being the same if the changes
are consistent with the natural changes of an object of that
kind.

A tree, for example, may lose its leaves and still be

regarded as the same object, but if it starts walking about
it is not likely to be regarded by consciousness as the same

object that was experienced before this change occurred.

In

any case, no matter what changes do actually occur in the
object, if consciousness intends it as the same object, then
it is experienced as the same object.

James says that the

179
In The Origins of Pragmatism (2£. cit.) A. J.
Ayer gives a brilliant detailed analysis of the first
condition but barely touches upon the second condition. If
Ayer had given equal attention to both conditions, he might
~t have wrongfully chastised James for ignoring the role of
e body in the experience of personal identity.
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principle of constancy in the mind's meanings can be
expressed as follows:
The same matters can be thought of in successive
portions of the mental stream, and some of these
portions can know that they mean the same matters
which the other portions meant. One might put it
otherwise by saying that the mind can always in!8Bd,
and know when it intends, to think of the Same.

The identity of the ME is the result of this sense of
sameness.

181

Consciousness has the ability to think a

thing as being the same as was thought before.

The identity

of the ME is the main source of the feeling of an identical
self.

Here the body is the dominant factor.

As stated

above, all the objects that form a part of one's objective
self involve some reference to the body.
requires sameness in the body.
something that changes.

Sameness in the ME

The body is, however,

The cells of the body, for example,

are continuously being replaced by new cells.
oowever, is not what is required here.

Immutability,

What is required is

that consciousness intend this changing physical mass as
being the same body and thus the same old objective core of
its self.

What sameness the ME is experienced as having is

contingent upon the intention of consciousness to think the
same ME.

"The sense of sameness," says James, "is the
lSO Pr~nc~p
'
' 1 es, I , p. 434 .

~ole

181 see James Edie's brilliant and lucid account of the

of "the sense of sameness" in James• account of personal
ldentity. 22· cit.

171

verY keel and backbone of our thinking.• 182
one's personal identity reposes on it.

The sense of

In other words the

functional identity of the pulses of consciousness is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the experience
of personal identity.

An objective identity must also be

present within the ME aspect of the self.

James writes,

The sense of personal identity is not, then, this
mere synthetic form essential to all thought. It is
the sense of a sameness perceived by thought and
predicated of things thought-about. These things
are a present self and a self of yesterday. The
thought not only thig~s them both, but thinks that
they are identical.

In order to fully understand the sameness that is to be
found in the objective dimension of the self, we must first
examine James' notion of the sense of sameness more fully.
This function of consciousness is regarded by James as being
the source of all experience of identical objects.
Unfortunately, James did not make explicit his doctrine of
the sense of sameness until many pages after his chapter on
the self.

It is to his chapter on conception that we must

turn to more fully understand his view of self-identity. 184
182 Pr1nc1p
.
. 1 es, I, p. 434.
183

184

Ibid., I, p. 315.

James Bayley regards James' chapter on conception as
the key to understanding his theory of personal identity.
Unfortunately Bayley employs James' notion of conception to
reduce the Jamesian "I" to a collection of organic movements
that are tied together simply by the concept self. No doubt
James would regard this as another extreme case of "anti8Piri tualist fevor." _Q£. cit.
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In his chapter on conception James pointed out that
~hether

there exists any real identity in the things

themselves or not, we would never notice an identity if we
had no sense of sameness.

We choose "the point of view of

the mind's structure alone." 185

James was well aware of

the fact that for any object to be experienced as "the same,"
its various perspectival apearances which consciousness
grasps in separate temporal moments must be treated by
oonsciousness as being aspects of the same object.

The

notion of something that remains identical amidst the
variation of its appearances and is evidently independent of
them is accomplished through the "sense of sameness."
James believes that we are masters of our meanings and
sameness is found in the world of the meant.

Due to the

•principle of constancy" in the mind's meanings, one is
always able, and always conscious of being able, to think
about the same one thought of before.

Although he denied we

ever get the same sensation twice, James insisted we do
encounter the same objects of thought all the time.

For

James, things can be experienced as "the same" only by a mind
Which can grasp them and hold them before itself through the
flux of temporal experience.

Here James is offering us his

version of the principle of intentionality.

According to

this phenomenological principle, consciousness can grasp, in

a real, intentional act, an objective meaning to which it can
185

.
. 1 es, I , p. 435 .
Pr1nc1p

173

always return.

As Herbert Spiegelberg has pointed out, the

•sense of sameness" is just James' term for the intentional
character of consciousness that allows me to constitute
objects as being the same not only through my own temporal
experience for me, but also as being the same for anyone that
thinks them.

186

James notes that although the thing we mean to point at
maY change considerably without our knowledge of the
alterations, in our meaning itself we are not deceived; our
intention is to think of the same.

Sensations may never

repeat themselves but this is not the case with the "object
of thought."

James writes,

Each conception ••• eternally remains what it is,
and can never become another. The mind may change
its states, and its meanings at different times; may
drop one conception and take up another, but the
dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be
said to change into its successor ••• Thus amid the
flux of opinions and physical things, the world of
conceptions, or things intended to be thought about,
stands B;iff and immutable, like Plato's Realm of
Ideas. 1

But of course James is no Platonist.

Unlike Plato,

James regards conceptions as historically acquired tools of
the human world.

He writes,

••• this translation (of the perceptual into the
conceptual order of the world) always takes place
for the sake of some subjective interest, and ••• the

'lol. I

I

186 Herbert Spiegelberg. The Phenomenological Movement,
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 161.
187 P .
. 1 es, I , p. 437 .
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conception with which we handle a bit of sensible
experience is really nothing but a teleological
instrument. This whole function of conceiving, of
fixing, and holding fast to meanings, has no
significance apart from the fact that the conceiver
is a !aeature with partial purposes and private
ends.

In The Meaning of Truth James spoke of certain special
conceptions which he refers to as "apperceiving ideas."
These concepts, James believes, arose as "spontaneous
variations" and have become permanent fixtures in human
thought because of their usefulness in handling the flux of
experience.

James regards these apperceiving ideas as,

••• definite conquests made at historic dates by our
ancestors in their attempts to get the chaos of
their crude individual experiences into a more
shareable and manageable shape. They proved of such
sovereign use as denkmittel that they are now a part
of the very structure of our mind. We cannot play
fast and loose with them. No experience can upset
them. On the contrary, they apperceiv1 9very
experience and assign it to its place. 8

James treats consciousness as the realm of meaning.

He

holds that sameness is to be found neither in the constantly
changing physical world nor in our fleeting states of
consciousness.

Sameness can be had only on the level of the

objectively meant.

On this level it is important to note

188 rbid., I, p. 456.
189 william James, The Meaning of Truth,
Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 42.

(Cambridge:

175
that James regards the concept of self as one of our most
primitive and colossally useful denkmitte1. 190
Now that we have a clearer understanding of what James
means by the "Sense of Sameness" we must now examine the role
it plays in self-identity.

The ME (the objective dimension

of the self) is regarded by James as a highly complex
object.

Yet James believes that to recognize one's ME as

being the same through a period of time is an achievement on
par with the recognition that this desk is the same one I
experienced yesterday.

In the case of the desk it is not

necessary that it be microscopically inspected to make sure
that there has been no physical changes at all in order for
me to experience it as the same desk; nor is necessary that
my perspectival perceptions of the desk be identical for both
days in order for me to experience it as the same desk.

Such

analysis is unnecessary for the experience of sameness in the
case of the desk and the same is true of the experience of
self-identity.

Such operations are unnecessary; it is only

necessary to analyze my meaning-intention itself.

And

according to James I can always mean the same again.

Like

the desk, the ME is an object constituted in consciousness
and to constitute an object is to intend it as distinct from
every other and as being the same as itself through a
temporal flux.

Although the ME is regarded by James as being

a very complex field of cared-for objects, there is one
190w~'11'~am J ames, p ragma t'~sm,
University Press, 1975), pp. 84-85.

(Cambridge:

Harvard
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primarily interesting object from which this whole field of
care seems to radiate and that object is called the body.
The body is that ever present object which consciousness with
rare exceptions continually judges to be the same ME.

It is

important to note that for James the body in itself does not
guarantee self-identity.

There is no experience of an

identical ME in the absence of those functions of
consciousness known as care and the sense of sameness.

The

identity of the objective self requires that the body be
cared for and judged to be identical.

James writes,

It belongs to the great class of judgments of
sameness and there is nothing more remarkable in
making a judgment of sameness in the first person
than in the second or the third. The intellectual
operations seem essential alike, whether I say "I am
the same," or whether I say "the pen is the same, as
yesterday." It is as easy to think the ~~~osite and
say "neither I nor the pen is the same."

James' meaning is clear.

The ME is discovered to be the

"same" through a series of experiences in the same way in
which any other object of consciousness can always again be
experienced as the "same" as was meant in an earlier
experience.

He writes,

The sense of our personal identity, then, is
exactly like anyone of our other perceptions of
sameness among phenomena. It is a conclusion
grounded either on the resemblance in a fundamental
respect, or on the conti~~ity before the mind, of
the phenomena compared.
19lp r~nc~p
.
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James regards "absolute identity" as being one of those
terms that are presupposed by all others and something we
never encounter in experience but instead attain to the
conception of it:
••• [by] the direct perception of a difference
between compounds (i.e. physical objects), and the
imaginary prolongation of the direction of the
difference to an ideal terminus, the notion of which
w: fix and 1 §3ep as one of our permanent subjects of
d1SCOUrse.

No absolute identity is to be found in the ME.

Like

every other aggregate, it changes with the passage of time.
The numerous cases of mental breakdown, and those rare cases
of multiple selves, and even the manner in which most of us
view our own distant past clearly indicates that the ME is
anything but a stable and permanent thing.
it a "fluctuating material."

Hence James calls

He is thus quite serious when

he claims that one's body by itself is no guarantee of one's
identity as a person.

The body must be judged to be

identical and mine and this judgement is made only if the
body is viewed with a high degree of care.

Upon these

conditions rest the maintenance of self-identity: when they
vanish so does the self.

Maintenance of self-identity is a

continuous task in which failure is always possible.

The

identity of the ME is thus based upon care and the sense of
sameness and in both cases the body plays a vital role for it
193

rbid., I, p. 480.
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iS felt with the highest degree of warmth and intimacy and is
moreover that ever present object in the field of experience.
consequently, the body functions as the core of the ME to
~hich

all its other elements (material, social and spiritual)

are arranged and bound.

The objective dimension of the self

(i.e. ME) is then a network of interrelated cherished objects
which has the lived-body as its center, and it is due
primarily to this center that there is a sense of selfidentity through the temporal flow of one's life.

As James

points out, we feel the whole cubic mass of our body
continuously and "it gives us an unceasing sense of personal
existence. n 194
Let us now summarize our findings on the identity to be
found in the Jamesian self.

For James, self identity always

entails two kinds of sameness:

(1) Sameness in the self as

knower and (2) Sameness in the self as known. 195

The first

is provided by the functional identity of the pulses of one's
consciousness and the second by the constituted identity of
the ME.

Each factor contributes to the identity of the self

for each of these dimensions is an aspect of the same self.
Together these factors, however, do not give to the self "a
sort of metaphysical or absolute Unity in which all
differences are overwhelmed." 196

Yet, they do give to the

194 rbid., I, p. 316.
195 James, Psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 201-202.
196 rbid., p. 202.
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self, the identity, "which the facts require us to
19 7
suppose. "
James writes,
If in the sentence 'I am the same that I was
yesterday,' we take the 'I' broadly, it is evident
that in many ways I am not the same. As a concrete
ME, I am somewhat different from what I was: then
hungry, now full; then walking, now at rest; then
poorer, now rich; then younger, now older; etc. And
yet in other ways I am the same, and we may call
these the essential ways. My name and profession
and relations to the world are identical, my face,
my faculties and store of memories, are practically
indistinguishable, now and then ••• the past and
present selves compared are the same just so far as
they are the same, and no farther. They are the
same in kind. But this generic sameness coexist
with generic difference just as real; and if from
the one point of view Il§W one self, from another I
am quite as truly many.
197 rbid., p. 203.
198 Ibid., pp. 201-202.

PART SEVEN
THE JAMESIAN SELF:

AN APPRAISAL

In this section we will be discussing the merits of the·
Jamesian theory of the self.

In so doing we will be

comparing the Jamesian theory to the traditional alternative
~eories

with respect to the following issues:

temporality, (3) agency and (4) sociality.

(1)

care,

(2)

The goal of this

section is to show that the Jamesian approach leads to a
richer and more adequate concept of the self than any of its
four traditional rivals.
These four issues, care, temporality, agency and
sociality, have not been chosen arbitrarily.

It is through a

careful consideration of each of these experiential features
of our personal existence that we come to realize the
enormous contribution James has made to our understanding of
selfhood.

There are at least five reasons for taking this

approach in our appraisal of the Jamesian self:

(1)

It is

clear that an adequate theory of the self will be one that
will not only not neglect these four experiential facts of
human existence but will explain their inter-relationship in
a single unified self.

(2) These are the four features of

our personal existence that have often been neglected by past
Philosophers whose search for the self was dominated by a too
narrow concern for the epistemological subject.

(3) All four

features (care, temporality, agency and sociality) are
180
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emphasized in the Jamesian theory of the self.

(4) Important

objections can be raised regarding James• treatment of each
of these four aspects of our personal existence.

(5) The

major uniqueness of the Jamesian theory of the self lies in
itS bold attempt to account for all four of these attributes

of personhood and show their inter-relationship in a single
concrete existing self.
A major weakness that is common in the traditional
theories of the self is a tendency not to confront and deal
with all the various experiential facts involved in selfhood.
Each of the traditional approaches (Spiritualists,
Transcendentalists, Associationists and Behaviorists) began
with too narrow a perspective on the problem of selfhood.
Their weakness can to a certain extent be traced to the
narrowness of their focus.

The Spiritualists started this

trend by focusing upon the thinking attribute of our being
to the exclusion of all else.

Associationists and

Transcendentalists, after pointing out the inadequacy of the
Spiritualist's position, continued to make the same mistake
of ignoring the non-cognitive dimension of the self.

After

recognizing the fruitlessness of all the above narrow
explanations, the Behaviorists went on to develop their own
one dimensional approach to the problem of the self in which
the subjective dimension of the self is methodologically
bracketed and then forgotten.
Unlike the above, the Jamesian aproach to the problem of
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the self is not based upon any preconceived notion of what in
the final analysis must be the self's irreducible core.

His

iS basically a phenomenological approach in that it strives
to be as faithful as possible to how the self manifests
itself in experience.

He is willing to sacrifice the

"sentiment for simplicity" and to "reinstate the vague in our
experience" in order to discover the meaning of self.

As a

result of his rigorous and unbiased approach, James
discovered a self that is more dynamic and more complex than
any of the traditional theories had envisioned and moreover a
self that is experiencable.
The great merit of the Jamesian theory of the self is
that it addresses itself to all the experiential facts of
selfhood without retreating to unexperienced entities or
principles to account for them.

Four basic experiential

facts of selfhood which the Jamesian theory takes into
account and which are not fully treated in any of the four
major alternative approaches mentioned above are as follows:
(1) Care is an essential feature of the self.

(2) The self

is historical and has a unique temporal structure.
self is essentially an agent.

(3) The

(4) The self is essentially

social.
Throughout this essay we have been exploring James•
reasons for regarding each of these four points as
representing an essential feature of the self.

The Jamesian

theory of the self is constructed in such a way as to
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accommodate all four of these facts.
be

In this section we will

comparing James' position to each of the four traditional

theories with regard to each of these four points.

Our aim

here is not to give a full scale critique of each of the
major alternative theories of the self.
go beyond the scope of this study.

Such a project would

Instead, our aim in this

section is to show, one, that an adequate theory of the self
must account for these four basic facts of selfhood and two,
that the Jamesian theory is more adequate than its
traditional rivals because it does a better job in this
regard.

In our appraisal of the Jamesian self we will also

examine certain major objections that have been or can be
raised regarding James' treatment of each of these four
features of selfhood, and we will determine to what extent,
if any, they weaken the case for the Jamesian self.

A.

CARE

The words ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse
feelings and connote emotional worth, are objective
designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the
power to produce in a stream of consci~~§ness
excitement of a certain peculiar sort.

According to the Jamesian theory presented here,
oonsciousness is a process of care and it is consciousness
qua caring that is the ground of selfhood.
is care can a self be said to exist.

Only where there

Care is the sign of

selfhood.
The significance of care has been strangely ignored by
most philosophical descriptions of the self.
~

It may simply

another case of the most obvious feature being left

unexamined because of its very pervasiveness.

Or the reason

for this failure may have its roots in western Philosophy's
great emphasis upon the powers of reason and their suspicion
of the value of subjective feelings.

The primary focus of

this tradition has been the theoretical side of human
existence.

The emphasis being here on the "I think" rather

than the "I do."

Breaking with this tradition, James

recovered the practical side of human existence and
discovered the role of care in selfhood.
The self is, if it is anything at all, that which one
cares most deeply about.

This is perhaps the first thing

199 P .
. 1 es, I , p. 304 •
r1nc1p
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that experience teaches us about the self.

That self-love

characterizes our existence is a fact that all men
intuitively recognize.

"Our language is laden with

evidence," writes Gordon Allport.

For he believes, "The

commonest compound of self is selfish, and of ego, egoism.
pride, humiliation, self esteem, narcissism are such
prominent factors that when we speak of ego or self we often
have in mind only this aspect of personality." 200

It is

this aspect of selfhood that tends to be taken for granted
and left philosophically unexplored.

James, however, saw

this factor in our existence as significant and in need of
analysis.
The altogether unique kind of interest which each
human mind feels in those parts of creation which it
can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is
a fundamental psychological fact •••• Each of us
dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place •••• 201

Why is self-love so common?

Why is there this enormous

correlation between the phenomenon of care and the self?
People are all the time telling us to, "Look out for number
one," but no one really needs to be taught this.
it quite naturally.

we all do

The infant is egoism personified.

This

natural caring attitude is nonetheless easily lost sight of
by philosophical investigators seeking the self, especially

when they assume the object of their search is a spiritual
substance or a pure principle of subjectivity.
200 Gor d on A11 port, Becom~ng,
.
New Haven:
University Press, 1955. pp. 44-45.
201 P .
. 1 es, I , p. 278 .
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however, no such blindness in James.

As John Smith has

pointed out, for James, the manifestation of selfhood first
appears, "not in an intuitive apprehension of an ego, but in
the discovery that we have an interest in certain parts of
what we encounter and that we are ready to ignore the
res t •

n202

On the face of it, the question, why is there a strong
correlation between the self and care? may seem ridiculous.
one is tempted to reply, of course each individual cares for
his self, self-preservation is an instinct that all organisms
possess.

But the two phenomena are not really the same.

The

self-preservation found in the animal kingdom involves no
real self and no real care.

Here the term self-preservation

refers to a set of reflex reactions and the behavioristic
"stimulus-response account" seems appropriate.

This fact

suggests that it is quite conceivable that a being similar in
appearance to man could have evolved in which all its
behavior was guided by its brain without consciousness being
present and so without care or any sense of self.

One has

only to think of all the complex acts the body already
~rforms

without a conscious awareness, to rediscover the

uniqueness of the presence of care.

I have in mind here the

various complex operations of our internal organs.

In light

Of these observations, the question, why is there a strong
202

John Smith, Themes in American Philosophy, New York:
Harper & Row, 1970, p. 77.
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correlation between the self and care? does not seem
ridiculous.

The nature of the relationship between caring

and the self now appears as something requiring a more
~netrating

phenomenological exploration.

The relationship between care and the self James
examined from a new perspective.

Scientific revolutions are

often born out of merely taking a different perspective on an
issue, or viewing an old problem in a new context, or asking
a whole new set of questions.
prime examples of this.
question:

Copernicus and Darwin are

James leaps past the obvious

How come this thing called the self generates so

much care?

He ponders instead the question:

Could it be

that it is care which is responsible for the generation of
the self?

He concludes that caring is not the result of

•mineness," but is rather the root of it.

His

phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of selfhood leads
him to the discovery that care is a constitutive factor in
the formation of one's material, social, and spiritual ME.
All objects that enter and form a part of my total historic
~do

so through the medium of care.

I don't care for these

objects because I sense somehow they have a reference to some
•inner principle of subjectivity," rather I identify with
these objects because I care for them.
To have a self that I can care for, nature must
first present me with some object interesting enough
to make me instinctively wish to appropriate it for
its own sake, and out of it to manufacture one of
those material, social or spiritual selves which we
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spriritualists embrace in their investigation of human
existence.

This, however, represents only one dimension of

selfhood and it is not at all clear that it is even its
primary dimension.

Even the self of the professional

philosopher is not so one dimensional.

Even Hume played his

backgammon.

James does not view the subjecthood of the self

as primary.

For him, all knowing is for a doing.

Both truth

and meaning in James' Pragmatic philosophy are grounded in
terms of action and consequences in the real world.

I'm

confident that James would applaud the comment of John
Macmurray:

"Against the assumption that the Self is, at

least primarily, a 'knowing subject,' I have maintained that
its subjecthood is a derivative and negative aspect of its
agency." 20 5
Care also did not find its way in the Associationists'
account of the self.

After correctly criticizing the

substantial soul theory, Hume continued down the
Spiritualists' same narrow path of equating identity of self
with identity of mind.

As in the case with Descartes, the

epistemic self became Hume's sole concern.

As

a

result, Hume

ended up with a self that was a bundle of passive unrelated
impressions and ideas.

The practical effect being that the

Single soul substance was displaced by a chain of little
substances each having the same independent status of the
205 John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London:
ana Faber Limited, 1953), pp. 11-12.

Faber
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original Cartesian substance.

What Hume failed to fully

appreciate was that certain impressions involve a special
warmth and intimacy.

In other words, consciousness cares

roore for some of its objects than others, and it especially
cares for that object called the body.

If one ignores the

role of care in selfhood, one is easily led to also ignore
the role of the most cared for object, the body.

If the

dynamic telic nature of consciousness is lost sight of, one
can easily be misled into identifying the self with all the
contents of consciousness, or finding this distasteful,
concluding the self must be a fiction.
Care also plays no role in the transcendentalist's
theory of the self.
empty ego.

There can be no great warm regard for an

The phenomenon of self-love or self-esteem can't

refer to love or esteem for the barren ego that Kant presents
us with.

One does not identify with a pure principle of

subjectivity for one can't care for that which transcends all
possible experience.

Kant would admit that his

transcendental ego forms no part of the cherished objective
self, but he would insist nonetheless that it does constitute
the self as knower.

James points out that it is unnecessary

and foolish to posit a second mysterious self hiding behind
the self that we do in fact experience and care for.

There

may be unknown conditions that are required for the
Possibility of experience, but whatever they may be they are
no more deserving of the name "self" than the oxygen one
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breathes which one may also view as a condition for
consciousness.

The experiential cherished self is the only

real self and it is the self as both knower and doer.
To sum up, then, we see no reason to suppose that
•self-love• is primarily, or secondarily, or ever,
love for ~fi~'s mere principle of conscious
identity.

The role of care in selfhood may have been ignored by
same because of an urge to treat the self in a "scientific
fashion" that does not involve questions of value or analysis
of feelings.

Here we have the restrictive and inadequate

methodology of Behaviorism.

Their sterile approach can never

uncover the field of the personal for a self always
represents a particular value system.

To reveal what matters

to you, is to reveal your very selfhood.

Care can not be

washed away or distilled with the hope of finding some
substantial residue called, "self."

When an individual is

confused about his or her own values, we sometimes say that
the person is suffering from an identity crisis.

Far from

~ing metaphoric, these words describe the situation quite

accurately.

Differences in care, alterations in what one

Values, does in fact mean self-transformation.

The quality

and quantity of my self-field is determined by the direction
and degree of my caring involvement with the objects
Presented in consciousness.

Where there is no such

involvement, there is no self.
206

In the account of the
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Behaviorists there is no place for a caring consciousness
that through its efficacy both creates and maintains a self.
aut to view man as an automaton, to explain away his behavior
in terms of reflexes and conditioned reinforcement, and to
treat all consciousness and feeling as epiphenomena is an
effort not in the direction of solving the mystery of
selfhood but of reducing it to something it is not, i.e.
something that their quantitative measuring tools can handle
with ease.

Here is the "sentiment of rationality" once again

forgetting its humble origin in the prereflective world of
lived-experience. 207
But what is this abstract numerical principle of
identity, this 'NUMBER ONE' within me, for which,
according to proverbial philo~8Rhy, I am supposed to
keep so constant a 'lookout'?

James considers in turn whether it be physiological
adjustments, or the principle of pure subjectivity, or the
chain of thoughts, or the soul or the pronoun I.

He reaches

the conclusion that the self for which he feels "hot regard"
can't be any of these items.

He points out that even if he

was given all these things he would "still be cold, and fail
to exhibit anything worthy of the name of selfishness or
devotion to 'Number One.'"209

~

207 James, "The Sentiment of Rationality" in The Will

Believe and Other Essays on Popular Philosophy and Human
Immortality. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.
208 Pr1nc1p
.
. 1 es, I , p. 303 .
209

Ibid., pp. 303-304.
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If none of these, what is it I care for in self-love?
what is that which I cherish and seek to preserve and
increase at all cost?

It is always my total empirical

selfhood, my historic me, which is nothing mysterious, but is
rather a collection of objective facts.

"Its own body,

-

then first of all, its friends next, and finally its

!firitual dispositions, must be the supremely interesting
objects for each human mind."210

-

A theory of the self which ignores the dominant role of

care will not be able to deal with all the features of
selfhood (material, social and spiritual) or account for
their unity in a concrete individual.

The fundamental ground

of the self's temporality, agency and sociality is
consciousness qua caring.

It is through care that the self

projects a future, has ends to motivate action, and is
sensitive to its own image in the minds of others.

Care is

one of the experiential facts of selfhood that the Jamesian
theory handles more adequately than the major tradi tiona!
~counts

of the self.

It was James' rigorous faithfulness to phenomena as
they manifest themselves in experience, i.e. his phenomenol~ical approach, which prevented James from ignoring the

dominant role of care in the field of the personal.

But

~rhaps there are good reasons for not giving care the

central role that the Jamesian theory does.
210

rbid., pp. 307-308.

Perhaps the
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traditional theorists of the self recognized these reasons.
~et

us now consider three such possible reasons, which may be

formulated as a critique of the role played by care in the
Jamesian theory of the self:

(1)

It turns the self into a

by-product of an emotion and consequently trivalizes it or
reduces it to the status of an illusion.

(2)

It ignores the

fact that each of us seem to have certain elements in our
self that we actually despise rather than cherish.

It

(3)

makes the self non-public and graspable only in the first
person.
Let us now examine the first charge.
in the following manner.

It can be stated

In making care the central

constitutive factor in selfhood, James is making the self a
mere product of emotionality.

In so doing, he turns the self

into a mirage, deprives it of any real agency and extends its
boundaries to an absurd degree.

Is the charge valid?

There

are many Jamesian statements that can be cited that seem to
support the objection.
This sort of interest is really the meaning of the
wor~ imy.•
Whatever has it is eo ipso a part of
me. 1
The fact remains, however, that certain special
sorts of things tend primordially to possess this
interest, and form the natural me •••• The phenomenon
of passion is in origin and essence the same,
whatever be the target upon which it is discharged;
and what the target i2tually happens to be is solely
a question of fact. 2
211
212
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In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self
is the sum total of all that he can call his, not
only his body and his psychic powers, but his
clothes and his house, his wife and children, his
ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his
lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All
these things give him the same emotions. If they
wax and prosper, he feels triumphant: if they
dwindle and die away, he feels cast down -- not
necessarily in the same degre2 ~or each thing, but
in much the same way for all. 1
The words, ME, then, and SELF, so far as they arouse
feeling and connote emotional worth, are objective
designations, meaning ALL THE THINGS which have the
power to produce in a stream of consci~~~ness
excitement of a certain peculiar sort.

What is this "excitement of a peculiar sort" which all
these objects elicit?

Is it simply an emotion?

Does James

ever specify in any clear consistent way what this
"excitement" is that personalizes a certain portion of one's
field of consciousness?

James' vocabulary seems to suggest

that it is something like an emotion, but the truth is he
never clearly defined the care which personalizes.
referred to this special mode of care as:

He has

"the sting of

interest," "love," "emotional involvement," "sense of
importance," "intimacy," "animal warmth" and "excitement of a
Peculiar sort."

On the face of it, it seems a case can be

made for claiming that James makes the self a product of an
emotion.

There is evidence, however, which suggest that this
213
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was not James' basic intention.

If one considers first his

quasi-behavioristic theory of the emotions and second his
description of the fifth trait of thought as selectivity, one
is led to believe that the care which personalizes the
objects in the field of consciousness is not a particular
emotion but is rather the interest which is present always in
consciousness as the ground of its selectivity.

In other

words, care is not a particular feeling such as fear or love
or hate but is rather consciousness itself viewed in terms of
its selectivity which according to James is on going.

James

writes, "If one must have a single name for the condition
upon which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects
depends one had better call it their interest." 215
We may be here going beyond certain explicit remarks of
James.

This, however, should cause us no concern since it is

not the purpose of this essay to merely restate James'
explicit position.

From the start, our goal has been rather

to present a Jamesian theory of the self that is based upon
his valuable insights regarding the nature of consciousness
and the self, the inter-relationship of these insights, and
their necessary implications.

It is James' confusing and

even overwhelming richness which we must both draw upon and
amend.
In the Jamesian posture, care is not a particular
emotion such as is fear, love or hate.
215 Ibid., II, p. 1164.

Care is a term that

198

refers to the volitional focus within consciousness.
attend, to select, or to think is to care.

To

The care which

forms one's objective self is nothing other than the
interested and choosing feature of consciousness which James
refers to as the fifth trait of thought.

The following words

of James are from his section dealing with the selectivity of
consciousness.
But in my mind and your mind the rejected portions
and the selected portions of the original worldstuff are to a great extent the same •••• There is,
however, one entirely extraordinary case in which no
two men ever are known to choose alike. One great
splitting of the whole universe into two halves is
made by each of us; and for each of us almost all of
the interest attaches to one of the halves; but we
all draw the line of division between them in a
different place. When I say that we all call the
two halves by the same names, and that those names
are •me• and •not-me2 6espectively, it will at once
be seen what I mean. 1

He does not abandon this position when it comes to his
chapter on the self.
~ck

In fact, he reasserts it and refers

to the section dealing with the selectivity of

consciousness.

James makes the following statement in his

chapter on the self.
This is as strong an example as there is of that
selective industry of the mind on which I insisted
some pages back (p. 284 ff). Our thought,
incessantly deciding, among many things of a kind,
which ones for it shall be realities, here chooses
one of many possible selves or characters, and
forthwith reckons it no shame to fail i~ ;ny of
those not adopted expressly as its own. 1
216 rb;d., I
~
, p. 277 .
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consciousness is not regarded by James as a chain of
passive witnesses or simple awareness; for him it's a roaring
river of care.
various degrees.

Care is always present in experience in
It not only helps constitute one's self, it

also helps constitute one's life-world.

James' notion of the

intentionality of consciousness is primarily teleological.

ae

views it as intrinsically purposeful.

interests, goals and choice.

It involves

Gary Kessler in his article,

•pragmatic Bodies Versus Transcendental Egos" points out that
it is this feature of James• theory of consciousness which
•signals an important difference between James' notion of
intentionality and Husserl's." 218

James is in fact closer

to Sartre's view of consciousness as being a "for-itself" and
•a passion for being."

Here in the Jamesian posture toward

the self we call this feature of consciousness "care."
We must now consider an obvious objection to identifying
care with the volitional focus of consciousness.

Since this

selectivity is involved in all the intentional objects of
consciousness does this not imply the absurd position of
identifying one's self with one's world?

One might pause

here and ask oneself, But is such a position so manifestly
absurd?

Is there not a sense in which one identifies with

one's entire world?

Isn't there a sense in which each of us

personalizes his or her world?

Isn • t there a sense in which

one's world is a reflection of one's self?

This is suggested

in the following words of James:
218 Gary Kessler, "Pragmatic Bodies Versus Transcendental
Egos," Transactions of Charles Peirce Society, Vol. 14,
Pp. 101-119, Spring 1978. p. 109.
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We may, if we like, by our reasoning unwind things
back to that black and jointless continuity of space
and moving clouds of swarming atoms which science
calls the only real world. But all the while the
world we feel and live in will be that which our
ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes of
choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors,
by simply rejecting certain portions of the given
stuff. Other sculptors, other statues from the same
stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same
monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but
one in a million alike embedded, alike real to those
who may abstract them. How different must be the
world~ ~n the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or
crab! 1

Nevertheless, James does not incorporate all the objects
of consciousness into the self.

The world remains divided

into self and non-self despite the ubiquitousness of care.
The objective self is simply those objects which evoke an
extremely intense and enduring form of care.

One's body and

other objects in practical relation to it tend to be the only
part of one's world to illicit this habitual and intense form
of care.

In this way, it can be said that care is

constitutive of both the self and world without equating one
with the other.
~rk

It is because the same creative force is at

in determining both the meaning of self and world, that

~have

a self which is a "fluctuating material" and a

situation in which the boundaries between self and world are
vague and shifting all the time.

For James the "sting of

interest" is fundamental for both the sense of the real world

or belief and the sense of self.
219
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tWO seems to be simply that the world includes all that is
continuously related to the self in a spatial, temporal, or
causal manner and not only that portion of reality for which
one has a "hot regard. n

The embodied self remains the

•anchor" of reality but it is not the whole of reality.

The

feeling of emotional involvement and interest is called for
bY both the self and the lived-world.

The self is simply

that portion of the world which generates the most intense
form of care.
One might still claim, however, that this intense and
enduring form of care ought to be regarded as an emotion even
if the other modes of care are not.

There are good reasons

for not treating James' personalizing care as an emotional
state.

(1)

Personalizing care is always present in

consciousness but we are not always in agitated states.
(2)

Personalizing care involves a sense of worthwhileness,

of interest, of importance but these are not necessarily
~esent

in what we call an emotion.

(3)

Personalizing care

involves a sense of warmth and importance that makes for
efficiency and unity while emotional excitement tends to
cause just the opposite.

For example, a healthy self-regard

tends to be viewed as a positive factor for doing well on a
test, but being in an emotional state tends to be viewed as a
negative factor here.
Gordon Allport takes a similar view in his distinction

~tween what he calls propriate states (i.e. ego-involved

states) and emotional states.

He writes:

Each lasting sentiment in personality is a propriate
state, but only on occasion does a sentiment erupt
into emotion. An Amundsen planning for decades to
fly over the North Pole is constantly ego-involved
but rarely agitated. It is true that all propriate
striving is felt to be important and laden with
value -- in this sense it is an affective state: but
the sense of warmth and importance makes for
efficiency and unity, not for the disruption and
disintegration that often accompany emotional
excitement •••• We cannot, ther2~3re, permit the two
conditions to be confused ••••

we must take a similar position in our Jamesian theory
with regard to care and emotionality.

They are not to be

confused in our theory of the self.
Thus we see that it is not true that the Jamesian theory
makes the self a mere product of emotionality.

Care is not

the same as an emotion but is rather the ground of all
emotions, actions and relations that form one's personal
life.

The first objection to the role given to care in the

Jamesian theory is without merit.
We must now consider another possible objection to the
role played by care in the Jamesian theory of the self.
~e

form of a question it could be stated as follows:

In
"How

can care be the ground of my objective self, if there are
~pects

of my self which I truly dislike?"

How do persons

account for those sections of their selfhood that they
despise and loathe if care is regarded as that which forms
220

Allport, Becoming, p. 59.
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the objective self?

It seems that nearly all of us have such

uncherished features that are recognized nonetheless as
elements of the self.

I'm not particularly fond of the shape

of mY nose, but I still view it as mine.
doesn't mean I disown it.

My disliking it,

Doesn't such an example serve as

testimony against the Jamesian view that it is only through
care that objects form a part of the self.
Robert Ehman believes this is a real flaw in James'
theory.

He writes, " ••• James fails to account for our

feeling of the relevance of our self of certain items in
which we have no interest and to which we may fail to respond
•
11 y •••• n221
emot1ona

This second objection is actually related to the first
objection which we have just considered.

It is based on the

presumption that the care which personalizes is an emotion,
that particular emotion called love.
shown, it is not.

As we have already

Thus there is no inconsistency in saying

that care is the author of selfhood and at the same time
agreeing that there are features of my self that I don't
like.

The opposite of personalizing care is not hate or a

feeling of dislike.

Care means interest, worth and

mportance and more than objects of love fall into this
category.

A person is in fact interested in, values and

221 Robert Ehman, "William James and the Structure of

~e Self," New Essays in Phenomenology, ed. by James Edie,
Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. pp. 260-261.
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regards as important those things which he hates for one
reason or another.

A person must be interested in and view

as important the object of hate if one is going to sustain
that emotion in consciousness.

If care has an opposite, it

would have to be described as something like absolute
disinterest and perfect insulation.

In other words, it would

have the characteristic of a thing, that is simply
•en soi" in the Sartrian sense.
Thus we see that this second objection loses its force
as soon as we understand that the term "care" in our Jamesian
theory is used in a special technical sense so that it no
longer means simply "like" or "love" but rather refers to the
impulsive and teleological character of consciousness itself,
i.e. James' special brand of intentionality.
There is another possible objection to the role of care
in the Jamesian theory.
follows:

This objection could be stated as

In making care the ground of selfhood the Jamesian

theory turns the self into something non-public, something
that can be grapsed only in first person experience and never
by

the Other.

The objection is not valid because care

manifest itself in one's concrete actions.
Care is not something beyond the notice of the Other.
James defines this caring character of consciousness in such
a manner that its presence can be scrutinized by the Other.
"Our interest in things means the attention and emotion which
the thought of them will excite and the actions which their
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presence will evoke." 222

In short, real care will be

reflected in one's observable behavior.

Just as James

defines true belief as a willingness to act, so also one
manifest what one really cares for through action.

We don't

have to rely on the testimony of the subject to determine the
constituents of his particular concrete self.

In fact, due

to self deception or what Sartre calls bad faith, the Other
maY know my self-field more accurately, especially if the
other is an intimate friend or relative, my therapist or my
scrupulous biographer.

Prior to Sartre, James held that one

reveals his true self in his undertakings.

His actions

define his cared-for-self not only to the Other but to
himself as well.
doctrine.
agent.

Here lie the seeds of his later pragmatic

In the Jamesian theory, the self is primarily an

Regarding its agency more will be said later.

The Jamesian self unlike a soul or a transcendental ego
is very public.

All the objects that are cared for by

consciousness and form a part of the Jamesian self are out
there in the world.

It is true that the caring consciousness

itself is non-public in the Jamesian theory.
what James calls "absolute insulation."

Here we have

This aspect of the

other's self I don't have direct access to.

But outside of a

few believers in mental telepathy I don't know of anyone who
seriously doubts the radical privacy of consciousness itself,

and I know of no good evidence that suggest that James is
222

.
. 1 es, I , p. 304 .
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mistaken on this point.

Although it is true that the

objective elements of the self are ordered around a
subjective center, we mustn't forget that this subjective
center loses its meaning apart from its objective
circumference.

In other words, I cannot care without caring

for something, something that belongs to the shared-livedworld.
We see then that this third objection to the role of
care in the Jamesian theory is invalid.

The emphasis on care

does not result in an insulated and non-public self.
Jamesian self is public and graspable by the Other.

The
It is as

public as a conscious being can be and a great deal more
public than a soul or a transcendental ego.
In this section we have discussed the role of care in
the Jamesian theory of the self.
~

We have shown why it should

treated as an experiential feature of selfhood.

We have

shown how this experiential fact was not fully grasped by any
of the four major alternative theories of the self.

we have

discussed possible objections for giving care the role that
it has in the Jamesian theory, and we have found each of
these objection lacking in merit.

Given the above, I think

its fair to conclude that of the theories we have discussed
and with respect to this one basic experiential fact of
Selfhood, the Jamesian theory is superior.

B.

TEMPORALITY

Experience is remoulding us every moment, and our
mental reaction on every given thing is really a
resultant of ~~3 experience of the whole world up
to that date.

The self manifest itself in experience as having a
mutable and accumulative existence in time.

The self is an

historical process such that for it there is always a future
appearing as the temporal horizon of this self's concrete
past.

A self exists by projecting a future in the present in

light of its past.

Or as Kierkegaard put it, the self lives

forward but understands backward.

This temporal feature of

selfhood is to a degree intuitively grasped by all men.

Yet,

it is strangely deemphasized in most theories of the self
where it is usually discussed only in connection with the
problem of reidentification of selves.

The Jamesian theory on

the other hand, recognizes the primacy of the self's unique
temporali zation and tries to account for it with a dynamic
theory of consciousness that is faithful to the "fact of
coalescence of next with next in concrete experience.• 224
The historical, dynamic nature of the self was not
really attended to in the traditional theories of selfhood.
The Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and Associationists
223 Ib;d., I
....
' p. 228 .
224 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 147.
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aespite their differences were all obsessed with finding
-ithin the self a core that was impervious to change,
development, or growth.

In pursuit of this goal, each of

these approaches to the self tended to ignore the historical
character of the self.

James on the other hand was obsessed

onlY with faithfully describing the self just as it revealed
itself in experience.

In this way, James came to recognize

that the self exhibited a mixture of sedimentation and
spontaneity.

For James, the flux and flow quality of the

self is primordial and to ignore it is to lose sight of the
nature of the self altogether.
one need only ponder one's life in the following manner
suggested by James to realize that the self is nothing frozen
in time.
From one year to another we see things in new
lights. What was unreal has grown real, and what
was exciting is insipid. The friends we used to
care the world for are shrunken to shadowsi the
women, once so divine, the stars, the woods, and the
waters, how now so dull and commoni the young girls
that brought an aura of infinity, at present hardly
distinguishable existencesi the pictures so emptyi
and as for the books, what was there to find so
mysteriously signi2~5ant in Goethe, or in John Mill
so full of weight?

The soul and the transcendental ego are both appealing
concepts in that they seem to offer us a persisting permanent
self that stretches unaltered all the way from the moment of
conception to the moment of death (and for those who identify
225

Principles, I, pp. 227-228.
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the soul and the self beyond even death).

But before we

embrace either of these solutions, we ought to consider
whether experience reveals the self as having such enduring
~rmanence.

I for one, can't imagine much in common between

mY present self and the self of my infant days that was
reported to me by my parents or between either of these and
the possible future self of my senile days when I may not be
capable of even recognizing the members of my own family.
When I reflect upon my experiences, I don't discover any
absolute core of permanence.
~rceptions,

I find rather a flux of

feelings, thoughts and desires.

Amid this flux

there does appear to be one comparatively stable structure
and that is the feeling of embodiment.

My body seems to be

in one way or another related to all my experiences.

Yet,

even here there is not found that core of absolute
~rmanence.

My body changes.

replaced by new cells.

Its cells are constantly being

It both grows and decays.

That old

photograph of my ten pound body, for example, doesn't seem to
have many affinities with any of my wedding photographs.

In

my own case I can't find the persisting permanent self that
is spoken of by both the Spiritualists and the
Transcendentalists.
The Associationists rightly recognized that there was no
absolute permanence to be found in experience.

They,

however, wrongly believed that there ought to be if there is
9oing to exist a self.

Hume concluded that the self was a

fiction.

He should have concluded that the self is a dynamic

process involving both sedimentation and spontaneity, that it
iS mutable and capable of both growth and decay, that it is
in short, historical.
James offers us the following penetrating description of
the self's mutability:
In the first place, although its changes are
gradual, they become in time great • • • •Well from
infancy to old age, this assemblage of feelings,
most constant of all, is yet prey to slow mutation.
Our powers, bodily and mental, change at least as
fast. Our possessions notoriously are perishable
facts • • • • The identity which the I discovers, as it
surveys this long procession, can only be a relative
identity, that of a slow shifting in wh~~g there is
always some common ingredient retained.

The Behaviorists can not provide a satisfactory account
of the historical character of the self because for them
there is no retention of the past or projection of a future.
For the Behaviorists, events merely leave an altered physical
organism.

Just as a nail once bent tends to bend again when

hit without memory or projection.

The bent nail example is

B. F. Skinner's own way of illustrating the effect of
experience on man.

Skinner maintains that there can only be

a response to a present reinforcer.

Distant goals, Skinner

insist are achievable only by means of a series of
conditioned reinforcers not because there is a self that can
Project into the future a different state of affairs than is
226 Ib1"d., I , p. 351 •
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given in the present.

In the hands of Behaviorists like

Skinner the self loses all its historicity and becomes a
chain of "it" processes.

Their view of consciousness as a

mere ephiphenomena prevents them from recognizing
sedimentation and spontaneity as real aspects of being a
self.

The Behaviorists are committed to treating the self as

just another thing in the physical world where time is a
series of nows and each now is equivalent to any other now.
The self is, however, not a thing, and its existence is not
confined to a "now" but is rather spread out through all
three dimensions of time simultaneously.
James grounds the self's historicity in the
temporalistic and caring character of consciousness.

The

continuous acts of appropriation by the present active pulse
of consciousness makes possible the accumulative and stable
character of the self.
sedimentation.

Here we have the self's

Care, the selective character of

consciousness makes possible the growing dynamic character of
the self through both its interpretation of its past and its
projection of its future.
spontaneity.

Here we have the self's

The self reveals itself in experience as

continuously involving both sedimentation and spontaneity.
It is a free force that always finds itself moving in a
particular direction which it can sustain or alter for it has
no destiny.

The Jamesian self conceived as a subjective-

Objective temporal process (I< ,ME) takes into account the
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experiential growth and decay as well as the stability that
is exhibited by the self.

The Spiritualists and the

Transcendentalists treat the self more or less as if it was a
finished product from the moment of its appearance while the
Behaviorists view it as a finished product once it is
thoroughly conditioned by its environment.

Each of the

alternative views fail to appreciate the fact that
"Experience is remolding us every moment ••• " 227 and that
"The problem with ••• man is less what act he shall now choose
to do, than what being he shall now resolve to

beco~e." 228

James on the other hand offers us a theory of the self that
recognizes the fact that the self is more a "becoming" than a
"block of being."
To use the term "becoming" to describe the self is to
emphasize the fact that the self is future orientated.

The

temporal character of the self is reflected not only in the
past horizon of consciousness but also in consciousness's
projection of a future horizon.

James refers to one's

projected future self as one's potential self.

Thus a person

identifies not only with one's past ME but also with one's
future ME.

He notes that with regard to each of the three

areas of the ME, material, social and spiritual, each of us
distinguishes between the present and actual and the future
and potential.
227
228

Also pointed out is the fact most of our

Ibid., I, p. 228.
Ibid., I, p. 277.
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attention and energy is directed towards the future ME for we
are beings who live forward.

To understand a particular

concrete self, it is not enough to know its past; one must
also know its dreams and aspirations, i.e. its projected
future ME.

Like Sartre, James believes each self is a being-

towards-some-ideal, a project in the making.

The future ME

that consciousness projects forms a genuine part of one's
present existence.

This future directed character of the

self was ignored by the Behaviorists who saw only the past
history of reinforcement and by the Spiritualists and
Transcendentalists who sought only permanence for the self.
Unlike these alternative theories the Jamesian theory
recognizes the fact that the self is more than a sedimentated
past, it is also an intended future.
the way," always "becoming."

A self is always "on

As Craig Eisendrath has pointed

out, the Jamesian self is primarily a "scheme of intention"
and what it is intending "is its own future.• 229
Like Merleau-Ponty, James recognized that the self was
not a "thing" nor a "transcendental subject" but rather that
which seemed to possess features of both for it manifested
itself as a "becoming," as if it lay between being and nonbeing.

Because of these unique features Merleau-Ponty has

called the self "time."

James does not refer to the self as

time, but he does claim that the "specious present" which is
229 craig Eisendrath, The Unifying Moment (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 128.
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the present pulse of subjectivity is the ground of all
experiential time for through it all three dimensions of time
are felt simultaneously.

James recognized, with Merleau-

Ponty, that time can not be derived from its parts.

All

three dimensions, past, present and future, must be felt
together in what James calls the specious present and MerleauPonty calls the field of presence.
way:

James describes it this

"In short, the practically cognized present is no

knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its
own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two
directions into time." 230

Both James and Merleau-Ponty,

who studied James extensively, recognized that the self is
not a substance but is rather a subjective-objective temporal
process.
To say that the self is historical means among other
things that it has a unique stream of past experiences that
are currently influencing its present activity including its
activity of experiencing.

Non-reproductive memory, i.e.

sedimentation, is always guiding our spontaneity and its
projection of a future.

James was fond of quoting

Kierkegaard's remark, "We live forward, we understand
backward." 231

Like Kierkegaard, James believed that the

self is stretched out through time.

Our sedimentated past is

presently affecting the meaning of everything in our present
230 rbid., I, p. 574.
231 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 121.

situation.
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our present experience of the world is a function

of our sedimentated interests, concepts, and habits of

perception.

We tend to ignore the influence of our

sedimentated past when we don't actively recall it and
reflect upon it, but the influence of past experiences is
continuous and growing and so the self is accumulative.

To

illustrate this point let us ponder how it was possible for
me to write the previous sentence.

The sentence would never

have been written had I not available to me in the present a
sedimentated vocabulary, grammar, rules of punctuation, a
specific knowledge regarding the self, an awareness of what I
wrote in the preceding sentence, and the already acquired
physical skill of writing itself.

Though I need all this

past to write the sentence, recollection is not required for
the self is so intrinsically historical that its past is
always already there in its present.

Each mental state is

for James " ••• a record in which the eye of Omniscience might
read all the frozen history of its owner." 23 2
It is hard to imagine this condensation of our past in
our lived present.
describe it.

We have no good models or metaphors to

James does, however, offer us the following:

"There is thus a sort of perspective projection of past
objects upon present consciousness, similar to that of wide
landscapes upon a camera-screen." 233
232 Pr~nc~p
. . 1 es, I , p. 228 .
233 Ibid., I, p. 593.

Though this enormous

216
accumulative character of experience is hard to conceive, it
is nevertheless clear that selfhood is inconceivable without
it.
Robert Ehman is in agreement with James here.

He

writes, "The nature of our past experiences now affects the
meaning that objects have for

USi

and unless we had already

learned certain concepts, acquired certain interests, and had
certain emotional reactions to things, we would not now
experience them in the manner that we do." 234
There is a special phenomenon which testifies to the
mutability of the self in a dramatic way.

The phenomenon

that I have in mind is that abnormality known as multiple
personalities.

Such cases of selfhood are unexplainable by

those theories of the self that stress permanence above all
else.

Cases of multiple personalities suggest that a single

body can on rare occasions enjoy the presence of more than
one self.

Assuming such strange happenings are possible and

the empirical evidence for it is growing stronger all the
time, it weakens the case for those theories that ignore the
dynamic character of the self. 235

First of all, two selves

per body suggest that the.self is not to be identified with
the physiological mass known as the body.

Second, two selves

per body suggest th•at the self is not to be identified with
234 Ehman, "William James and the Structure of the
Self,"££· cit., p. 268.
235 see R. D. Laing, The Divided Self and John Perry,
"Can the Self Divide?", Journal of Philosophy, (September, 1972).
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the soul for souls are by definition unsplitable and come one
to a body.

Third, two selves per body suggest that the self

is not to be identified with the pure ego for like the soul
it too is by definition unsplitable and comes one to a body.
The phenomenon of multiple selves favors none of the
traditional approaches to selfhood but instead suggests a
process view of the self such as James offers us.
Let us now consider how the Jamesian account could
handle the case of multiple selves.

It is possible in the

Jamesian theory for the field of the Me to hold uncompatible
objects.

Since in principle any object can enter the self

field by being cared for by consciousness, it is possible for
the contents of one's objective self to come into conflict.
The incompatibility of certain parts of my empirical ME may
lead to a splitting of the ME.

The normal tendency is toward

integrating and unifying the various parts of the "me", but
one can imagine situations where the reverse happens and a
fissure is created in one's objective self.

Imagine if you

will a woman who has conflicting aspirations, one towards
being a nun and another towards motherhood.

It is

conceivable that if both aspirations are nourished and grow
in equal strength that a split in the self may occur so that
multiple personalities would be the result.

Such an event

could be represented symbolically in the following way:
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I (

,ME

Normal
( 1)

~ME

I~\

I~ME

Conflict

Split Personality

(2)

(3)

Figure three shows how it is possible for a single body
to support more than one self.

Here each I( )ME represents a

self, i.e. a single unified subjective-objective process.
The split would be the result of the formation of conflicting
fields of care.
The above is not meant as a scientific solution to the
mystery of multiple personalities.

Our intention here is

only to show that the existence of such phenomena would not
invalidate the Jamesian self as it would those traditional
theories that exaggerate the permanence to be found in
selfhood and fail to appreciate the historical and dynamic
character of the self.
From what has been said so far it should be apparent
that the Jamesian theory does a better job of recognizing the
dynamic temporal character of the self when compared to any
of the traditional alternative views.

To the extent that it

better attends to this particular experiential fact of
selfhood, the Jamesian theory offers us additional evidence
of its superiority.

But before passing judgment in this

regard, we must consider certain major objections concerning
James' treatment of the self's temporality.

219

Although one of the merits of the Jamesian theory is
that it recognizes and takes into account the historical
character of the self, certain objections can be raised
regarding the principles it employs to account for the self's
unique temporal structure.

The main problem concerns the

theory of appropriation by pulses of consciousness.
Regarding his theory of appropriation, James is at times both
vague and inconsistent.

Here once again we must make an

effort to amend his confusing richness while constructing a
sound theory of the self based on James' insights and the
interrelationship of these insights and their necessary
implications.
In the chapter on the self, James describes the act of
appropriation by the present pulse of consciousness as not
being automatic but involving a judgment of identity based on
a feeling of warmth and intimacy.

Here he writes that each

new pulse of consciousness, "knows its own predecessor, and
finding it 'warm,' in the way we have described, greets it,
saying:

'Thou art mine, and part of the same self with

me.•n 236

But in the same chapter he also describes it as

being an automatic process.

"But the essence of the matter

to common-sense is that the past thoughts never were wild
cattle, they were always owned.

The Thought does not capture

them, but as soon as it comes into existence it finds them
already its own.n 237

Which position are we to regard as

236 P r~nc~p
'
' 1 es, I , p. 322 .
237 b'd
I~., I ' p . 321 .
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representing James' ultimate position regarding the act of
appropriation?
James' treatment of consciousness in his chapter on the
stream of thought which preceded his discussion of the self
suggest that the act of appropriation is automatic.

The

third trait of thought declares that consciousness is always
continuous.

If the act of appropriation was not automatic

but involved a judgment in which rejection was always
possible, then the third trait Qf thought is false.
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself
chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or
'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents
itself in the first instance. It is nothing
jointed1 it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the
metaphors by which it is most naturally described.
In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the
stream of though2~ of consciousness, or of
subjective life. 8

James treatment of our experience of time which came
after his discussion of the self also suggest that the act of
appropriation is automatic.

According to James' famous

doctrine of the "specious present" there is always a
retention of the past and a projection of the future in each
living present.

If the act of appropriation was not

automatic but involved a judgment in which rejection was
always possible, then James' doctrine of the specious present
is false.
238 Ib1'd., I
' P· 233 .
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These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of
new, are the germs of memory and expectation, the
retrospective and the prospective sense of time.
They give that continuity to conscious~3§s without
which it could not be called a stream.

The following words from Essays in Radical Empiricism
also seem to suggest the pre-reflective character of the act
of appropriation.
The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble
to philosophy is the co-conscious transition, so to
call it, by which one experience passes into another
when both belong to the same self. About the facts
there is no question. My experiences and your
experiences are 'with' each other in various
external ways but mine pass into mine, and yours
pass ina yours in a way in which yours and mine
never pass into each other •••• Personal histories are
processes of change in time, and the change i~folf
is one of the things immediately experienced.

The view that the act of appropriation is pre-reflective
and automatic is the position that is most compatible with
James' other theories concerning the self, consciousness, and
time.

It is therefore the position adopted in our Jamesian

theory of the self.
But though the accumulation of experience is an
automatic process, the ,sedimentation that is thus available
to us is still open to interpretation.

In other words, how

we wish to view our appropriate past is still up to us.
239 Ibid., I, pp. 571-572.
240 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 25.
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we must now look at another apparent inconsistency in
James theory of the act of appropriation.

James seems to

maintain at the same time that consciousness always reveals
itself as a stream and that consciousness consist of
continuous pulses of appropriating thought.
both these views?

How can he hold

Marcus Peter Ford thinks James is wrong in

adopting both views.

He writes, "He [James] realized that

according to his analysis the self must be a series of
thoughts, each in some manner really distinct from past
thoughts of the same self, and yet he could not
introspectively verify that individual thought exist •••
According to experience "thinking goes on."

There is a

stream of thoughts, not a chain." 241
James is really not being inconsistent here.

If new

pulses of thought are constantly appearing and appropriating
past pulses of thought, consciousness "becomes" a flowing
stream.

The stream exist from the standpoint of the present

pulse of appropriating thought.

Without pulses of

appropriating thought, consciousness could not manifest
itself as a stream and our experience would be of unrelated
impressions without even the feeling of succession.

In other

words, the stream of thought presupposes the existence of an
appropriating present pulse of consciousness.
Regarding the present pulse of thought and how its
appropriation makes possible the stream character of
241 Marcus Peter Ford, William James• Philosophy,
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), p. 22.
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consciousness, James writes:
It appropriates to itself, it is the actual focus of
accretion, the hook from which the chain of past
selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which
alone passes for real, and thus keeping the chain
from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook
itself will drop into the past with all it carries,
and then be treated as an object and appropriated by
a new Thought in the ~2w present which will serve as
living hook in turn. 2

Thus we see that it is the present pulse of consciousness
which serves as the anchor for the entire past stream which
would vanish but for its act of appropriation.

It is through

appropriation that consciousness becomes a stream and it is
the present pulse of consciousness that does the
appropriating.

Thus I see no problem with James maintaining

that there are continuous pulses of appropriating thought and
also that consciousness reveals itself as a stream.
There is another difficulty concerning James' theory of
appropriation which we must consider.
question it reads as follows:

In the form of a

"How can the present pulse of

consciousness which has no knowledge of itself and is as James
says 'the darkest in the whole series,' appropriate anything
to itself?"

This is one difficulty that James clearly

anticipated.

His solution to the problem is simple.

"Its

(the present pulse of thought) appropriations are therefore
less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its
242

.
. 1 es, I, p. 323 .
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present Object, the body •••• n 243
position once again in a footnote.

He states the same
"The sense of my bodily

existence, however, obscurely recognized as such, may then be
the absolute original of my conscious selfhood, the
fundamental perception that I am.

All appropriations may be

made to it, by a Thought not at the moment immediately
cognized by itself." 244
We have shown that the difficulties discussed above are
not disastrous for James' theory of appropriation.
Nevertheless, the act of appropriation remains for us a rather
obscure process. 245 This is as it should be for we lack
"knowledge about" the appropriating present pulse of
consciousness.
through it.

Subjectivity itself is only felt as we live

When we try to grasp the present appropriating

thought in reflection, we transform this pulse of subjectivity
into a mere object.

That the condition of all objectivity is

not subject to objectification should not surprise us.
is why it is "the darkest of the whole series."

This

James

acknowledges the obscurity of the act of appropriation.

He

writes, "The only point that is obscure is the act of
appropriation itself." 246

But James adds that this process

is much less obscure than the imagined soul or transcendental
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid., p. 324 n.
245 A. J. Ayer regards this as the "chief weakness" of
James' account of the self. 2£· cit., p. 278.
246 James, Principles, I, p. 323.
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ego which is not even felt and moreover it does the job that
they were invented to explain.
It is impossible to discover any verifiable features
in personal identity, which this sketch does not
contain, impossible to imagine how any transcedent
non-phenomenal sort of an Arch-Ego, were he there,
could shape matters to any other result, or be known
in time by any other fruit, then just this production
of a stream of consciousness each •section' of which
should know, and knowing, hug to itself and adopt,
all those that went before -- thus standing as the
representative of the entire past stream; and which
should similarly adopt the objects a12~'dy adopted by
any portion of this spiritual stream.

Unlike its traditional rivals, the Jamesian theory does
not try to disguise the intrinsic historical character of the
self.

James feels that it is time we recognize rather than

camouflage the "becoming" character of the self.

Experience

reveals the self as being not pure permanence but rather a
dynamic temporal process involving both sedimentation and
spontaneity.

This dynamic process is made possible through

continuous acts of appropriation by consciousness.

we have

shown that the major objections to the theory of appropriation
are without merit.

We have admitted that there is a certain

unavoidable obscurity regarding the act of appropriation by
the present pulse of subjectivity, but in so doing we have
noted that this obscurity is nothing compared to the mystery
surrounding the alternative explanations which posit
unexperiencable permanence.
247

Ibid., p. 322.

With regard to the experiential
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feature called temporality, the Jamesian theory of the self
'

must be regarded as more adequate than the traditional
alternative explanations.
The Jamesian theory not only does a better job of
recognizing the primordial role of care in selfhood, it is
also superior in its treatment of the undeniable temporal
character of the self.

We must now evaluate the Jamesian

theory in terms of another experiential feature of selfhood,
agency.

C.

AGENCY

Our acts, our turning places, where we seem to
ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the parts
of the world to which we are the closest, the parts
of which our knowledge is most intimate and
comple~~B
Why should we not take them at their facevalue?

At the heart of James' conception of the self is the
notion of creative effort.

Like P. F. Strawson, James sees

an intimate connection between the concept of self and the
notion of agency.

He felt that the traditional view of the

self as primarily owner of experiences, as an enduring
substance which somehow binds all experiences together is
mistaken.

Yes, the self is the knower, but it is this

because it is primarily an actor.

In contrasting various

features of selfhood with the self's creative effort James
writes, "But the effort seems to belong to an altogether
different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we
are, and those were but externals which we carry.n 24 9
The notion of agency is implicit in James' criteria for
determining the presence of mind.

His criteria is "the

pursuance of future ends and choice of means for their
attainment." 250

Agency is for James the indubitable

248 James, Pragmat1sm,
.
(1907 edition), pp. 287-288.
24 9Pr1nc1p
. . 1 es, II , p. 1181.
250 Ibid., I, p. 21.
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expression of the Self.
The self is not simply an object that appears in
reflection, and it is not simply a collection of personality
traits.

The self is an agent.

is action of a self.

All purposeful human action

To deny this is to make all such acts

impersonal and beyond praise or blame as the beating of one's
heart.

This "beyond dignity" approach is embraced by B. F.

Skinner and the Behaviorists, but there are others who do so
unwittingly when they neglect to emphasize the active
character of the self and treat it as if it were simply
another object in an anonymous field of experience. 251
James has steadfastly insisted that the self has causal
efficacy and is a real active and spontaneous force in the
world.

The self functions dynamically.

Its actions include

bodily self-seeking, social self-seeking, and spiritual
self-seeking, and each of these are acts of an actual self
motivated by a projected potential self.

The self is not a

shell created by the past acts of some non-personal agent.
The self is a social, historical, and caring agent.

Here the

commonsense view must prevail: the self is a doer as well as
a knower.

James would applaud the following observation of

Professor Macmurray, "The field of our enquiry, then, is the
251 unfortunately this view of the self as an object for

an active but impersonal consciousness is attributed to James
by Bruce Wilshire in his vJilliam James and Phenomer1ology: A
Study of "The Principles of Psychology." Wilshire ignores a
great deal of James in order to bring James into the
phenomenological camp of Husserl. What he ignores here is
this: for James consciousness is personal and the self is
the source of creative effort.

229
field of the personal, and we have to survey it from the
standpoint of action, which is the distinguishing
characteristic of the personal." 252
The myth of the non-active self arises when
consciousness is artificially separated from the self.
consciousness can be analyzed in this manner but this
analysis doesn't destroy the fact that consciousness is
always personalized consciousness and exist only as the
subjective dimension of that irreducible reality known as the
self.

It is always the self which acts in the world.

An

agent is never an impersonal transcendental consciousness nor
that purely physical mass called the body.

This becomes

clear once we realize that {1) consciousness can act upon its
environment only by means of the body, and (2) the body qua
body has no ends and thus no reason or motivation to act at
all without consciousness supplying ends.

An agent is always

an embodied consciousness in the world, which is to say an
agent is always a self.

It is the self which acts on its

environment guided by its own interests and the ends which it
has formulated for itself.

To those who deny self agency

James replies that there is no other kind of agency.

In

Aristotelian terms James believes our ideas function as final
causes.

Thus it is only within "the total fact of personal

activity" that "final and efficient causes coalesce." 253
It is at the core of the self that James locates "the
252 Jon Macmurray, Persons in Relation, London, Faber
and Faber Limited, 1961, p. 24.
253 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 107.
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source of effort and attention.• 254

Here is the place

•from which appear to emanate the fiats of the will."2SS
It is because consciousness is essentially teleological that
the self is an active and creative force in the world.

The

self's freedom lies in selecting those objects or parts of
objects to which it will attend.

"Each of us dichotomizes

the Kosmos in a different place.• 256

It is the interest

and selectivity of consciousness which forms one world of
meaning out of many possible worlds.
[consciousness] functions exclusively for the sake
of ends that do not exist at all in the world of
impressions we receive by way of our senses, but are
set up by our emotional and practical subjectivity
altogether. It is a transformer of the world of our
impressions into a totally different world, -- the
world of our conception; and the transformation is
effected in the interests of our vol~~~onal nature,
and for no other purpose whatsoever.

James would not deny that consciousness serves a
biological end.

He would deny, however, that its function is

merely that of contributing to survival.

For consciousness

no sooner comes than it creates its own ends, and these ends
greatly surpass that common concern for survival.

Moreover

it brings with it the power of determination and moral
254 Pr1nc1p
'
' 1 es, I , p. 285 .
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid., I, p. 278.
257 James, "Reflex Action as Theism" (1879) in The Will
to Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 94-95.
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effort, and thus making it possible for an ideal to
oecasional displace a concern for survival.
Gary Kessler has argued that it is this teleological
character of the Jamesian consciousness which kept James from
making the idealist turn of Husserl and led him to emphasize
the body and practical action which in turn led him to his
famous theory of pragmatism.

Kessler writes:

In Husserl the emphasis is on the meaning bestowing function of the transcendental ego. In
James the emphasis is placed on the freedom of the
individual interacting with the world. He argues
that the line between the activity of the mind as a
meaning - bestowing agent and its passivity as a
receptor of sense impressions should not be drawn
where ideas interact with experience, but rather
where the mind chooses to attend to certain
sensations and to ignore others. This signals an
important difference between James' notion of
intentionality and Husserl's, James sees
intentionality as primarily teleological. It
involves purpose, choice, goals, and interests. It
is only.a s~gst step from this position to
pragmat~sm.

For James, the effort of willing is the effort of our
impulsive, habitual and obsessional stream of consciousness.
It is the effort of clearing away all the conflicting ideas
and leaving one purpose solely in command.
is effort of attention.
controlled thought.

Volitional effort

Action is the result of consistent

"The essential achievement of the will,

in short, when it is most 'voluntary' is to attend to a
258

Kessler, p. 109.
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difficult object and hold it fast before the mind." 259

We

don't will ourselves to act; we will ourselves to focus our
thought, to attend to an idea, and this in turn leads to
physical action.

The self is the agent because through its

structure of interests it is the source of "selective
attention," i.e. the source of our ability to resolutely
sustain attention to an idea.
Ideas naturally tend to lead to action and bodily
movement.

When they don't, its because of the presence of

conflicting ideas.

Our freedom and our agency lies in the

power of the self to focus its attention on objects that may
at the moment be regarded as unpleasant and so difficult to
attend to.

James illustrates his point with the example of

the difficulty of getting out of a warm bed on a cold
morning. 260

usually in such situations, after pondering

the competing alternative courses of action open to us, we
simply find ourselves standing on the cold floor with our
thoughts occupied with the responsibilities of the day.

our

rising from our bed followed naturally from our attending to
this idea rather than the competing and highly tempting idea
of the warm bed.

Consciousness naturally tends to express

itself in bodily movement for the body is its way of being-inthe-world.
James theory of a selective and creative consciousness
259 Princip1es, II, p. 1166.
260 I b'd
1 . , I I, p. 1132 .
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must be understood not in a Kantian sense, but rather in
conjunction with the special role he attributes to the body.
The self is not a disembodied ego that constructs its world
through a priori categories.

The self is immersed in the

world and it is only because it is so situated that there
exist for it concrete possibilities for action.

The initial

basic structuring of the experienced world is grounded in the
body.
The world experienced (otherwise called the 'field
of consciousness') comes at all times with our body
as its centre, centre of vision, centre of action,
centre of interest. Where the body is here~ when
the body acts is 'now'~ what the body touches is
'this'~ all other things are 'there' and 'then' and
'that'. These words of emphasized position imply a
systematization of things with reference to a focus
of action 2 g£d interest which lies in the
body; ••••

James sees the body as the condition for practical
action.
talks.

It is the body which labors, points, gestures and
The self's agency in the world is always through

bodily action.

Even our knowing activities in this world are

not purely epistemological for our knowledge always is based
upon the needs and interests of the embodied self.
So far as 'thoughts' and 'feelings' can be active,
their activity terminates in the activity of the
body, and only through first arousing its activities
can they begin to change those of the rest of the
world. The body is the storm center, the origin of
co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all
261

James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 86 n.
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that experience-train. Everything circ~g~ around
it, and is felt from its point of view.

John Macmurray shares James' view regarding the need for
a philosophical recovery of the body.

He writes:

The effect of transferring the center of reference
to action, and at the same time its sufficient
justification, is that man recovers his body and
becomes personal. When he is conceived as an agent,
all his activities, including his reflective
activities, fall naturally into place in a
functional unity. Even his emotions, instead of
disturbance to the placidity of thought, take their
place as necessary motive which sustain his
activities, including his activity of thinking. 263

Actions not words reveal one's self to the other and to
oneself.

One finds out who he is only as he acts in the

world with others.

James points out that our self-feelings

in this world, "depends entirely on what we back ourselves to
be and do." 264

Deeds testify to my true field of care and

so it is in my actions that my self becomes manifest to the
other and to me.

James eloquently declares the primacy of

action in the following passage from his Principles of
Psychology:
No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may
possess, and no matter how good one's sentiments may
be, if one has not taken advantage of every concrete
opportunity to act one's character may remain
262

Ibid.

263

Macmurray,

££· cit.

p. 12.

264p r~nc~p
.
. 1 es, I , p. 296.
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entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good
intentions, hell is proverbially paved •••• Every time
a resolve or a fine glow of feeling evaporates
without bearing practical fruit is worse than a
chance lost: it works so as positively to hinder
future resolutions and emotions from taking the
normal path of discharge. There is no more
contemptible type of character than that of the
nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his
life in a weltering sea of sensibility an~ 5motion,
but who never does a manly concrete deed. 6

James views the self as an agent because experience
reveals our conscious states as positing ends and directing
our actions in terms of those ends.

James mainly argues for

his agent view of the self by comparing it to a parallelist
view of the self.

He gives a number of reasons for rejecting

the conscious automaton theory \·lhich treats consciousness as
a mere epiphenomenon.
earlier section.

We have discussed these reasons in an

The following constitute a summary of

James' reasons for believing that the self is a real agent in
the world:
experienced.

(1) The efficacy of consciousness is directly

'
(ala
Descartes.)

Here we have knowledge by

direct acquaintance of it rather than "knowledge about it."
(2) The efficacy of consciousness is the only way to account
for the enormous correlations between pleasure and beneficial
activity and between pain and detrimental activity.

(3) The

efficacy of consciousness is the only way to account for the
enormous correlation between the feeling of effort and nonautomatic responses.

(4) The emergence of novelty in the

world suggest that the self is a real agent.
265 Ibid., I, p. 129.

(5) Our
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inability to completely comprehend the relationship between
thought and matter is not adequate evidence of its nonexistence and so it is not a disproof of the self's agency.
(6) A theory of the self must not ignore how this notion
functions in one's daily life and the value it carries there
and consequences that flow from it.
None of the major traditional alternative approaches to
the self recognized agency as the distinguishing
characteristic of the self.

The Spiritualists, the

Transcendentalists and the Associationists regarded the self
as primarily the "knower" rather than as the "doer."
Although each of these philosophical camps recognized that
the self was an agent, they each constructed their theories
of the self as if it was primarily the spectator of the world
rather than a participant in the world.

Their general

neglect of the self's agency began when a meditative
Descartes turned his thoughts inward and pronounced, "I am a
thinking thing."

In giving primacy to the "I think" this

philosophical tradition lost sight of the "I do."
The Spiritualists recognized the efficacy of the self
and James says at one point that this is what makes the soul
theory more attractive than some of the other alternatives.
But though he finds it attractive, James rejects the notion
of a spiritual substance because it is inexperiencable and
superflous.

The soul theory also creates additional problems

regarding the self's agency in the world.

In viewing the
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self as primarily mind, i.e. essentially the knower to whom
the world appears, the self's agency in the physical world
became problematic.

The soul being an independent and

radically different kind of substance than that which
composes the physical world makes it very difficult to
develop an adequate account of the self's agency in the
world.

It is not a question of finding the point where these

two contrary substances interact as Descartes apparently
thought with his "pineal gland" hypothesis.

The problem is

that given the character of each substance (for example one
in space the other not) a point of interaction seems
impossible.

The Spiritualists recognize the agency of the

self, but they formulate it in such a way that its agency in
this world becomes problematic.
The Associationist's "brick-and-mortar" approach to
experience also made the discovery of an active self
impossible.

Hume analyzed the self in terms of a passive

succession of discrete ideas and impressions.

Despite some

excellent critical insights concerning the problem of
personal identity, Hume failed to give an adequate account of
the self.

His basic assumption that experience is atomistic

made it impossible for him to find the dynamic self that
James discovered.

Hume did not realize that in explaining

away self identity in terms of our "feigning" such a unity
into our discrete impressions, he was already assuming an "I"
which required a greater continuity and activity than was
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allowed by his account of the self.

Hume's disjointed self

could not account for the initiative and creative effort that
are called for by the "feigning."

James, however, recognized

creative effort as lying at the very core of the self and
because of this unlike Hume he gave the body a privileged
place in his account of the self.

Hume still under the

influence of the Spiritualist's tradition that he criticized,
regarded the problem of the self as being mainly the identity
of mind.

In so doing, he too put the emphasis on the "I

think" rather than the "I do."

Had Hume's analysis focused

upon the body, he might have realized that the self is not
that sought for single impression which remains always
identically the same, but is rather the source of purposeful
activity.
The agency character of the self is also not dealt with
adequately in the Transcendentalists' account.

James viewed

Kant as tacitly accepting Hume's "atomistic" theory of
experience and inventing his transcendental string to tie it
up.

James rejected the Kantian Ego not only because it

couldn't be found in the stream of experience but also
because it wasn't an active enough self.

James saw the

notion of activity as lying at the very core of our sense of
self, and he did not view this activity in the Kantian sense
as being primarily epistemological.

The transcendental ego

is in no position to do the work of a real self which James
sees as making judgments about how to act.
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The soul truly explains nothing: the 'synthesis':
which she performed, were simply taken ready-made,
and clapped on to her as expressions of her nature
taken after the fact: but at least she has some
semblance of nobility and outlook. She was called
active: might select: was responsible, and permanent
in her way. The Ego is simply nothing: as
ineff2~6ual and windy an abortion as Philosophy can
show.

James' message is clear:
is.

the self is where the action

The self is much more than the subject of experience: it

is also an agent in the experienced world.

The self is not

transcedent, but is rather situated in the world.

The self

conceived simply as "the knower," as a non-agent is a myth.
There is no "knower" that is not also "doer."

The self

exists only in its agency, and even its cognitive acts have
their ultimate basis in the self's agency in the livedworld.

"My thinking," says James, "is first and last and

always for the sake of doing, and I can only do one thing at
a time." 267
Where the Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and
Associationists recognize the self's agency but fail to account
for it and appreciate its importance, the Behaviorists refuse
to recognize it at all for it is precluded by their single
mechanistic explanation of behavior.

In their deterministic

closed universe there is no room for real agency for here all
action is actually re-action and nothing lies outside the
endless physical chain of cause and effect.
266
267

Ibid., I, p. 345.
Ibid., II, p. 960.

In clarifying
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James' position, we have already discussed the Behaviorist's
position with regard to the self's agency.

But the

Behaviorists raise a major problem concerning James's view of
the self as agent.

It is the same old problem that has

plagued all believers of an efficacious consciousness.

James

doesn't explain how consciousness and matter interact.

We

must now consider whether this is

disastrous for his theory

of an active self.
Although the six reasons stated on page 235 can be
viewed as accumulative evidence for believing that the self
is a real agent and consciousness is efficacious, they do not
tell us how consciousness is efficacious.

In other words,

James position is mainly defined in reference to the opposing
deterministic view of the self that sees consciousness as an
impotent epiphenomenon.

James was well aware of the lack of

a positive account of his interactionist view.

He felt,

however, that an understanding of this process lies beyond
the scope of human reason.

Before it, says James "our

reason can only avow its impotence.n 268
But James insist that man is more than a rational
spectator, that he is also an active participant in the
world.

He points out that rationality in its theoretical

form is itself a sentiment involving a passion for
simplification and distinguishing whose justification lies in
268 James, "The Feeling of Effort," Collected Essays
and Reviews, ed. by R. B. Rerry, New York: Longmans, Green
& Company, 1920, p. 216.

241
removing doubts concerning the consequences of future
actions.

James therefore believes that if reason alone can't

decide the issue of human freedom or an efficacious
consciousness this is no reason to deny it.

He notes that if

we deny the existence of all that we can not explain then the
scientific community is going to have to dispense with its
notion of physical causality for that too has not been
satisfactorily explained.
In the "Dilemma of Determinism" James shows why the
question of human freedom is insoluble from any strict
theoretical point of view.

Science which only deals with

facts can't speak with authority regarding the existence of
human freedom for the whole issue concerns the reality not of
facts but rather the reality of future possibilities.

Here

the theoretical point of view must be supplemented by the
practical point of view which is in fact the natural point of
view of the self as agent.

It is from this practical point

of view that James proclaims the self to be a free agent in
the following passage:
I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all
pretension to prove to you that the freedom of the
will is true. The most I hope is to induce some of
you to follow my own example in assuming it true,
and acting as if it were true. If it be true, it
seems to me that this is involved in the strict
logic of the case. Its truth ought not to be
forced willynilly down our indifferent throats. It
ought to be freely espoused by men who can equally
well turn their backs upon it. In other words, our
first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all
269 James, The Dilemma of Determinism ..
in Essays in
£Eagmatism, ed. by Alburey Castell, New York: Hafner
Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 37-38.
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inwar~ ~ropriety

free.

6

to be to affirm that we are

James believes that an adequate theory of the self will
take into account the entire range of human experiences which
include not merely cognitive acts and the sentiment of
rationality, but also actions based upon interests of a
practical, aesthetic, ethical or religious nature.

Only a

theory of the self as agent can welcome and embrace these
various interests of the whole man.

It is for this reason

that James believes we ought to reject those theories of the
self which deny or underplay the agency character of the
self.
After a crisis of spirit in his own life, James
struggled with the question of human freedom.

It is clear

from what he wrote in his diary on April 30, 1870 that this
issue of self agency was much more than an academic question
for James.

He writes,

My first act of free will shall be to believe in
free will •••• I will go a step further with my
will, not only act with it, but believe as well;
believe in my individual reality and creative
power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimistic
but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the
self-governing resistance of the ego to the world.
Life ~ha12 be built in) doing and suffering and
creat1ng. 70
270 James, The Letters of William James, edited by his

son Henry James, Vol. I, Boston:
1920, p. 148.

The Atlantic Monthly Press,
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James' view of the self as agent is not unlike Merleauponty's position.

James too sees the self as both the knower

and the doer as both situated in the world and yet surpassing
it in that it employs its imagination and agency to transform
and complete its world.

The self has the power to contribute

something to the completion of a universe as yet unfinished.
James remarks that the following consideration is forced upon
him at every turn:

"The knower is an actor and coefficient

of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers
the truth which he helps to create." 271
Our initial and basic understanding of the notion of
agency comes from our direct acquaintance with it in our own
personal existence.

Each of us experiences himself or

herself as a real agent.

James believes this is true even of

the preachers of determinism who "the moment they forget
their theoretic abstractions, live in their biographies as
much as any one else, and believe as naively that fact even
now is making, and that they themselves, by doing 'original
work' help to determine what the future shall become." 272
In this section we have shown that one of the great merits of
the Jamesian account of the self is that it fully recognizes
the fact that the self is primarily an agent in the world and
not a mere spectator of it.

With respect to this aspect of

selfhood we have shown that he gives a more adequate account
271 James, Collected Essays and Reviews,££· Clt.,
.
pp. 66-67.
272 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, New York:
Longmans, Green & Company, 1948, p. 152.
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than the Spiritualists, Associationists, and
Transcendentalists who treated the self as primarily the
knower of the world and the Behaviorists who treated the self
as just another passive thing in a totally determined world.
It was James• recognition of the essential roles played by
both a selective consciousness and a lived-body that led
James to a more adequate account of the agency character of
the self.

D.

SOCIALITY

The innermost of the emp~7~cal selves of a man is a
Self of the social sort.

Once the emphasis shifts from self as subject to self as
agent, it becomes clear that the self is not isolated but
rather exists in a dynamic intersubjective world in which
relations with other personal agents become a part of his
expanding and complex self-field.

The size and character of

one's social ME is a reflection of one's agency in the sharedlived-world.
James' claim that the innermost of the empirical selves
of a man is a self of the social sort, should not be viewed
as denial of his earlier position that the nuclear self is
"spiritual."

We must remember by "spiritual" James simply

means the active element in the self that which welcomes or
rejects, which turns out to be not the soul but rather an
embodied consciousness.

Thus in stating that the innermost

part of the objective self is social, James is simply
pointing out the fact that the active self, "that which
welcomes or rejects" must be specified not only materially
and spiritually but socially as well.

The self as agent

involves all three MEs for personal activity always takes
place within a community.
273

For James there is no self outside

.
. 1 es, I , p. 301 .
Pr1nc1p
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of "ethical republics.n 274
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Every self is a member of some

nsocius."
That our sense of self is based to a great extent upon
what we think others think of us, is something that James
fully recognized.

The Jamesian theory stresses the

tremendous significance that social images play in one's
sense of identity.

James realized that we become in varying

degrees the roles we adopt in our social relationships.
These roles (father, mother, lawyer, doctor, carpenter,
student, etc.) help to define us not merely to others but
also to ourselves.

Moreover, many of the character traits we

attribute to ourselves we learn from others.

If a person is

told enough times he is ugly, he will naturally come to
regard himself as ugly.

The other's image of me becomes a

part of my self-field because as Sartre points out, I am not
simply a being-for-itself, I am also a being-for-others.

For

James, this relation to the other is an essential and not
merely an accidental feature of my being.
If no one turned round when we entered, answered
when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every
person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were
non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent
despair would ere long well up in us, from which the
cruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for
these would make us feel that, however bad might be
our plight, we had not sunk t~ ~uch a depth as to be
unworthy of attention at all. 7
274 James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" in
The Will to Believe, pp. 141-162.
275 Pr1nc1p
. . 1 es, I , p. 281 .
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For James, the distinguishing characteristic of the self
iS agency and agency implies a community of agents.

We are

not mere spectators of existence we are participants.
denY this is to condemn oneself to solipsism.

To

As an agent

the self only exists in dynamic relation with the Other.

It

is in relation to the Other that the self is constituted.
The self exist in its intersubjective relationships.
The self is that which is always separate from the Other
but never isolated from the Other.

Each and every self is at

the same time separate from the other personal agents of his
society and related to them.

A self always involves an

essential relatedness to others.

Personal existence is

characterized by a "being-with."

The self is never a monad.

Every self has its social dimension.

James points out

that even the most humblest outcast tends to hope for
recognition from some "ideal tribunal."
unselfishness, in other words, can hardly

"Complete social
exist~

complete

social suicide hardly occurs to a man's mind." 276
is completely asocial.

No self

Even the religious hermit has his

ideal potential social self, that is, he cares about his
image in the mind of God, "the Great Companion." 277
James offers us the following description of the self in
its social mode:
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves
as there are individuals who recognize him and carry
276 Ibid., I, p. 302.
277 Ibid., I, p. 301.
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an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of
these his images is to wound him. But as the
individuals who carry the images fall naturally into
classes, we may practically say that he has as many
different social selves as there are distinct groups
of persons about whose opinion he cares. He
generally shows a different side of himself to each
of these groups •••• From this there results what
practically is a division of the man into several
selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as
where one is afraid to let one set of his
acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may
be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as
where one tender to his children is ster~ So the
soldiers or prisoners under his command. 7

Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the social
character of the self is given in the experience of being in
love.

In such a state it seems nothing else matters but

one's image in the mind of the beloved.

When one is rejected

by such a cherished person, a real eclipse of the self is
experienced.

Here is the void of unrequited love.

Those who

have had the experience recognize the truth of James' words.
"To his own consciousness he is not, so long as this
particular social self fails to get recognition ...... 27 9
The shrinkage and collapse of the self on such occasions
clearly suggest there is a large social dimension to the
self.

Who knows how many lovers have taken their own life

because they felt the largest part of their self had already
been destroyed?

If one denies the essential social character

of the self, how can one account for such extreme acts of the
self?
278 Ib;d., I
•
' pp. 281 - 282 .
279

Ibid.
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The social character of the self does not only manifest
itself in the behavior of one who is in love, it is evident
in the behavior of all selves.

The attitudes of others

towards us form such a large part of our empirical self field
that there is hardly a human action that does not suggest a
social self of some sort.

One powerful social self is what

is commonly called one's honor.

It is his image in the eyes

of his own "kind," and James notes that it is one of the most
powerful forces that we experience. 280

It is due to this

kind of social self that soldiers go bravely to their death,
firemen rush into burning buildings and scholars spend years
on books that will provide little or no financial reward.
The motivation for such acts may be numerous and varied, but
one of the things which is at stake in each of these cases is
this, " ••• his image in the eyes of his own 'set' which exalts
or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements
that may not be made of one in another walk of life." 281
To deny the intrinsic social character of the self is to
render as inexplicable a whole range of human behavior
similar to that described above.
The above should not be viewed as a denial of the
possibility of altruistic acts.

It is only a denial that

such acts have no reference to one's sense of self.
is not the consequence of bracketing one's own
280 Ibid., I, p. 283.
281 Ibid., I, p. 282.

self~

Altruism
it is
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rather the result of a self-field that has expanded to
include among its cherished objects the welfare of certain
others.

The difference between an altruist and an egoist is

the difference between a small and a large expansive selffield.

This fact is reflected in the language we use to

describe someone who acts in an egotistical fashion.
conspicuous ego involved behavior tends to illicit the remark
"you are being small."

Egotistical selves do in fact tend

to be tiny by comparison with altruistic selves.

As James

points out, all narrow people "intrench their Me" while
sympathetic people "proceed by the entirely opposite way of
expansion and inclusion."282
The traditional theories of the self generally neglected
the essential social character of the self because of their
obsession with the "I think" rather than the "I do."

The

egocentricity of modern philosophy is in part due to a
conception of the self as primarily subject.

In reflection

we suspend our basic relation to the world which is practical
and we isolate ourselves from our essential network of social
relations.

If the self is examined from this narrow and non-

primordial perspective, one is easily led to believe that the
self is primarily the subject of experience, and as such
isolated from the Other.
James' phenomenological approach to the self reveals
that the self is not an isolate at all but is rather
282 I b'd
~ .

,

I

,

p. 298.
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intrinsically social.

Those images in the minds of others

actually form a large part of my objective self.

It is these

images that make me bloom with pride or make me shrink in
shame~

it is not my "pure principle of subjectivity."

These

social images constitute a large part of my total empirical
selfhood.

James asks, "In what capacity is it that I claim

and demand a respectful greeting from you instead of this
expression of disdain?" 283

Do I make this claim as a bare

subject of experience? as a soul substance? as a
transcendental unity of apperception? as simply the owner of
experience?

James shows that it is not as a bare I that I

feel entitled to a respectful greeting but as a self with a
concrete social content.

A respectful greeting is expected

because this self "belongs to a certain family and
'set,•" 284 and "has certain powers, possessions, and public
functions, sensibilities, duties, and purposes, and merits
and deserts." 285

It is the particular social character of

my self that your disdain negates and contradicts.

It is the

social dimension of my self, my concrete historic ME, that
your disdain has pricked and collapsed.

One's social images

do not lie outside one's self but are a part of the self, and
this is why their good fortune causes pride and their
misfortune brings shame.
283 1b1'd., I
' p. 306 .
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
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The Spiritualists and the Transcendentalists were from
the start in no position to appreciate the enormous social
character of the self for their permanent fixtures, the soul
and the transcendental ego, precede society's influence.
Their selves are essentially isolates for whom being-withothers is a mere accidental feature of their existence.

They

do not realize that one's existence is not enclosed within
the boundaries of a monadic ego or substance.

The self

exists as a field that is always stretched out towards others
with their power of approval or disdain, and these attitudes
of others towards one are actually incorporated into one's
self-field to form a part of one's very being.

Unlike the

Spiritualists and Transcendentalists, James takes relations
seriously.

In his radical empiricism, relations are viewed

as real as the things they relate.
Because of this extraordinary phenomenological
faithfulness to experience, James was able to discover that
the self exists in the groups to which it belongs, and in the
relation of love and in relation to an Ideal Spectator which
for those who pray is the only adequate Socius. 286
The Associationists also did not recognize the enormous
social character of the self.

Like the Spiritualists and the

Transcendentalists, Burne viewed the self primarily in terms
of the mind.

When Burne's search for a permanent subject of

knowing proved fruitless, he concluded that the self was a
286 Ibid., I, p. 301.
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fiction.

If Burne's analysis had focused upon the body and

its actions, he would have had to notice the enormous social
character of the self.

In concentrating on the mind rather

than on the embodied consciousness the traditional approaches
lost sight of the social dimension of the self for minds are
private in a way bodies never are.

In order to grasp the

social character of the self, one must give full recognition
to the bodily existence of the self.
Unlike classical modern philosophy, today's behaviorists
have not neglected the enormous social character of the
self.

On the contrary, they view the self as entirely social

in nature.

According to B. F. Skinner the self is merely a

repertoire of behavior which is prescribed by a given set of
social contingencies.

Social Behaviorists like George Mead

believe a self arises in a social setting where an organism
takes the attitude of the other towards himself.

Mead and

his disciples maintain that a self arises when language, a
purely social invention, is turned inward and one begins to
have internal dialogues.

Unless the organism adopts the

attitudes of others toward himself through internalized
conversations, there is no development of a self.

For these

Behaviorists the social me is not one of three dimensions of
the empirical self, it is rather the only dimension.

For

them the social self is the only self.
The question

tha~

now arises is this:

Did Mead

exaggerate the social character of the self or did James not
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fully appreciate the total social nature of the self?

This

question leads us into a consideration of George Mead's
criticism of James.

Mead puts forth the Behaviorist

objection to the Jamesian self in the following passage from
his highly influencial work Mind Self and Society:
Cooley and James, it is true, endeavor to find the
basis of the self in reflexive affective
experiences, i.e. experiences involving "selffeeling;" but the theory that the nature of the self
is to be found in such experiences does not account
for the origin of the self, or of the self-feeling
which is supposed to characterize such experiences.
The individual need not take the attitudes of others
toward himself in these experiences, since these
experiences merely in themselves do not necessitate
his doing so, and unless he does so, he cannot
develop a self; and he will not do so in these
experiences unless his self has already originated
otherwise, namely, in the way we have been
describing. The essences of the self, as we have
said, is cognitive: it lies in the internalized
conversation of gestures which constitutes thinking,
or in terms of which thought or reflection proceeds.
And hence the origin and foundation ~7 the self,
like those of thinking, are social. 2

Because of a number of similarities in their positions
on the self, a comparison between James and Mead might be
helpful here.

It should also be noted that the similarities

are due to James' great influence on Mead.

James' distinction

between the "me" and the "I" was adopted by Mead in his
theory of the self.

His interpretation of these dimensions

of the self is, however, quite different from James.·

Mead

287 George Mea d , M'1n d S e 1f an d Soc1e
. t y, Ch'1cago,
University of Chicago, 1934, p. 174.
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agrees with James that the "I" never appears in consciousness
as an object and that what shows itself in introspection is
always the objective self, the ME.

He also agrees with James

that the "I" is the source of creativity and novelty as well
as that which unifies experience.

Despite these basic

agreements, the differences are great although they may at
first sight seem small.

In other words, they are seemingly

tiny differences with big consequences for selfhood.

While

for James the "I" is immanent in the stream of consciousness
as the present pulse of Thought and is felt and known by
direct acquaintance1 Mead regards the "I" as necessary for
consciousness but transcendent to it and forever
unexperienced.

While for James the "ME" is material,

spiritual, and social1 Mead regards the "ME" as entirely
social.
According to Mead, James underestimated the social
character of the self.

Mead insist that a self arises not as

a result of a caring consciousness but as a consequence of an
organism taking the attitude of the other towards himself.
Jamesian response to Mead might go as follows:

A

Why would an

organism bother itself about the attitude of the other toward
it, if it didn't already have a special caring attitude with
regard to its own existence, an attitude quite unlike any
which the other takes toward it?

In other words, the process

which Mead describes to account for the emergence of self
seems to require the more primordial process which James
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claimed was responsible for selfhood and which Mead rejects.
In the absence of care, it is difficult to see how the
approving or disapproving attitudes of my fellow human beings
could begin to touch me or be incorporated into my selffield.

Mead claims that the self first arises when language

is turned inward and one begins to have internal dialogues.
It is difficult to see how the self can be a consequence of
these internal dialogues, for unless the coversing parties
already exist there is not going to be any dialogue.

The

self can not be a consequence of an internal dialogue for in
such a dialogue it is the self conversing with itself.

Mead

seems to think that the self only exists in and through
reflection.

But the self is not the effect of introspection

but rather it is the self which reflects upon itself.
In the case of Mead the relationship between the I and
the ME is not at all clear.

He does not seem to realize that

the concrete full self is an irreducible whole involving both
these dimensions.

Although Mead speaks of the "I" and the

"ME" aspects of the self, nearly everything he says about the
self concerns only the "ME" aspect.

Mead admits that the "I"

is the active part of the self and a necessary phase of the
self, but he has little else to say about it because he
insists it transcends experience like the Kantian ego.

It is

not even clear if the "I" of Mead is really a free active
force or simply the place where different environmental
factors come together.

On this point he is rather ambiguous,
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but the general behavioristic thrust of his thought is toward
a reductionist approach to both mind and self which sees both
phenomena as a product of language which is the gift of one's
social environment.
James does not believe like Mead that Society is
responsible through language for the existence of mind and
self.

James also does not believe that all thinking goes on

in the form of language.

He points out that there is much

evidence that deaf mutes have thought processes that are not
dependent upon the language symbols of society.

James points

out that it is difficult to see how something so complex as
society and language could arise from an organism that lacked
both mind and self.

Although James feels that the whole

issue of origin here is like that dilemma concerning the
chicken and the egg, he tends to lean towards the view that
sees the social world as being due to the accumulated
influences of individuals of their examples, their
initiatives, and their decisions.2 88
The mutations of societies, then, from generation to
generation, are in the main due directly or
indirectly to the acts or the examples of
individuals whose genius was so adapted to the
receptivities of the moment, or whose accidental
position of authority was so critical that they
became ferments, initiators of movements, setters of
precedent or fashion, centers of corruption or
destroyers of other persons, whose gifts, had they
h~d fr:e P~g~, would have led ·society in another
d1rect1on.
288 James, "Great Men and Their Environment" in The Will
to Believe, pp. 163-189.
289

rbid., p. 170.
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The self of Mead tends to passively reflect the social
environment in which it is situated.

For Mead the

distinguishing characteristic of each self is not agency but
the individual perspective from which it receives and
reflects its environmental influences.

As in B. F. Skinner's

treatment of personhood, Mead's "I" is not a genuine source
of novelty: it is only the place where various old data comes
together in new ways.

James regards such a treatment as an

unjustifiable diminishment of the self.

James writes,

"Determinists, who deny it, [human freedom] who say that
individual men originate nothing, but merely transmit to the
future the whole push of the past cosmos of which they are so
small an expression, diminish man.

He is less admirable,
stripped of this creative principle." 290
Because of the wedge that Mead drives between the I and
the ME, and his subsequent neglect of the "I," the self is in
effect reduced to a static set of personality traits.

The

agency character of the self is lost sight of and the self
becomes merely something that an organism encounters in
reflection when he takes the attitude of the other towards
himself.

From a Jamesian perspective, Mead's view does an

injustice to our basic pre-reflective understanding of the
self as an agent.

Unlike James, Mead did not recognize the

privilege position of the body in selfhood.
290 James,

.
Pragmat1sm,
p.

59

.

Mead's ME is
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entirely social in character and the body which forms a part
of Mead's self is the body as seen from the outside and
judged by

others~

it is not the directly felt active body of

James.
James agrees with Mead that images we think others hold
of us form a large part of the objective self.

But unlike

Mead, James realizes that the self is much more than these
images and that these images only form a part of the self
because a caring consciousness cherishes them and as a result
identifies with them.

In other words, the social dimension

of the self is grounded in those other dimension of selfhood
that we have already discussed and labeled as care,
temporality and agency.

What Mead fails to realize is that

it is not as a mere organism that I take an interest in these
images that others have of me, but rather it is because I am
a caring, temporal_agent in the world that these social
images matter to me.

What James recognizes and the

Behaviorists do not is simply this:

A genuine social

relation already presupposes the existence of personal beings
for if the relation is social it takes the form of !-thou or
!-you but never it-it.
Unlike Mead, James recognized the futility of a
reductionist approach to the self.

To view the self as a

mere organism is to already lose sight of the meaning of
personal existence.
forth the same view:

In The Divided Self, R. D. Laing puts
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One's relationship to an organism is different from
one's relation to a person. One's description of
the other as organism is as different from one's
description of the other as person as the
description of side of vase is from profile of face;
similarly, one's theory of the other as organism is
remote from any theory of the other as person. One
acts towards an organism differently from the way
one acts towards a person. The science of persons
is the study of human beings that begins from a
relationship with the other as person and P2~!eeds
to an account of the other still as person.

The Jamesian self is social.

We have argued in this

section that with regard to this experiential feature of the
self, James gives a more adequate account of the self than
the Spiritualists, Transcendentalists and Associationsists
who tended to neglect the social character of the self, and a
more satisfying account than the Behaviorists who tended to
exaggerate the social nature of the self to the point of
neglecting its other experiential features.

In our

discussion of the Behaviorist position, we have shown that
the objection that the Jamesian self is not social enough is
without merit.

The Jamesian theory recognizes the fact that

the self is intrinsically a social being without betraying
that equally important truth, that the self is a caring,
historical, active being.
291 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self, p. 21.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF PART VII
In this section we have argued the merits of the
Jamesian theory of the self.

we have compared the Jamesian

theory with four different major alternative theories with
regard to their treatment of four separate experiential
features of selfhood.

These four experiencable traits of

selfhood are as follows:
the self.

(1) Care is an essential feature of

In other words, each and every self unlike any

"thing" exhibits an existence that is clearly "for-itself."
(2) Temporality is an essential feature of the self.

In

other words, each and every self unlike any "thing" exist
historically in such a manner that it is continuously
projecting a future in the present in light of its past.
(3) Agency is an essential feature of the self.

In other

words, each and every self unlike any "thing" initiates
action that is guided by its own ends.
essential feature of the self.

(4) Sociality is an

In other words, each and

every self unlike any "thing" is intrinsically related to the
Other in such a manner that its images in the minds of others
forms a part of its very being.
In this section we have argued that Jamesian theory of
the self avoids the narrow one sided approach of both
Behaviorism and classical modern philosophy.

James

recognized that the accounts of Descartes, Hume and Kant paid
too little attention to the non-cognitive dimension of the
261

262

self and that the Behaviorist's account paid too little
attention to the subjective dimension of the self, which
James regarded as one's concrete, temporal, telic, volitional
stream of consciousness.
The Jamesian theory of the self, unlike any of its
traditional rivals, is designed in such a way as to
accommodate all four of the above mentioned experiential
features of personal existence.

Furthermore, with its

emphasis upon care, it is able to account for the interrelationship of each of these aspects of selfhood.

It is

because the self is primarily a process of caring that it is
historical, social and active.

Without a caring

consciousness there is no projection of a future in light of
a past; there is only the given.

Without this temporality of

the subject, self agency is unthinkable for there could be no
motivation to act where the given is not contrasted with an
alternative future state of affairs.

Finally, without

caring, historical agents there can be no social realm
whatsoever.

Care, temporality, agency and sociality are each

attributes of personal existence and each entails the
presence of all the others.

The self can not be caring, or

historical, or social or active without being all these all
at once and in its entirety.

The self reveals itself in

experience not as a mere epistemological subject nor as a
mere physical organism but always as a caring, historical,
social agent.

The Jamesian account is the theory that is
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most faithful to how the self manifest itself in experience.
The self conceived as an irreducible subjectiveobjective process of care is a conception of the self as
intrinsically ambiguous.

The ambiguity of the self manifest

itself in a number of ways:

(1) It has both a subjective and

a objective dimension; (2) It is continuously remoulding
itself; (3) It includes a wide and changing field of
multifarious objects of care; and (4) It exists in its
complex social network of relationships.

As a result of

James' "reinstatement of the vague" here, we have a
conception of the self which is far from simple.

But if

ambiguity is what truly characterizes personal existence, it
is time that a theory of the self recognize this as one of
its positive features.

The Jamesian self is not neat and

tidy like a soul or an ego or a machine but neither is it
reductive of the scope and the richness of personal
existence.

SUMMARY

I began this study by noting that each of us knows the
meaning of the term "self" until we are asked to define it.
It should now be clear to all my readers why James regarded
an account of the self as "the most difficult of philosophic
tasks." 292

It is a philosophical problem of enormous scope

and difficulty for it lies at the point where a number of
metaphysical issues intersect.

This is why metaphysics

leaked into his psychology at every joint.

No one has dealt

with the compounding mysteries of the self more honestly and
more insightfully than William James.
Let us briefly review our major findings concerning the
Jamesian self.
process.

The self is a subjective-objective temporal

In other words, personal existence entails the

togetherness of a subjective dimension and an objective
dimension and their continuous interdependence.

Thus the

being of the self can by symbolized as follows:

I< )ME.

Here

the "I" indicates the present pulse of care, and the "ME"
stands for the entire field of objects (material, social, and
spiritual) that through care are selected and organized into
the objective self.

The arrows represent the continuous

mutual influence between these dimensions of the self.

The

self is this process as an irreducible whole, and it is only
within this process that there is found an "I" and a "ME."
292

'
' 1 es, I , p. 220 .
Pr1nc1p
264

265

I have labeled this Jamesian self Self-constitutingHistorical-Existence in order to emphasize the fact that
unlike any "thing" its existence involves both sedimentation
and spontaneity.

With this conception of the self, personal

existence is portrayed as primarily a process of caring.

The

primary object of care and thus the objective core of the
entire self-field is the body.

It is because it is an

embodied process of care that the self is essentially
temporal, social, and active.

In other words, the self is a

social and historical agent because it is the being that
cares.

All these essential features of the self are a

reflection of the fact that personal existence is
intrinsically ambiguous.

The ambiguity of selfhood is rooted

in the fact that the self is both a dialectic of subjectivity
and objectivity and a temporal synthesis of past, present,
and future.

The identity that this ambiguous being enjoys is

not the kind that is impervious to change, growth, or decay.
Rather the self has a "loosely constructed identity" based on
two principle conditions:

(1) the functional identity of the

pulses of consciousness and (2) the constituted identity of
the "ME," a constitution made possible through:

( 1) care,

(2) the sense of sameness, and (3) that always present and
relatively stable structure in experience known as the body.
The Jamesian account of the self that I have presented
here is not one that James fully developed or one that he
consistently and unambiguously professed throughout his long
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philosophical career.

It is, however, the only consistent

account of personal existence that can be constructed from
all his valuable but loosely organized insights concerning
consciousness and selfhood.

It is moreover the one account

that is most consistent with all his writings on the self and
the one that is implied in his critique of alternative
theories of the self.

Finally, the Jamesian view of the self

presented here is one that is consistent with his basic
philosophical doctrines.

Thus, I don't subscribe to the view

that James developed various unrelated and often conflicting
philosophical doctrines in his numerous books and essays.
His philosophical psychology, his radical empiricism, his
pragmatism, and his religious thought are all part of the
same philosophical vision, and at the heart of this vision is
the unwavering belief in a creative and historical self.
I have argued here that this Jamesian conception of the
self is one that leads to a wider, richer and more accurate
portrayal of personal existence than is found in the
traditional alternative views.

It is a theory of the self

that takes into account all the basic experiential facts of
personal existence.

Moreover, it performs this task without

appealing to any unverifiable principles and without
introducing any trans-empirical entities.
James broke with the tradition that glorified absolute
permanence.

Unlike the traditional treatments of the self,

James• account did not attempt to camouflage the intrinsic
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historical character of the self.

He recognized that the

flux and flow quality of the self was primordial and that the
self reveals itself as a dynamic temporal process involving
both sedimentation and spontaneity.
James also broke with the tradition that stressed the
theoretical side of the self in order to recover the
practical side of personal existence.

Instead of the

Cartes ian pronouncement "I think," James declared, "I do."
With this shift of emphasis from contemplation to action,
James recovered both the body and the lived-intersubjectiveworld.
With James the shift towards the "I do" occurs because
at the very core of his view of the self is the notion of
creative effort.
selfhood.

Agency is the undubitable sign of

He insist that the self is not just an

epistemological observer of the worldi it is an active
participant in a world as yet unfinished, and a world
moreover that welcomes his finishing touches.

For James, the

world and the self interpenetrate each other and thus, each
are co-determinants of reality.
A major consequence of James' position is that the
dignity of the self is reaffirmed.

The Jamesian conception

of the self does not thwart our natural aspirations for
freedom and purpose in life.

Nor does it deny us the

possibility of ethical progress.

James offers us a theory of

the self that allows for the transformation of both the
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individual and the community to which he belongs.

In short,

the Jamesian theory of the self makes " ••• a direct appeal to
all those powers of our nature which we hold in highest
esteem." 293
James wrote about the self like his life depended upon
it, and in a certain sense it did.

He was a man who for most

of his life suicide was a "living option."

His search for

the meaning of self was no mere passing academic inquiry.

On

the contrary, we find in James a man passionately and
relentlessly struggling throughout his life to find the
meaning of personal .existence.

we are all the beneficiaries

of this long and arduous search for the sense of self.
James was a firm believer that one's own individualized
experience must be the ultimate court of appeal in one's
search for truth.

When the truth that is being tracked down

concerns the self, this rule seems especially appropriate.
Thus, James is continually inviting his reader to consult his
own experience of selfhood in judging the soundness of his
portrayal of the self.
most convincing.

Here is where the reader finds James

Where the traditional theories of the self

seem to offer somewhat plausible accounts of the self of the
Other, James offers us a portrait of that self that each of
us is most familiar with i.e. one's very own self.

At least

293 James, "The Sentiment of Rationality" in The Will
to Believe, p. 89.
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that is this reader's reaction when reading James'
penetrating descriptions of personal existence such as the
following:
••• the knower is not simply a mirror floating with
no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an
order that he comes upon and finds simply existing.
The knower is an actor, and coefficient of the truth
on one side, whilst on the other he registers the
truth which he helps to create • • • • In other words,
there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a
spontaneity, and a vot2
It is in the game, and not
a mere looker-on; •••• 94

James has not said the last word on the nature of the
self.

In fact, he would deny the possibility of there ever

being a final accounting of the self.

He recognized that

there is always more to an issue than can be captured at one
time and from one perspective.

He believed in the attitude

called "a-ready-to-take-back-ness."
are to be regarded as provisional.

For James, all positions
Thus, I will not claim

that James has given us the final and definitive accounting
of the self.

No, he has simply made an enormous contribution

to our understanding of the self, a contribution that has yet
to be surpassed.
294 James, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as

Correspondence" in Collected Essays and Reviews, ed. Ralph
Barton Perry, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920,
pp. 67-68.
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